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Abstract
This thesis studies three channels through which elections and, ultimately, public
policy may be interrelated: new media, electoral systems and vote motivation.
The media has the fundamental role of providing political information to voters.
New media such as the Internet brought about an enormous shift in the availability of
political information during elections. Exploiting the timing and geographic variation
in the introduction of Internet in Brazil, in the first chapter, I show that municipalities
with higher Internet penetration voted more often in candidates who faced legal
restrictions for advertising in traditional media.
Electoral systems, in turn, have specific features that, in theory, may allow vot-
ers to select better politicians by providing more information about candidates and
other voters’ preferences. In the second chapter, using the discontinuous allocation
of single- and dual-ballot electoral rules across mayoral elections in Brazil, I compare
the quality of politicians fielded and elected in these systems. In general, dual-ballot
candidates from major parties are more politically experienced. This experience may
be translated into unobserved political skills that are required to deal with the more
competitive electoral process, that, by itself, punishes female candidates, to the extent
to which women’s participation in politics has been historically low. No differences
in performance are observed, except in the attraction of discretionary resources by
dual-ballot mayors eligible for reelection, but only in election years.
Finally, in the third chapter, I use a quasi-naturally generated group of voters
with differential political information and voting motivations to show that politicians
extract more rents in municipalities where they know a number of voters is not di-
rectly interested in public goods and do not have readily access to local sources of
information.
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“O que mais dói não é sofrer saudade
Do amor querido que se encontra ausente
Nem a lembrança que o coração sente
Dos belos sonhos da primeira idade.
Não é também a dura crueldade
Do falso amigo, quando engana a gente,
Nem os martírios de uma dor latente,
Quando a moléstia o nosso corpo invade.
O que mais dói e o peito nos oprime,
E nos revolta mais que o próprio crime,
Não é perder da posição um grau.
É ver os votos de um país inteiro,
Desde o praciano ao camponês roceiro,
Pra eleger um presidente mau.”
Patativa do Assaré
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Chapter 1
Internet availability, political
information, and voting: Evidence
from Brazil
1.1 Introduction
Recent literature in political economy has shown information plays an important
role in voters’ decisions. Objectively, voters need to be able to predict and evaluate
politicians’ performance in office, as well as what the best policy platforms would
be contingent to different states of the world. Most of this information is provided
exclusively by the media.
The Internet has considerably changed the supply of information available to
voters. It gives cheap access to a number of sources in a wide range of political
ideologies and preferences. It is also a new medium candidates can use for their
campaigns and fund raising. A small but growing literature has been interested
on the effects of these additional information sources on people’s voting decisions.
Specially because this information structure facilitates ideological segregation and the
simultaneous growth in the supply of online entertainment can affect the opportunity
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cost of news consumption and crowd out traditional media. This literature has focused
on the effects of Internet availability, as a source of political news, on turnout and
parties’ vote shares in parliamentary elections of established democracies.
In this paper, I investigate Internet effects on candidates’ outcomes in the 2010
Brazilian presidential election. I find that parties with restricted exposure on tra-
ditional media had systematically more votes in municipalities with higher Internet
availability.
The expansion of Internet availability in Brazil occurred unequally across munici-
palities in the late 2000s and the use of online tools in politics was intensified only in
2010, as a result of their successful application in Barack Obama’s political campaign
in 2008. This scenario allows me to exploit variation in Internet availability across
time and space, and assess the effects of the interaction between political advertise-
ment and news consumption. Brazil’s presidential elections have distinctive features
that create a unique set up able to remove some of the elements likely to reduce the
information effects Internet might have that cannot be captured in electoral systems
considered in previous research.
First, the elections follow a majority runoff system. First round elections are
less plagued by strategic considerations (Martinelli, 2002; Bouton, 2013; Kawai and
Watanabe, 2013); when voters know a second round is likely to occur, they may choose
to vote for their preferred candidate in the first round, instead of voting strategically.
This mechanism would allow voters to reveal preferences generated by information
collected online even if the preferred candidate had no chance of victory.
Second, campaign advertisement on TV and radio is restricted to the time made
available to candidates by the electoral authority, which is free of charge. Political
advertisement is aired simultaneously in all free-to-air channels such that a citizen
in a small city in the poor north of the country will watch the same advertisements
a citizen in a large city in the rich south does, conditional on watching TV. The
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same is true for radio stations.1 The appearance in newspapers is also restricted,
even though newspaper penetration is not significant in the country.2 This implies
that candidates cannot target advertisement, as it is normally done in the U.S. elec-
tions. That is, they are not free to adjust the use of traditional media according to
the level of Internet penetration municipalities have. The main advantage here is
that candidates’ adjustments in the use of traditional media3 would produce baseline
municipalities with low Internet penetration that are essentially different from those
with high penetration, in terms of intensity of treatment. This could potentially un-
derestimate online information effects.4 This set up guarantees the homogeneity of
what is produced in traditional media across municipalities.
Third, the country’s compulsory voting system has been producing historically
high turnout rates. In this scenario, voters are more likely to turn up to vote in-
dependently of the information they have. That is, it could be the case that online
information affects vote decision but not turnout, and in a voluntary voting system
we would not observe the choice of this type of voters.
My hypothesis is that the additional political information made available online
affected decisions of voters for whom Internet was available, especially with respect to
voting for candidates with low share of advertisement in traditional media. I conduct
the analysis at the candidate level, but considering the party label as a feature that
allows me to compare vote shares over time, so I can use a first differences approach.5
1Even though voters do not have access to the same radio stations everywhere, every radio station
has to air the same advertisements.
2I include controls for possible variations in information at the local level, such as mayor’s en-
dorsement and candidate’s visits to municipalities for public events.
3Indeed, Da Silveira and De Mello (2011) have shown TV advertising time affects election out-
comes.
4Targeted online advertisement is also possible, but there are reasons to believe in the homogene-
ity of the online political information available to all voters due to the fact that advertisement on the
Internet is also regulated, in the sense that paid advertisement is not allowed (such as advertising in
websites with high traffic or paying for Facebook or Google to display ads to certain types of voters,
etc.)
5As it will become clear, it is the party label that determines exposure on the media. And in the
models considered here I will use only the variation in the vote shares a candidate receives across
municipalities. I am not making comparisons across candidates.
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The measure of Internet availability is the number of Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
in the municipality.
To deal with the endogeneity of Internet availability – ISPs may serve highly
dense and wealthier municipalities first and therefore those with potentially different
political preferences – I use an instrumental variable approach. Similar to previous
literature, I exploit geographic components of the cost of deploying cables for the
Internet infrastructure across municipalities. To reduce costs, telecommunication
companies chose to deploy cables through existing power transmission lines, gas and
oil ducts, railways, and roads. I use distance from municipalities’ centroids to the main
routes of fiber optic cables (backbones) as an instrument for Internet availability in
a first differences model. The identifying assumption is that, conditional on a set
of demographics and infrastructure controls, distances only affected the change in
political outcomes through their effect on the costs of infrastructure deployment.
I use official election results at the municipality level to investigate the aggregate
effects of Internet availability, and a large and representative survey of the electorate
applied at the beginning and at the end of the three-month-long electoral campaign
to analyze the same effects at the individual level.
The aggregate data show a positive and large effect for small candidates, remark-
ably for the third-placed candidate, with a 6.3% increase (on average) in her votes
share. For the aggregate of other minor candidates, there was a 7.8% increase (on av-
erage). For the main candidates, the Internet effect is negative and significant for the
winner candidate, -0.5 percentage point (-25% on average), whereas for the runner-up
the effects are not statistically significant. I also find that Internet availability did
not affect turnout or the share of blank votes.6
Using the individual-level data, I find the same overall effects: positive and signifi-
cant for the third-placed candidate and negative and significant for the winner. These
6Brazil has an electronic voting system. The machine has a button which displays “blank”, so
voters can choose this option when they do not want to vote for any candidate.
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results are consistent with voters switching party lines as a result of the consumption
of online information. Especially those unhappy with the incumbent party.
To investigate about the validity of the instruments, I run a placebo experiment
where I regress the measure of Internet availability on the vote shares of the presi-
dential election in 2002, when online campaigning was barely used by candidates and
Internet was still not widely available to the population. The results suggest that
unobserved characteristics of municipalities that could be correlated with political
preferences are not driving our main results.
These results reinforce the importance of information in elections, in particular,
that obtained online, and presents new evidence that this influence is perhaps aug-
mented by online political campaigns. Moreover, they suggest that the lack of effects
found in previous literature for small candidates, attributed to the crowd out of more
informative media, may be partially due to attenuating factors stemming from the
institutional setting in which they have been evaluated.
The main result that small candidates benefit from the possibilities of advertise-
ment allowed by the Internet, prompts to more specific issues regarding the disclosure
of information in elections. As Castanheira (2003) and Piketty (2000) point out, the
possibility of voting for candidates that have no chance of winning increases the infor-
mational content of elections when voters signalize their policy positions to influence
mainstream parties. My results suggest that a possible substitution effect between
communicating policy preferences using online tools and via casting a vote may not
outweigh the effects of minor candidates reaching more voters through the Internet.
This paper contributes to the literature on media economics that identifies effects
of new media on political behavior (Gentzkow, 2006; Strömberg, 2004; Enikolopov,
Petrova and Zhuravskaya, 2011; DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007). It closely relates to
Miner (2015), Campante, Durante and Sobbrio (2014), and Falck, Gold and Heblich
(2014) that identify Internet effects on turnout and parties’ vote shares for parliamen-
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tary elections in Malaysia, Italy, and Germany, respectively. Unlike these studies, I
investigate these effects in presidential elections in a different institutional environ-
ment. The problem about measuring the effects of campaigns at the candidate level in
general is the selection bias in advertisement. For example, candidates might target
cities where they already have some advantage (or not). Looking at the data at a
more macro level, parties at parliamentary elections, takes averages across candidates
and reduces the bias. Here, I have the framework described above that accounts for
this fact. This level of analysis here allows for a more precise inference on the effects
of the interaction between online and oﬄine news content and advertisement.
The paper also adds to the literature on campaign advertisement and voting be-
havior (Da Silveira and De Mello, 2011; Levitt, 1994; Ansolabehere and Iyengar,
1994a,b). The variation in the use of different media created by the institutional
framework of these elections allows me to show advertisement has indeed an im-
portant effect on votes, and that the use of Internet as an advertising medium can
compensate for the lack of advertisement in traditional media, which might be an
important factor for candidates with small budgets, for example.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the background
of the Internet roll-out, the electoral system and the media market in Brazil. Section
3.2 describes the data and construction of variables. Section 1.4 discusses the iden-
tification strategy. Section 1.5 presents the main results. Section 1.6 concludes the
paper.
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1.2 Background Information
1.2.1 Electoral system
Brazil is a democratic federative republic with a presidential system. With ap-
proximately 136 million registered voters, it is one of the world’s biggest democracies.
General elections are held each four years: president and parliament members are
chosen at a national level, and governor and local parliament members at a state
level. These elections occur simultaneously, so each voter has five choices to make:
president, senator, federal deputy, governor and state deputy.
The country has a compulsory voting system where citizens between 18 and 70
years of age are required to vote by law. Voting is voluntary only for citizens aged 16 or
17, older than 70 years, and illiterates. Because of the compulsoriness, election dates
are national holidays to facilitate voters’ attendance. This requirement is enforced
by state agencies who will demand a proof of electoral participation in any type of
service citizens may need, such as the issuing of a passport or a driving license. Non-
attendees have the option of justifying their absence with the electoral authority and
use it as a proof of electoral participation. Though, this option is often as costly as
voting itself, since the voter has to visit a polling station or a local post office to do
the paperwork.
The average turnout in the last four presidential elections was about 80% of the
total population in voting age, with 77% in the presidential election of 2010. To
give a sense of magnitude, in the last four U.S. presidential elections, which follow a
voluntary voting system, the turnout rate was about 55% of the population in voting
age.
Presidential and gubernatorial elections follow a two-round majority system,
where a second round is held, after a month of the first round, with the two candi-
dates with the majority of votes, when none of them has more than 50% of the valid
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votes in the first round. Terms last four years and elected candidates can run for
re-election for one consecutive term.
Senate elections follow a first-past-the-post system. Terms last eight years and
each state has three representatives. The election for federal deputies follows a pro-
portional system, where 513 seats are allocated to the parties according to an open
list. The same is valid for state deputies, but the number of seats varies across states
according to the population size.
Candidates must be supported by a party or a coalition of parties. There are
about 29 parties in the country, but not all of them are relevant at a national level.
In fact, only about six of them are politically strong nationally. The party system is
extremely unstable and the majority of voters cannot recognize what their ideological
positions are (CSES, 2010). Politicians, in turn, change party identification very often
from election to election. This lack of identity makes political campaigns even more
relevant to voters’ decision making (Samuels, 2001).
As in the U.S., candidates, rather than parties, are responsible for raising and
spending the most of campaign funds. There are no a priori limits to campaign
spending. At the time of registration for the race, candidates declare their expected
spending and that becomes the limit of what they can spend.
Political parties are funded by public and private sources. Direct public funding is
allocated proportionally to the number of votes the party obtained in the last election
for the chamber of deputies. Companies can donate up to 2% of their gross revenue
on the previous year and ordinary people up to 10% of their total income on the
previous year. There are no limits when candidates spend their own resources in the
campaign.
Advertisement slots for political campaigns on TV and radio are free of charge
by law. They are allocated to each party according to an specific division rule: (i)
one-third of the total time available is proportionally divided among candidates; and
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(ii) two-thirds are proportional to the number of representatives each party has in
the chamber of deputies. Therefore, major parties get more time of advertisement in
the mass media.
Table 1.1 displays the distribution of the time each candidate had to broadcast
their adverts on TV and radio in the 2010 election. While the first ranked candidate
had 10 minutes of advertisement time on TV, minor candidates had only 55 seconds.
Additional time cannot be purchased so budget does not determine media exposure,
at least not in the short run.
The media coverage of candidates’ activities during the campaign period is fairly
regulated in terms of time devoted to each candidate on TV and radio’s news bulletins
or space in newspapers. Negative advertisement is forbidden and the law is fairly
enforced because of the monitoring parties themselves do against opponents.
The use of Internet for political campaigns in previous elections was restricted
(by law) to candidates’ and parties’ web pages. The Bill 12034 of 2009 relaxed
these restrictions allowing any citizen to make use of online tools to express political
positions, as long as they were not made anonymously or through paid advertisement.
Note that this condition made targeted advertisement in websites such as Facebook
or Google illegal. The electoral authority would take down any website breaking these
rules for a time determined on a case-by-case basis and charge a penalty from the
implicated candidate. Even though the magnitude of online content available imposes
restrictions in identifying and punishing such cases, the candidates themselves make
sure to sue opponents whenever they can identify irregularities. This mechanism hold
candidates accountable.
In fact, according to data from Google Transparency Report7, from June to De-
cember 2010 about 98 court orders (more than 12000 items) for defamation and 19 for
7The data can be found on this address http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/
removals/government/data/?hl=en. Google has been publishing in this website all worldwide
government requests for content removal since 2010.
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noncompliance with the electoral law (35 items) were filed to remove content across
all Google’s platforms. For comparison purposes, in 2011, a non-electoral year, there
were zero orders for noncompliance with the electoral law and 136 for defamation
(including only 683 items to be removed). This number went up in 2012 again, when
mayoral elections were held.
The Internet itself also provides tools that facilitate monitoring illegal practices.
For example, one information crowdsourcing website was used to collect reports from
all over the country about abuses of the electoral process.8 The website eventually
attracted attention of traditional media and was featured on Google’s dedicated page
to the elections of that year. The project received over 1200 repor ts of irregularities
during the electoral period.
1.2.2 Media and Elections
Free-to-Air (FTA) television is the most popular media in Brazil. In 2010, TV
penetration was about 97%, with FTA accounting for 80% of the audience. Pay-
TV has still a small market in the country, despite its growth in the last decade.
Approximately 73% of the population listens to FM radio stations and 31% AM
radio stations. From these, 10% using the Internet as a medium, and 18% a mobile.9
With respect to news consumption, survey data from 2010 shows that 45% of the
population preferred television as their main source of information, and 40% the
Internet. Newspapers penetration is one of the lowest in the world, with a rate of
0.04 newspapers for each 1000 inhabitants.10
8The website was called Eleitor 2010 and used the crowdsourcing online service Ushahidi to map
reports of irregularities coming from the population. The website is not available anymore, but
more details about it can be found in this address http://transparency.globalvoicesonline.
org/project/eleitor-2010.
9Data from Panorama da Comunicação e das Telecomincações no Brasil(Panorama of Commu-
nications and Telecommunications in Brazil), 2011-2012.
10Instituto Verificador de Circulação (IVC), in Panorama da Comunicação e das Telecomunicações
no Brasil (Panorama of Communications and Telecommunications in Brazil), 2011-2012.
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The news market in FTA television is dominated by one channel, TV Globo, which
registers the highest audiences among news bulletins in television. Nonetheless, it has
presented a decline in audiences since 2005, registering a minimum in 2010, as view-
ers migrate to other platforms and media outlets. According to IBOPE (Brazilian
Institute of Public Opinion and Statistics), between 2000 and 2009 the average per-
centage of television sets turned on during prime time fell from 66 to 59 percent, and
the five biggest broadcasters of the country lost, as a group, 4.3 percentage points
in the ratings. Most importantly, the growth of the Internet appears to be a pivotal
cause of the decline in FTA television. According to research carried out by F/Nazca,
a significant proportion of Brazilian Internet users say they have abandoned some
forms of traditional media and focused attention on the Internet.
Survey data from 2010 shows that 55% of Brazilian Internet users used Google
as the primary tool to search for news, and 51% social networks. Websites of tradi-
tional news outlets appeared in 5th place only. In June 2010, Brazil was the second
biggest market in the world in terms of Twitter penetration, with 20.5 percent of its
Internet users having an account, reaching the first position in the last month of the
presidential campaign in October 2010. The country at the time was also the largest
market for Google’s social network Orkut.
Candidates use television, radio, newspapers and Internet for campaigning. As
previously discussed, radio and TV time are determined by the electoral authority
based on the number of representatives a party has in the Lower Chamber. Each
presidential candidate produces television and radio “shows”, normally with new edi-
tions every week, that are aired everyday at lunch time and in evening prime time
across all free-to-air channels and radio stations. That is, a voter that has access to
FTA TV only, will have to watch political advertising during the three months of the
electoral campaign during this time.
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Television newscasts are enforced by law to allocate the same time of coverage of
daily activities to each of the main contestants in the election, normally the top three.
For the remaining candidates they just make rapid mentions about what the candidate
has done on that day. Apart from the advertisement in the media, candidates travel
to municipalities for rallies, inaugurations, etc.
A key aspect of the Internet’s role in elections may be the transformation of how
political campaigns are organized and conducted. Now, candidates make use of a wide
range of unprecedented tools, available online, to track and reach voters in a targeted
manner. In Brazil, this new possibility was particularly important for candidates
with negligible time of advertisement in traditional platforms. Anecdotal evidence
says that the third-placed candidate, Marina Silva, made “efficient use of the Internet
to receive donations, publicize her political agenda, and interact with voters. [She
also] made systematic use of social media, mainly through Twitter”(Mizukami, Reia
and Varon, 2013), and this was an important determinant of her final share of votes.
Each candidate had a website where voters could find details about policy propo-
sitions, biography, agenda, and so forth. All of them were also in social networks,
with a constant stream of posts, videos and chats. Nonetheless, small candidates were
the ones who tried to use online tools in the most creative ways. For example, the
debates on TV most of the time include only candidates that polls indicate are the
top three. In a similar debate held online, with just the top three, the forth-placed
candidate, Plinio Sampaio, independently held a parallel live section on Twitcam to
answer the questions asked in the debate as well as to comment on the other candi-
dates’ answers. This led to the candidate being featured on Twitter’s trending topics
on that day, above all the other candidates.
An important aspect of this competition for attention online was that small can-
didates would come up with innovative ways of using existing online platforms and
major parties’ candidates would follow up. In fact, most of the online services such
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as blogs, Wikipedia and Google search engine experienced peaks in terms of political
themes in the three months of presidential campaign. Because Google is the leading
search engine in the market, its volume of searches for a given topic serves as a good
snapshot of interests, concerns, and intentions of the population over time. Figure 1.6
displays weekly Web search volume on Google Trends for terms related to politics –
as defined by Google itself– in 2010, the election year, and in 2009-2011, non-election
years. The grey area highlights the period of electoral campaign. Interest in politics
was higher than in the previous and subsequent year of the election for the entire
campaign period, reaching a first peak in the week of the first round, and a second
peak in the runoff, going back to normal levels just after.
To further illustrate this online activity, Figure 1.1 breaks down the search volume
by candidate and displays search intensity by states. Darkest areas in the map depict
those states with the highest search volume in the period. As it can be seen, these
queries were fairly distributed across the country, with surprisingly blank areas in
states where campaigns are produced and concentrated – South and Southeastern re-
gions. This perhaps illustrates how important alternative sources of information were
to voters in relatively more peripheral areas in a country with continental dimensions
such as Brazil.
Since Obama’s 2008 campaign, where it was first used for political purposes,
the microblog Twitter has become one of the most important platforms for political
debate (Enli and Skogerbø, 2013; Petrova, Sen and Yildirim, n.d.). It is therefore
informative to verify the dynamics of Twitter usage across candidates. Figures 1.2
and 1.3 illustrate Twitter activity for the top four candidates during 2010. Except for
the second-placed candidate, Jose Serra, who created a Twitter account already in
2009, the other three candidates did so in 2010 only. The data are displayed from the
time they created their accounts until later after the elections. Perhaps as a result
of this earlier creation, PSDB’s candidate was the one with the highest number of
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followers throughout the year, but all candidates experienced increases in the count
of followers in the electoral period and became stagnant afterwards (Panel (a) of
Figure 1.2). Interestingly, the highest monthly growth was verified by the fourth-
placed candidate, Plinio de Arruda (PSOL), when the other candidates presented
similar rates (Panel (b) of Figure 1.2). He was exactly the candidate who posted
the most during election time (Figure 1.3), followed by the third-placed candidate,
Marina Silva (PV).
comScore data, which measure online audience at the user level through a tracking
software installed in the computers of a set of panelists, also show that the audience of
news websites and blogs were the highest on the months leading up to the election.11
This is anecdotally attributed to the use of the Internet for campaigning purposes.
It is then important in its own right that we understand how this availability of
information affected voters decisions. I claim that the Internet introduction might
have had both an information and a propaganda effect. Information because more
news sources were made available online and propaganda because candidates had a
supposedly cheaper and not as regulated medium to run campaigns. Minor candi-
dates, normally with very low budgets and negligible broadcast time on TV and radio,
were able to reach voters more easily. My hypothesis is that these two effects raised
the number of votes these candidates received.
1.3 Data
I estimate Internet effects on voting outcomes both at the aggregate level (munici-
pality) and individual level. The subsections below describe in detail the data sources
used and the construction of each relevant variable for the two levels of analysis.
11These data are available on http://www.slideshare.net/DigiTalks/
alex-banks-a-audincia-brasileira-em-2010?related=1.
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1.3.1 Aggregate-level data
To be able to estimate the effects of Internet on voting outcomes at the aggregate
level, I match voting information to a series of variables, aggregated at the munici-
pality level.
Election data
The election data are from Brazil’s federal electoral authority, the Tribunal Supe-
rior Eleitoral (TSE), for 2002, 2006, 2008 and 2010 elections. The data are provided
at the precinct level and includes candidates names, parties, and votes broken down
by those received by candidates, blanks, and invalid12. I aggregate them up to the
municipality level to match the level of the other variables considered. To construct
the shares for the candidates, I divide the number of votes received by the total
number of registered voters in the municipality.
The number of municipalities in the country goes from 5507 in 2000 to 5565 in
2010 as a result of the creation of new municipalities over the decade. I exclude from
the sample all the 119 municipalities involved in this process due to incompatibility
of data levels of aggregation or disaggregation. So I am left with 5446 municipalities
in the sample. The majority of these excluded municipalities (78%) are from the
south of the country, where the penetration of Internet is higher on average. Hence,
at most this would insert a downward bias in the Internet availability effects. The
final number of municipalities is 5445 though, because I loose Fernando de Noronha, a
small island in the northeast cost of the country for which I have missing observations.
12Invalid votes are those in which the voter types a number that does not correspond to any
candidate. It can be done either intentionally, to spoil the vote, or by mistake.
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Controls
I split the variables used as controls into four groups: controls, other media, local
support, and state dummies.
Controls. This group includes demographics relevant to election outcomes. I
use a 10% sample of the 201013 and 2000 censuses from the Instituto Brasileiro de
Geografia e Estatística - IBGE, about 20 million people, which is representative at
the municipality level. I use the frequency weights provided to expand this sample
to the whole population and then create the proportions for each variable used. All
variables extracted are conditional to people being in voting age, that is, above 15.
I use the following variables (in shares): unemployed, college education, females,
catholics, migrants, urban population, receives some social benefit from the govern-
ment, blacks, and age groups (16-17, 70-plus). I also extract the median household
monthly income (in terms of minimum wage) in each municipality. The vari-
ables GDP growth in 2009, and GDP per capita in 2006, and the (log of) population
density, at the municipality level, are also in this group. The data are also from IBGE.
I include density of roads, transmission and distribution lines and railways at the
municipality level to account for the development effects this pre-existing infrastruc-
ture might have entailed. They are calculated as the ratio between the length of
all roads/lines/railways within a municipality and its area. The data are for 2005
and provided by IBGE in shape files. I then used GIS software to calculate these
densities. The development index used, the Gini index, captures income inequality
and development levels. The data are from the United Nations Development Pro-
gram (UNDP) and Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA). I also use per
capita GDP and total population as controls with data also provided by IBGE. Other
13According to IBGE, census interviews were conducted from August 1st to October 30th, so they
overlap the electoral period. For variables that are potentially bad controls, I interpolate the values
for 2000 and 2010.
17
Media. These are controls for media availability other than the Internet. There are
dummies indicating whether the municipality had a local newspaper, magazine, ra-
dio station, local TV channels and the number of FTA TV channels they had access
to. This group also includes the share of voters with TV and radio sets at home,
extracted from Census data. The data on the structure of media outlets available
in each municipality comes from the Perfil dos Municípios Brasileiros 2006 - IBGE
survey.
Local Support. This group has to do with all candidate-level variables that might
affect election outcomes. First, I include an indicator for those cities visited by a given
candidate during the campaign. I denote this variable I(V isitedCandi), where i is
the candidate. It accounts for candidates’ direct activities at the municipality level.
To construct this variable, I use data from a magazine of national coverage, Veja, on
the agenda of the first three ranked candidates in the election. The magazine details
the place each candidate visited, by dates, and qualify their activities there. These
variables for the three candidates are highly correlated, indicating that the candidates
concentrate this type of campaign on the same places, on average. Because of that,
even tough we do not have the same data available for the other candidates, we suspect
that they have focused their activities on some of the other candidates’ visited cities,
such as capitals. The next level of controls include the share of voters who hold a
membership with a party that supports a given candidate. I assume these voters are
more likely to vote for these parties independently of the level of information they
have. I call this variable Members Candi. It is built using data from TSE, which
details (i) the name of voters affiliated to each party by municipality, (ii) when they
have registered with the party, and (iii) whether they have already left the party
or not. To construct the variable, I count the number of voters registered with a
party before 2010 and have not cancelled their membership. I then divide these
counts by the total number of voters affiliated to some party at the municipality.
18
Finally, in Mayor Candi (Gov. Candi), I include those municipalities with a mayor
(governor), at the 2010 legislature, that was of the same party of the presidential
candidate in question so as to control for the networks of support they can create
locally. These indicator variables were constructed using election results of the 2008
mayoral elections and 2006 gubernatorial elections, also provided by TSE.
State Dummies. Here I include (i) a dummy for each state, to control for state
fixed-effects; (ii) a dummy for capitals, where politicians normally concentrate their
campaigns; and (iii) a dummy for municipalities belonging to the Amazon region,
where both population density and Internet penetration are below the average.
1.3.2 Individual-level data
To evaluate whether the aggregate-level results can be replicated at the individual
level, and are not just a feature of ecological inference, I use individual-level data
from a survey applied both at the beginning, in July, and at the end, in September,
of the electoral campaign. Even though these data are representative at a national
level only, each survey has about ten thousand observations and asked voters about
their candidates’ choice and the sources of information they used to get informed
about the election. The data are from Datafolha, one of the main polling institutes
in Brazil.
July’s survey interviewed 10905 voters. It asked voters to rank in order of impor-
tance which type of media they used the most to get information about candidates
in the election. I create a variable that is 1 for those who ranked Internet as first
or second media used, and zero otherwise. From the same question I also create two
other variables indicating voters who ranked newspapers and talk with friends as their
first or second most preferred means to acquire electoral information.
As controls, I am able to use age, gender, university degree, income, employment
status, partisanship, and ownership of radio and television sets. The survey also asked
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whether voters had Internet access at home or not. With this information I create
the indicator variable Home internet. From the survey I also know the party to which
the respondent reported being closer to their political views.
September’s survey had a different set of respondents. It interviewed 11660 voters
nationwide. And, unfortunately, they did not respond to the same questions. But I
am able to construct the variable for Internet use from a slightly different question:
Which media have you been using to get information about the candidates running
for the national parliament? I assume these voters are also collecting information
about candidates running for other positions in the election from the same media.
Additionally, I construct a variable that accounts for voters’ level of interest in politics.
I use a question that asks whether the voter could remember for which candidate they
had voted for the lower chamber in the previous election. This is a concurrent election
and there is always a sizable number of candidates to choose from. So, if the voter
can remember the name of the candidate chosen in that election, it is an indication
of an interest in politics that is above average. The voters were prompted to tell the
name of the candidate, so lies are less likely to occur.
1.3.3 Measuring Internet availability
The 2010 Census asked a random sample of 10% of the population, approximately
20 million people, whether they had a computer and/or Internet access at home.
The sequence of questions in the survey was as follows: (i) Do you have a computer
at home? In case the person said yes, the interviewer would further ask (ii) Do you
have Internet access at home? That is, only people who had computers answered the
question about Internet. Table 1.2 displays descriptive statistics14 of the distribution
14The missing values found in the data correspond to the places where these questions were not
applied: hotels, accommodations, hospitals, military bases, etc. That is, any place that cannot be
characterized as a household.
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of computer and Internet availability using the data at the individual-level.15 Note
that those who had a computer at home but not Internet are 8 percent of the total
population.
A survey held in 2010 by Brazil’s Ministry of Communication16 asked voters the
place where they were able to use the Internet more often. The majority of them
reported having access to it at home, but 32% were able to connect from other places
such as cybercafes (18.4%) and workplace (7.5%). Hence the availability of Internet
at home is likely to be a lower bound for the actual Internet availability.
Comparing these data with other measures of Internet penetration further reveals
that the share of people who reported having both computer and Internet at home
in the census is a noisy measure of Internet availability. I arrive at this conclusion by
comparing the two measures with a third measure of Internet availability: the number
of Internet subscriptions in each municipality. The data are provided by Brazil’s
telecommunications authority (Anatel). Each year, Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
are required by law to report to the agency the number of subscriptions they have in
each municipality. I create a variable that measures the number of subscriptions per
10 people and check the correlation with the other measures (Table 1.4). While the
correlation between Internet and number of subscriptions is 0.37, this number goes
up to 0.75 with computer ownership. It is true that the measure of access points
also includes business addresses, but this is not necessarily a measurement error if we
consider the distribution of places where people do have Internet access. Importantly,
this measure also accounts for cybercafes, for example, an important medium used
by people in poorer areas.
Apart from that, its true that the measure of Internet take-up is more plagued by
endogeneity concerns: once the Internet service is available in a location, the consumer
15I expand the 10% sample using the probability weights that extends it to the entire population.
16 Hábitos de Informação e Formação de Opinião da População Brasileira.
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decides whether to contract the service or not. It is also much more difficult to find
an instrument that can identify compliance to the treatment at this level of decision.
So I follow the previous literature on media economics that has used availability
of treatment to identify LATE effects of the introduction of a new media on voter
behavior. Enikolopov, Petrova and Zhuravskaya (2011) have used signal availability
of a radio station to show that opposition parties benefited from voters’ access to a
source of information not controlled by the government. Gentzkow (2006) uses data
on availability of television in U.S. cities to show that television introduction had
a negative impact on voter turnout. DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) uses Fox News
availability to show there was a positive effect of its introduction on the vote shares of
Republicans in U.S. presidential elections. Specifically with respect to the Internet,
Campante, Durante and Sobbrio (2014) have used data on the availability of ADSL
technology, measured as the percentage of households with access to ADSL-based
services, and Falck, Gold and Heblich (2014) uses the number of households that
are covered by networks to show the effects of Internet in voter turnout and election
outcomes.
Based on these considerations, I use the number of ISPs in operation as my mea-
sure of Internet availability in a municipality.17 A measure of availability should
capture the number of households that could be served by an Internet connection
if they all could contract the service, instead of actual take up. Tables 1.3 and 1.4
displays correlations between Internet take-up and number of ISPs in levels and dif-
ferences between 2006 and 2010. As it can be seen, there is a high correlation between
these measures. Figure 1.5 presents graphically the estimations in Table 1.3’s columns
(2) and (3).
Due to the fact that telephone companies had the advantage of holding infras-
tructure that could be adapted to provide Internet, and that this market was already
17The number of ISPs as a measure of Internet availability has also been used by Jaber (2013).
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highly concentrated, the Internet market in Brazil is dominated by six large ISPs that
provide services to 78% of the market (Cetic, 2011). The largest number of ISPs fall
within the small and medium categories (99.7%) accounting for 22% of the market.
The important factor about the composition of this market is that small and medium
ISPs enter smaller municipalities, which are normally unattractive to large providers.
Therefore, using number of ISPs as a measure of Internet availability will probably
allocate more weights in the variation of the service in smaller cities, which are 98% of
all municipalities in Brazil. This is an important feature in favor of this measure, as
the large urban centers are the first to be served with Internet connectivity and have
greater exposure to all types of political campaign, factors that interact to produce
stronger endogeneity biases.
Even though the market for large ISPs does not seem to have competition, in
the market for smaller ISPs, competition over price and quality seem to be relevant
since their number present stead growth over time within municipalities. The delay
in auctioning the spectrum to be used for providing 3G technology, which involved
a different structure of costs, meant that this type of Internet access, that is used
especially in smartphones, was not available in the country until 2009. In fact, the
auction of this frequency band was held only in 2008. Internet provision through
cable technologies, are commercialized bundled with TV services, what makes it more
expensive. In addition, cable television pre-existing infrastructure serves only aﬄuent
areas of larger cities, restricting its reach. All in all, most of the Internet in Brazil
is provided through copper cables, the pre-existing telephone infrastructure already
available at the time of introduction of the Internet. A detailed discussion about
the composition about the representativeness of each type of different technologies
involved in the provision of the service is left for the Appendix 1.7.3.
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1.4 Empirical Framework
1.4.1 Identification Strategy
The cost of Internet deployment depend on geography, topological aspects such as
the type of terrain or altitude, and predicted demand. The higher the geographical
cost of installation, the higher the predicted demand for the service has to be, which
depends primarily on the population density of the area. There is a series of costs
involved in building the many layers of the Internet infrastructure. To understand
this structure of costs, we have to understand more broadly the composition of this
infrastructure.
The provision of Internet involves many network elements: international network
links, domestic backbones, backhauls, and access points. At the top of the chain is the
international network of links connecting countries via submarine cabling systems or
satellite, the international backbones. At the second level, each country has a domes-
tic system of fibre-optics (in some cases it can also use satellite or microwaves) that
takes over the signal from the submarine cable/satellite and distributes it across the
country; these are designated regional backbones, they aggregate and transport high
volumes of communications traffic. At the third level, there are the backhauls, the
switching and routing nodes. They are the intermediate links (also in fiber-optics) be-
tween the backbone, the core of the network, and the hierarchically smaller networks.
Finally, the access points constitute the so called “last mile” of the system, that is, the
links connecting final consumers to the rest of the network. The technology used at
this part of the network is normally xDSL, which requires telephone infrastructure,
or cable technology (bundled with the cable-TV infra-structure). Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) coordinate the distribution of the service to end users.
The company with the largest coverage in Brazil has 628,000 km of fiber backbone
networks all over the country. The market includes 14 different networks at national
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level, from which 95% is owned by the five largest telephone companies, even though
there were 2500 ISPs in the market in 2010.
Work on the foundations of the Internet infrastructure in Brazil started in the
90’s, with the construction of a network connecting universities, but only with the
privatization of the state-owned telecommunications system in the late 90’s and the
approval of regulatory measures that prepared the ground for a system of shared
infrastructure among companies, Internet services were extended to private users.
The privatization fostered competitiveness in the market, bringing down prices and
democratizing access to the technology. Since mid-2003, the Brazilian telecommuni-
cations market has enjoyed a period of remarkable growth, led by mobile telephone
and broadband. As a result, the number of households with internet access raised to
22 million (38%) in 2010, almost three times the numbers registered in 2000. A large
share of the low income population has been able to have access to the Internet due
to the combined effects of lowered prices of computers and Internet services and the
growth of households’ income that brought 30% of the population to the middle class
in the same period. Those who are still unable to afford computers or Internet access
can take advantage of thousands of cybercafes spread throughout the country, built
as a consequence of the information boom.
To meet the ever growing demand for Internet services, many companies have
built their own networks (backbones). The placement of fibre-optic routes are nor-
mally defined on the basis of pre-existing infrastructure. The electricity, gas and oil
transportation and distribution systems, that also follow paths defined by roads and
railways are normally used to host fibre-optic cables. In Brazil, the large part of the
infra-structure is composed by Optical Ground Wires (OPWG) hung on pylons that
are also used for electricity distribution (Knight, 2014).
According to specialized literature, the advantages of using overhead electricity
transmission and distribution lines to carry fibre-optic cables are related to the speed
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of installation, security in terms of the occurrence of cable damages, and the reduction
of deployment costs. Underground cable requires the digging of trenches, which in
turn need environmental permits. These requirements increase considerably the time
for installation. Attaching them to poles and pylons is considerably faster, and depend
less of favorable natural conditions for its execution. About security, rates of theft and
vandalism are lower, given the natural protection the proximity to power conductors
offers, and not subjected to damage by excavations.
The cost of aerial cables is higher, but the easy with which they can be deployed
and the savings from not building additional infrastructure, imply that the installation
of aerial cables have the total lowest cost, when compared to underground alternatives
Ostendorp and Gela (1997). Another advantage of the use of these lines is that their
path of distribution eventually reaches all the costumers of interest, enabling the
connection of the fiber to the broadband service providers’ infrastructure, usually the
telephone infrastructure, and also reaches the end user. Part of the fiber-optic routes
were also laid underground following the path of roads and railways. Deploying
underground cabling involves getting rights of way and negotiating leasing prices.
Deployer companies are normally liable for any damage or interference with existing
networks and have to preserve the integrity of the road during earthworks (Kelly and
Rossotto, 2012; Knight, 2014).
Even though most of the Brazilian cities are covered by telephone access, techni-
cally not all of them can have Internet access. The problem is related to the distance
of the consumer premises from the so called central office structure of the telephone
company. The further the consumer is from the premises, the higher is the atten-
uation the signal suffers, and the slower the connections are. With respect to the
quality of the call the problem can be corrected by inserting loading coals to the
cables to increase the inductance of the circuit. This is good for calls, but terrible
for the data transmission at the frequency used in the Internet data. And to correct
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this issue is not enough to have the cables replaced since the distance itself will be an
impeding factor. The provision of Internet to these areas depend on the availability
of fiber-optics signals nearby, via backhaul, or the construction of a new central office,
or the use of another type of technology, such as FTTH (Fiber to the home), but the
cost might be prohibitive. Since the backhaul installation costs are also high, this
infrastructure is not normally immediately available.
In Brazil, most of the infrastructure already built for electricity and gas trans-
portation was used to lay fiber-optics cables. The costs involved in this case were the
negotiations with power companies to allow the inclusion of the cables in their struc-
ture. Backhaul owner companies with bandwidth capacity can both operate on the
wholesale market, leasing bandwidth to Internet Service Providers (ISPs), or provide
the final service themselves.
I use the networks of backbones dataset built by Motta (2012) to calculate dis-
tances from the municipalities’ population center to the closest probable location of a
network of backbones. The rationale is that distances18 increase costs of deployment,
since the network will have longer paths to follow, there will be an increase in the
quantity and quality of cables used along with the amount of hosting infrastructure
that needs to be leased. These data display only the nodes of the network without
the details of the path of the fiber-optic cables along the nodes. Technically, the ISPs
can construct a backhaul from any section of these paths.
Using Geographic Information Systems (hereafter, GIS), I put together four layers
of networks that cover the whole area of the country: federal and state roads, railways,
gas and oil ducts, and transmission lines. These are geocoded data provided by IBGE.
I combine these layers into a unique layer that connects all the municipalities Motta
(2012)’s dataset reports to have a link between backbones’ nodes. Using this new
layer, I calculate the minimum distances from the geographic mean population centre
18Distances to backbones have also been used as instruments for Internet availability in Miner
(2015).
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of each municipality to the closest complete link between two cities, the probable
path of the backbones structure.
The assumption here is that the cheapest way of building this network would
be using the pre-existing infrastructure optimally. Proxy cost models of network
deployment in developing countries, see Benitez et al. (2000), point that the best way
of lowering Internet infrastructure costs is making use of overhead power line structure
used in electric power transmission and distribution of electrical energy, deployed
along roads, railways and pipelines networks for oil and gas transportation, to avoid
going into rain forests and/or digging trenches that would considerably increase the
time and costs of provision, because apart from the higher building costs they also
require environmental permits.
This identification strategy is in line with Duflo, Glennerster and Kremer (2007)
and Lipscomb, Mobarak and Barham (2013) where counterfactual costs are used as
instruments. The idea is to calculate what the cost of building infrastructure would
be if the providers were taking into consideration only factors that are not directly
related to the demand for the service, such as geographic distances, land gradient,
etc.
The necessary identification assumption here is that pre-existing infrastructure
does not have a long lasting effect on municipalities characteristics, conditional on a
set of sociodemographic controls. If we also consider that the position of pre-existing
infra-structure was partly based on geographic suitability – for example, it is easier
to build roads or deploy pylons in places with suitable terrain properties such as flat
slopes and good drainage – once we control for long lasting developmental effects
infrastructure might have, the variation left is plausibly exogenous.
As Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004) point out, geography may have a
direct effect on incomes through agricultural productivity and indirect effects through
many channels: distances from markets, quality of institutions and trade integration.
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Figure 1.4 displays the chain of these effects. For geographic instruments to be valid,
the potential biases coming from the effects indicated by arrows (3) and (5) need to
be accounted for. With respect to (3), it is unlikely that the instruments will have
a direct effect on political preferences other than via demographics. For example, it
could be the case that places with unfavorable geography are underserved in terms
of infrastructure and voters tend to dislike politics above average (It could as well be
the other way around). However, these aspects should be reasonably captured by the
characteristics of the place – such as development index, income, percentage of people
in urban areas, etc – and voting behavior in previous elections. Hence, it suffices to
show that I am able to control for the channel (5) of correlation.
Assuming my instrument has a long-lasting effect on development that in turn
affect political preferences systematically, it is necessary to find a control that can
further account for these effects up to the 2010 election. It seems reasonable that
the political preferences induced by the development effects coming from geography
would already show up in a previous election such that the vote shares obtained by
a given party in a previous election would be a good candidate as a control. Hence,
the key identification assumption here would be that conditional on previous election
outcomes, geographic instruments are plausibly exogenous. I use a first differences
model to account for that.
Another possible source of bias is the effect displayed by arrow (6), which may not
be accounted for by the control proposed above if there are significant developmental
effects resulting from Internet availability contemporaneous to the 2010 election. It
means that it could be the case that voters choose a candidate because they are
happier or there is economic growth, etc. To take this into consideration, I also apply
first-differences in some contemporaneous demographics: income, population size,
social benefits, and GDP. These variables already capture contemporaneous Internet
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effects on development/growth and, thus, account for voting with economic beliefs,
avoiding confoundedness with the direct Internet effects via information.
With these assumptions in place and conditional on the controls proposed above,
I can plausibly estimate the effect displayed by arrow (8).
1.4.2 Model Specification
My baseline model19 is given by:
yit = β0 + β2ISPit + ρi + δit+ εit (1.1)
where yit is the outcome of interest, namely the vote shares of each candidate/party
considered. I omit the index that characterizes candidate/party for simplicity, and
use i to index municipalities and t the time. ρi is the municipality fixed effect and
δit the municipality trend.
In order to control for the time invariant elements I use a first-differences specifi-
cation:
∆yit = β1 + β2∆ISPit + (δi + ∆εit) (1.2)
With just two periods of data, δi is not identified. I therefore approximate munic-
ipalities trends by using state trends. That is, δi = δ˜i + λis. The assumption is
that the municipality’s trend can be decomposed into two components: one that is
idiosyncratic to the municipality itself δ˜i, and one that is common across munici-
palities within the same state λis. Note that these municipalities are in the same
gubernatorial constituency. I also use robust standard errors.
19Since there is strategic interaction between the candidates, the errors across the equations for
each candidate are correlated. Estimating a SUR model is an option, but since the controls used
across equations are the same, there would not be any gains in efficiency by doing so.
30
I subsequently add controls at the baseline period,Xit−1, and time variant controls,
∆Wit, that include the four groups of controls described in Subsection 1.3.1: controls,
other media, local support, and state dummies.
∆yit = β1 + β2∆ISPit + β3Xit−1 + β4∆Wit + λis + (δ˜i + ∆εit) (1.3)
To account for unobservables that correlate both with ∆ISPit and the error term
(δ˜i + ∆εit), I use Zit, the distances, as an instrument in the following two-stages least
squares specification:
∆yit = β1 + β2∆ISPit + β3Xit−1 + β4∆Wis + λis + (δ˜i + ∆εist) (1.4)
∆ISPit = β˜1 + β˜3Xit−1 + β˜4∆Wit + η˜Zit + λ˜is + vist (1.5)
For example, the number of ISPs tend to be higher in densely populated areas.
Since densely populated areas tend to have a whole set of characteristics that correlate
with political preferences, they might be substantially different from others in many
unobservable time variant dimensions. The two-stages least squares specification
should account for that as long as my identification assumption holds.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Outcomes of Interest and Descriptive Statistics
I define vote shares of each candidate as outcomes of interest. In the 2010 election,
nine candidates were fielded under different party denominations. I will refer to
the candidates by their party acronym. I do so because when I introduce the first-
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differences model, I am comparing vote shares of the same party, but possibly different
candidates over time.
The two largest parties in the country, PSDB (center-right) and PT (center-left)
have been consistently fielding candidates in all presidential elections since the coun-
try’s redemocratization in 1989. In 2010, PSDB’s candidate finished the race in
second place and PT’s won the election. The details of the election can be found
on Table 1.5. The other parties, either support one of these two candidates, field a
candidate themselves or do not compete at the presidential level. PMDB is a large
(centre) party that has been conveniently supporting one of the candidates of the two
parties mentioned. The candidate of Partido Verde (Green Party), henceforth PV, a
relatively small party at that year, as measured by the number of seats in the lower
chamber, fielded a candidate who finished the first round in the third position.
I classify as small/minor candidates, candidates/parties ranked 4th to 9th in this
election and that had the same time of advertisement on television and radio. The
sum of the vote shares of these candidates is one of the outcomes of interest. As for
the three first ranked candidates, I refer to them as PT, PSDB and PV, respectively.
Descriptive statistics are displayed in Tables 1.6-1.9. In Table 1.6 it can be seen
that the average differences of vote shares between 2010 and 2006 for the PT is
greater for the bottom 50% municipalities, as per number of ISPs, whereas the vote
for the PSDB is about the same. When we look at the vote shares of PV and small
candidates, however, the reverse happens. The average differences in the vote shares
between 2010 and 2006 is greater in the top 50% municipalities, as per number of
ISPs.
This table also displays the distances to backbones, my instrument, which are
considerably greater, on average, for municipalities at the bottom 50%.
I also look at each parties’ aggregate vote shares for the Lower Chamber, to have
a sense of the voting patterns of each party in a setting where candidates’ quality is
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averaged and campaigns were not so focused on the Internet. The same pattern is
verified for the PT and PV, bottom 50% municipalities vote more often for PT and
top 50% municipalities vote more often for PV. On the other hand, PSDB received
on average more votes in the top 50% municipalities, whereas small candidates had
more votes in the bottom 50% municipalities, getting even a negative average in the
top 50% municipalities.
When we also take into account the demographics presented in Tables 1.7, these
results indicate that it is probably the case that municipalities with above median
number of ISPs are wealthier and have preferences for center-right political parties
and poor, underdeveloped areas have preferences for center-left, populist political
parties. However, the PV, as a center-left party would not have its vote shares
patterns explained by this theory. Table 1.9 that describes the variables indicating
local support for these parties seem to present a balance between the two groups of
municipalities. Moreover, this is also verified in the vote shares of PT, PSDB and PV
in the lower chamber, but for small parties, their average vote shares was negative as
compared to the previous election in the municipalities above the median number of
ISPs.
Interestingly, the voting patterns from the election in 2012 relative the ones in
1998 do not seem to differ much across the two groups, on average, at least for
PSDB, PT and small parties. Some difference is verified only when we look at the
PPS20, the party which came in third in that election, mostly favored by bottom 50%
municipalities.
Finally, municipalities’ access to traditional media, namely newspapers, maga-
zines, radio stations and TV channels that are produced locally, as well as the num-
ber of channels they have access to, are unbalanced towards the above median ISPs
group (see Table 1.8). This means that differential access to other types of media is
20Partido Popular Socialista(PPS). A party that was created in 1992 by former members of the
Brazilian communist party (Partido Comunista Brasileiro-PCB).
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a potential confounder for the Internet effects. Therefore, I include all these controls
for other media in my regressions.
In the next section, I try to account for the factors that may be inducing these
higher vote shares for PV and small parties in municipalities with higher Internet
availability: trends and heterogeneity.
1.5.2 Preliminary Analysis
In Table 1.10 I estimate the model in equation 1.3. The results indicate that vote
shares for PV and small parties were significantly larger in municipalities where the
penetration of Internet was higher. Interestingly, this increase seem to come from the
reduction in the PT’s share of votes.
Since PV and some of the small parties had no candidates running for the 2006
elections, I assume that the vote shares of similar parties in 2006 are a good proxy
for the vote shares these parties would have got, had they fielded candidates. For
example, I consider the vote shares that the third-placed party got in the previous
election as the baseline for PV votes.
Given that there is a large proportion of zeros in the sample of vote shares for
small candidates and because of the problems caused by assuming a linear conditional
mean for fractional dependent variables (see Papke and Wooldridge (1996) for details)
I also estimate non-linear models: Poisson21 and Probit (not reported). There is no
variation in the magnitude of the coefficients for Internet availability. The linear
estimates are visibly not different from the non-linear estimates, so I use only the
linear models for simplicity.
These results are robust to a number of controls, time-invariant unobservables
and state trends. However, there can be remaining factors that vary over time fol-
21A Poisson model in this context is equivalent to assuming the conditional mean to be E(y|x) =
exp(xβ) and estimating the parameters via non-linear least squares or GMM (see Windmeijer and
Silva (1997) for more details).
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lowing Internet availability growth that can confound our results. For example, if
municipalities where Internet growth was higher enjoyed better economic growth, as
a consequence or not of Internet penetration (see Czernich and Falck (2011) for the
effects of Internet on growth), and considering that this growth might involve many
dimensions that are not captured by GDP, voters could attribute these economic ef-
fects to the performance of the incumbent party (PT) in which case the coefficient of
the effect of Internet on the PT votes would be upward biased, that is, less negative.
And the coefficient for PV would probably be downward biased.
To tackle this sort of confounding mechanisms, I use an instrumental variables
approach. The identification assumption is that, distances to backbones, the system
of main network cables to which municipalities need to be connected in order to have
access to the Internet, are plausibly exogenous, conditional on a set of demographic
controls. Since the construction of backbones was facilitated in places where pre-
existing infrastructure was available, we can assume this path was pre-determined,
making sure to control for long lasting effects of infrastructure by adding socioeco-
nomic controls for the baseline year.
1.5.3 Two-Stage Least Squares
Now, I turn my attention to the IV regressions in Table 1.12. As discussed previ-
ously, the estimates are likely to be biased in OLS. We can find stories that rationalize
both downward and upward bias. For example, it could be the case that voters more
interested in politics self select into more densely populated areas in which the pro-
vision of Internet is higher because companies exploit economies of scale in these
areas. Conversely, these voters could experience a crowding out of information in
these places and/or the availability of more amenities could be incentives to devoting
less time to acquiring political information.
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My key assumption in the IV specification is that my instruments are conditionally
correlated with Internet availability, via increasing costs of provision and the existence
of complementary infrastructure, but not correlated with unobserved municipality
level characteristics that are related to voting behavior. The major concern about
the validity of the exclusion restriction is that even though the deployment of the
Internet cables network used pre-existing infrastructure, providers used only those
which were closer to more dense areas with favorable demographic characteristics for
high demand. So, I include the measures of infrastructure themselves to account for
this. I also use further controls such as urban population and income.
Table 1.11 shows the first-stage and reduced form regressions. In column (5) the
reduced form regression is displayed. As expected, log distances are significantly
negatively correlated with the change in the number of ISPs. Columns (1) through
(4) display the first-stage estimates for each of the parties or group of parties ana-
lyzed. Log distances correlates positively with PT and PSDB vote and negatively
with both PV and small parties. That is, it displays the same pattern of correlations
with Internet availability. The F-statistic for excluded instruments, 17.6, indicate log
distances are a relevant instrument, relieving concerns about finite sample bias in the
IV estimates.
The results of the IV regressions are presented in Tables 1.12 and 1.13. In Ta-
ble 1.12 I assume PVt−1 = 0, that is, I consider the PV vote shares in levels and
in 1.13 I assume PVt−1 = PPSt−1, that is, vote shares of the third-placed party in
2006 is a proxy for the vote shares PV would have received had it fielded a candi-
date. As in the OLS estimations, they show both minor and third-placed candidates
benefited from Internet availability. It also had a comparatively high and significant
negative effect on the vote shares of the pro-government candidate.
The coefficient for the PV vote in the more conservative specification, Table 1.13,
is approximately 0.5 percentage point, a 6.3% increase (on average) in her vote shares.
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For the aggregate of small candidates, there was a 7.8% increase (on average) in vote
shares. In absolute terms, one additional ISP increased their vote shares by about
0.04 percentage point.
For the main candidates, it is a different picture. While the Internet effect is
negative and significant for the winner, approximately -0.5 percentage point for each
additional ISP (-25% on average), they are not statistically significant for the runner-
up. Its relevant to point out here that my instrument does not predict well the PSDB
vote shares as it can be seen in Table 1.12, column (2), so I cannot test very precisely
the assumption that Internet availability affected the vote shares of this party.
The differences found in magnitudes of the coefficients in OLS and 2SLS call for
a discussion here. It is probably the case that OLS gives more weight to municipal-
ities where the rise of the so called class C in Brazil – a group of households that
transitioned from lower to middle class – and their endogenous demand for services
contributed significantly to the growth in Internet availability, as measured by the
number of ISPs. The victories of PT’s candidates in Brazil are anecdotally attributed
to the vote of this new middle class that related their better economic conditions to
the incumbent government. So the effect of Internet on vote shares would be upward
biased for the PT’s candidate and, by complementarity, downward biased for PV’s
and small candidates. The IV approach allocates more weights to the vote in those
municipalities in which Internet availability was more affected by technical factors
than lack of demand. As a result, PT’s vote share is more negative, that is, it is net
of the vote shares of those municipalities who had high Internet availability but were
already voting for PT due to other reasons. The effects on PV’s and small candidates’
votes follow by complementarity.
Previous literature has also found that OLS leads to downward bias in the effects
of Internet on election outcomes, and normally the size of this bias is very large,
even when there are many periods of time available for inference and cities’ trends
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are accounted for more precisely (see for example Campante, Durante and Sobbrio
(2013)). To further compare the results found with the previous literature, I calculate
persuasion rates as in DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010). Basically, in order to compare
these effects we need to take into account the differences in the size of the group for
which the treatment is applied and the intensity of treatment. That’s what this
measure tries to do. The upper bound of the persuasion rate (where I consider an
Internet penetration of 42%, a lower bound would consider full penetration.) for the
positive message is given by fu+ = 7.31−0.04∗0.81 ∗ 0.00530.42 ∗ 100 = 9.5% and for the negative
message fu− = −7.30.38∗0.81 ∗ 0.00470.42 ∗ 100 = −26.4%. This indicates that about 9.5% of the
treated voters were persuaded to vote for small parties and 26.4% to not vote for the
incumbent party (PT). In the literature, the range for positive measures goes from
4% to 20% and for negative messages from 14% to 65.4%.
Placebo Test
To provide evidence of the validity of the exclusion restriction assumed with re-
spect to the instrument, I conduct a placebo experiment using the outcomes of the
presidential elections of 2002 and 2006, a period where we do not expect Internet
availability in 2010 would play an important role, as most of the expansion in its use
in politics happened in the 2010 election only. I use the same specification of the
previous models and just plug in the equivalent outcomes for the previous elections.
This placebo test serve two purposes. First, to demonstrate that (log) distances
are not correlated with unaccounted confounding factors that would be also present
in the 2006 election and produce the same correlations we see in the 2010 election.
Second, even though there was already a reasonable level of Internet penetration in
2006, its effect in candidates’ vote shares was not significant, probably due to the fact
that candidates were not using it for political campaigns as intensely as they did in
2010.
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To be more conservative, I use the levels of vote shares for those parties who did
not field a candidate in 2002 (the coefficient is insignificant if we consider differences
as before too). Results are shown in Table 1.14. The variation in the number of
IPS cannot explain the variation in vote shares for PT, PSDB and small parties.
As for the third-placed party, the coefficient on ISPs is still significant at the 10%
level. So this significance could be an indication that either there is some remaining
endogeneity or that Internet had already some effect in 2006, even when not being
used as intensely for political campaigns, but as a source of news content only.
To test this hypothesis, I also conduct a placebo using the 2002 and 1998 elec-
tions’ outcomes. The results are presented in Table 1.15. Parties’ are displayed in
columns following their ranking in the election. Now, all the coefficients are statis-
tically insignificant, providing evidence in favor of the hypothesis that Internet had
some effect on the votes of the third-placed candidate in 2006.
To sum up, these results provide evidence that my specification might not account
for all the relevant covariates that relate to the voting outcomes, but the instruments
are plausibly valid and account for these omitted variables.
1.5.4 Turnout and Blank Votes
Now I turn my attention to the Internet effects on turnout and blank voting.
As previously described, voting is compulsory for citizens aged 18-70 years. For
16 and 17 year olds, and those above 70 years of age the vote is voluntary. This
compulsoriness seems to hold well, since turnout has been around 80% on average
in presidential elections. So we should expect that if anyone’s decision on whether
to vote or not is affected by Internet, it should especially be 16 and 17 year olds.
Table 1.16, Column(2), displays the results for overall turnout. It shows Internet
availability did not significantly affect aggregate turnout. The age composition of
the voting population across municipalities is very similar, especially for the group of
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16-17 year olds, according to the census of 2010. When I include the share of voters
of this age in the regression and interact with Internet availability, I still find no
statistically significant effects (not reported). This provides evidence that this group
of voters already had a high turnout. Probably due to the fact that their parents are
required to vote and by some imitation mechanism they also vote, even when they
are not required to do so.
In any case, these results indicate that the effects of Internet availability verified
on voting are likely to be coming from voters switching party lines, rather than from
a recomposition of the electorate that turns out to vote.
Table 1.16, Column(1), shows that Internet availability did not have any statisti-
cally significant impact on the variation of the share of blank votes across municipal-
ities. This is an important result to the extent that it indicates Internet availability
had no effect on what could potentially be protest voting. If it had any, it was through
voting for other candidates, perhaps small candidates. However, note that my iden-
tification strategy takes care of any fixed effects in protest voting, and the IV should
account for whatever factors that are correlated with both Internet availability and
the presence of voters that are likely to protest, that is independent of Internet use
itself. Thus, if those who vote for small candidates are doing so as a form of protest,
it was induced by the Internet.
1.5.5 Individual-Level Results
The analysis of individual-level data allows me to (i) evaluate whether the results
obtained at the aggregate level can be replicated at the individual level; (ii) infer
about voters’ usage of Internet for political purposes; and (iii) have an idea of what
voters’ level of information was before and after the period of political campaigns in
the media.
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Verifying the existence of similar effects at the individual level provides evidence
that the aggregate variation in voting shares across municipalities can be used for
inference about voting behavior. More than that, it provides evidence that the model
specification used is able to reasonably account for heterogeneity across municipalities.
Since I have used the concept of Internet availability at the aggregate level, which
is important only to the extent that it correlates to effective Internet usage, it is
important to evaluate the magnitude of this correlation at the individual level.
Having surveys conducted at the beginning and at the end of the campaign period
may suggest whether Internet effects are primarily driven by the information effects,
in which case it is likely we will find similar effects both before and after the cam-
paign period, or propaganda effects, a result of the campaigning conducted by the
candidates.
The period when candidates run their political campaigns goes from July to
September. I analyze the results of a survey conducted at the beginning of the
campaign period, July, and at the end, September. I start by the results of Septem-
ber’s survey. In this survey, voters were asked to rank a list of sources of political
information in a scale from “very important” to “unimportant” in terms of provid-
ing information about the candidates running for the Lower Chamber. From this
question I create the dummy “Internet”, that takes 1 for those who ranked Internet
as being either a “very important” or an “important” source. The assumption made
here is that voters who use the Internet to obtain information about candidates in the
Lower Chamber election, which occurs simultaneously with the presidential election,
are more likely to do the same for the presidential election. The other variables that
have to do with media are created in the same fashion.
I also add controls for affiliation with the three main parties (PT, PSDB, and PV),
and demographics: income, unemployment, employment in the public sector, age,
gender, education and income. The Linear Probability Model in Table 1.17 replicates
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the qualitative results found in the aggregate data for the three main parties: positive
for PV, negative for PT and insignificant for PSDB. On the other hand, the results for
small candidates are not significant. Perhaps because the effect for these candidates
is undetectable when looked at a sample of this size. Importantly, note that the
traditional media is relevant in explaining the likelihood of voting for PT only. A
different pattern is verified in the dummy variable that is one when the voter watches
the campaigns broadcast on TV or radio: it is significantly positive for PT vote shares
and significantly negative for PV vote shares.
As verified earlier in the aggregate results, OLS provides downward biased esti-
mates for the Internet coefficient. In order to use the same identification strategy
applied at the aggregate level analysis, I match voters’ municipality to the number
of existing ISPs to obtain the effects of Internet availability at the individual level.
The results of a linear probability model (LPM), where the outcome variable is a
dummy indicating whether a voter reports voting for a given party, is presented in
Table 1.18. With this specification, the coefficients are also qualitatively similar to
the ones obtained at the aggregate level, except for the significantly positive effects
for PSDB.
In Table 1.19 I report the results of a two-stages least squares model where I also
instrument Internet availability by distances. Essentially, each additional ISP in a
municipality implies that a voter is on average less likely to vote for the PT (-0.142)
and more likely to vote for the PV (0.028) and small parties (0.009).
When we look at the July’s survey, in which I also have information as of whether
voters had an Internet subscription at home, 13% of voters who reported using the
Internet for political purposes did not have Internet at home, whereas 49% of those
who had Internet at home used it for the acquisition of political information. This
sheds light on the degree of compliance to the treatment when we consider Internet
availability. It is important to highlight that at the time at which this survey was
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applied, July 7-23, 2010, campaigns on TV and radio had yet to start (August 17,
2010). The first debate was held only on August 5, 2010. This allows us to infer the
effects of Internet before the campaign started, that is, effects that are mostly free of
online advertisement by candidates.
Table 1.20 displays the IV-2SLS estimations for these data. As before, an addi-
tional ISP would lower the probability of voting for PT and increase the probability of
voting for PSDB. Different from September’s results, the coefficients here are smaller
and PSDB vote is significantly affected by Internet. Obviously, part of the differences
found here may be just given to sampling variation. But the differences in the results
are too large to be attributed just to this factor, as a two sample test reveals. PV’s
coefficient is also smaller and not significant. Another important fact is that, an ad-
ditional ISP also increases the probability of voting blank, for which the coefficient
has about the same magnitude. These results suggest that the political campaign
period in the media, especially online advertising, seem to have changed vote choices
in favor of PV’s and against PT and PSDB’s.
1.6 Conclusion
I analyze the effects of Internet availability on voting outcomes of the 2010 presi-
dential election in Brazil. Identification of causal effects is possible by exploiting the
variation in Internet availability across municipalities and using distances to the core
section of fiber-optic cables (backbones) that connects municipalities to the regional
and international network of cables that constitute the Internet. The identification as-
sumption is that conditional on economic and demographic variables, infrastructure
is a pre-determined variable and thus plausibly independent of unobserved factors
that jointly determine political preferences and Internet availability.
43
With aggregate data, I find that the effect of Internet availability was positive and
significant for both small parties and the third-placed party. One additional ISP in a
municipality increases the vote for small parties by 0.04 percentage point and the vote
for the third-placed party by 0.48 percentage point. This result is robust to a series
of important controls: demographics, geography, information availability, candidates’
support networks and candidates’ visits. In addition, a placebo experiment provides
evidence in favor of the exogeneity of the instrument used and that the Internet effect
was potentialized by online political campaigns.
Individual level data confirm the direction of these effects and provide evidence
of some of the mechanisms composing them. (1) Internet availability is a reasonable
proxy for Internet use. (2) The effects verified at the beginning of the campaign period
reveal an informational effect of Internet availability that is to a certain extent free
from interactions with online and oﬄine political campaign. (3) Though, a stronger
effect of Internet availability on vote shares is found at the end of the three-month-
long campaign period and (4) Voters who report Internet as an important source
of information on average have reduced their consumption of other more traditional
media.
Further checks show Internet had no causal effect on blank voting or turnout.
Hence, it is likely that the persuaded voters switched parties as a result of the addi-
tional information available (if we hold constant the flow of new voters).
A small theoretical literature has called attention to the importance of elections
that allow for voters to communicate their political preferences that is independent
of the choice of the candidate that they actually vote for (see Piketty (2000) and
Castanheira (2003)). That is, the vote in the first round in runoff elections would
allow for communication and in the second round the voter would actually vote for
the candidate who is closer to her preferences. Voters normally vote for small, more
extreme candidates to send a message to mainstream politicians about policy posi-
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tions. There are two effects that the Internet use would produce in this respect: (1)
the possibility of communication and mobilization voters themselves have through
social networks would reduce the necessity of communicating preferences though vot-
ing; and (2) more knowledge about small, more extreme candidates, would persuade
more voters to vote for them as a form of communicating. The results found here
point to a stronger second effect.
This suggests that the Internet, both as an additional source of information or
as a new advertising medium for candidates, had an important causal effect on the
votes of candidates that did not advertise as much in the traditional media. A play-
ing field that fostered competitiveness among candidates. The mechanisms through
which this might happen have important policy implications in terms of media related
regulatory policies for campaign advertisement, even though not providing clear-cut
recommendations.
Internet informational effects and low costs (at least a priori) might eliminate
barriers to entry for new candidates, but we cannot say much about voters’ implied
welfare effects. It could be the case that now candidates of higher quality are allowed
to run for office, or that voters can identify more easily the candidates that are
closer to their preferences. Alternatively, having more candidates running for office
and proportionally more information about them, both positive, negative or false,
may just reduce the signal to noise ratio on information and increase the amount of
effort required in order to make an informed choice. These are questions for further
consideration.
It is fair to consider that the campaigning effects are also bounded by the persua-
sive abilities of the candidates, as well as their valence and political platforms. Since
this was an election where this media was first used, there might exist some learning
curve and its effects fade with time. The dynamics of this type of effect will only be
verified as more data become available.
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1.7 Appendix
1.7.1 Figures
Figure 1.1: Web search volume (by state) of content in politics related to each can-
didate.
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(a) Search volume for content in pol-
itics related to PT’s candidate (Dilma
Roussef).
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(b) Web search volume for content in pol-
itics related to PSDB’s candidate (Jose
Serra).
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(c) Web search volume for content in pol-
itics related to PV’s candidate (Marina
Silva).
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(d) Web search volume for content in pol-
itics related to PSOL’s candidate (Plinio
de Arruda)
Note: Search volume by state of content in politics related to each candi-
date, as defined by Google itself. The state with the highest search volume
is given 100 and the search volume of the other states is a relative measure.
These data were obtained from public Google Trends data available online.
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Figure 1.2: Candidates’ Twitter activity: followers.
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(a) Candidates’ number of followers on Twitter over time.
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(b) Growth in the number of Candidates’ followers on Twitter over time.
Note: Data obtained from Twittercounter.com. The grey area defines the elec-
tion campaign period. PSDB’s candidate created a Twitter account before all the
other candidates on May 20, 2009. For the other candidates, data are presented
from the date they created an account.
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Figure 1.3: Candidates’ Twitter activity: tweets.
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Note: Data obtained from Twittercounter.com. The grey area defines the elec-
tion campaign period. PSDB’s candidate created a Twitter account before all the
other candidates on May 20, 2009. For the other candidates, data are presented
from the date they created an account.
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Figure 1.4: Identification Strategy.
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Source: Adapted from Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004).
Figure 1.5: Correlation between number of lines (per 10 inhabitants) and number of
ISPs.
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Figure 1.6: Web search volume for terms related to politics on Google Trends.
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Note: Web search volume for terms related to politics, as defined by Google itself.
The grey area defines the election campaign period. These data were obtained
from public Google Trends data available online.
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1.7.2 Tables
Table 1.1: Distribution of free broadcast time (in seconds) on TV and Radio in the
first round.
Ranking Time on FTA TV Time on Radio
1st 638 153
2nd 438 105
3rd 83 19
4th 61 14
5th 55 13
6th 55 13
7th 55 13
8th 55 13
9th 55 13
Note: Data provided by the electoral authority (TSE). Time displayed in seconds.
Table 1.2: Descriptive Statistics for computer ownership and Internet.
Fraction Total Population Population
No computer, no internet 0.58 76195260.22
Computer, no internet 0.08 10749440.22
Computer, internet 0.34 45260435.24
Total 1.00 1.32×10+08
Note: Data extracted from 2010 Census.
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Table 1.3: Correlation between ISPs and Internet Lines.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Voters Internet Subs. 2006 Subs. 2010 ∆ Subs.
ISPs 2010 0.337*** – 816.581*** –
[0.027] [304.392]
ISPs 2006 – 556.175** – –
[241.789]
∆ ISPs – – – 991.882***
[340.851]
Observations 5545 5545 5545 5545
R2 0.327 0.221 0.303 0.293
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in brackets.
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Region fixed effects are also added. The
measures of Internet used are respectively (1) the share of voters who reported having Internet
access at home in the Census 2010, (2) the number of Internet subscriptions reported by the ISPs
in the first term of 2007 to the Anatel, (3) the number of Internet subscriptions reported by the
ISPs in the third term of 2010 to the Anatel, and (4) the difference in the number of subscriptions
between 2010 and 2007.
Table 1.4: Correlations between measures of Internet.
Computer Internet #ISPs
Computer 1
Internet 0.501 1
# ISPs 0.752 0.372 1
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in brackets.
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Region fixed effects are also added. The
variable Computer is the share of voters who reported have Internet access at home, and Internet
is the share of voters who reported having both computer and Internet at home in the Census
2010.
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Table 1.5: Overall results of first and second round of the 2010 presidential election.
Note: The table displays number and percentage of votes for all candidates in the election in both
first and second rounds. It also displays details about turnout, blank and spoilt votes. Data are
provided by the Electoral Authority (TSE).
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Table 1.6: Descriptive statistics for vote shares.
Top 50% # ISPs Bottom 50% # ISPs
Mean Std.Dev. Obs Mean Std.Dev. Obs
Change in Vote Shares 2010-2006
∆ PT 0.66 7.56 2578 2.97 8.31 2600
∆ PSDB −7.17 5.81 2578 −7.33 6.31 2600
PV 9.68 5.42 2578 5.85 3.22 2600
∆ PV 6.54 4.26 2578 3.96 2.98 2600
∆ Small 0.61 0.31 2578 0.47 0.35 2600
Instruments
Distances (Km) 58.67 78.03 2578 97.47 114.49 2600
Log Distances 3.65 0.92 2578 4.20 0.86 2600
Change in Vote Shares 2010-2006 Parliament
∆ PT 0.83 18.59 2578 7.90 20.63 2600
∆ PSDB 6.52 17.06 2578 2.61 20.04 2600
∆ PV 7.47 6.68 2578 4.37 5.36 2600
∆ Small −0.01 1.50 2578 0.20 0.82 2600
Change in Vote Shares 2002-1998
∆ PSDB 15.30 7.14 2547 13.90 7.17 2599
∆ PT −15.20 7.94 2547 −12.41 9.79 2599
∆ PPS 1.74 4.59 2547 3.15 6.36 2599
∆ Small 0.04 0.07 2547 0.04 0.08 2599
Note: The table shows summary statistics for the groups of municipalities that are above and below
the median number of ISPs in 2010. The unit of observation is a municipality-year.
Table 1.7: Descriptive statistics for controls.
Top 50% # ISPs Bottom 50% # ISPs
Mean Std.Dev. Obs Mean Std.Dev. Obs
Catholics 0.36 0.07 2578 0.40 0.06 2600
College 0.03 0.02 2578 0.02 0.01 2600
Migrants 0.29 0.09 2578 0.32 0.09 2600
Black 0.06 0.04 2578 0.07 0.05 2600
Urban 0.45 0.03 2578 0.44 0.03 2600
Unemployment 0.09 0.04 2578 0.07 0.04 2600
Inequality 0.52 0.05 2578 0.52 0.06 2600
Median HH Income 6.64 0.39 2578 6.30 0.41 2600
GDPpc 2007 11.61 13.60 2578 6.79 5.74 2600
GDP 2009-2008 1.08 0.13 2578 1.09 0.16 2600
∆ Age 16-17 −0.01 0.00 2578 −0.01 0.00 2600
∆ Age 70+ 0.01 0.01 2578 0.01 0.01 2600
∆ Child Benefit 1.13 0.34 2578 1.14 0.33 2600
∆ Female 0.00 0.01 2578 0.00 0.01 2600
∆ Voters 0.07 0.07 2578 0.06 0.09 2600
Log Pop. Density 2006 4.37 1.36 2578 3.18 0.93 2600
Note: The table shows summary statistics for the groups of municipalities that are above and below
the median number of ISPs in 2010. The unit of observation is a municipality-year.
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Table 1.8: Descriptive statistics for other media.
Top 50% # ISPs Bottom 50% # ISPs
Mean Std.Dev. Obs Mean Std.Dev. Obs
TV 0.84 0.08 2578 0.74 0.13 2600
Radio 0.79 0.08 2578 0.73 0.13 2600
I(local newspapers) 0.61 0.49 2578 0.14 0.35 2600
I(local magazines) 0.15 0.36 2578 0.01 0.09 2600
I(Local Radio Station) 0.82 0.38 2578 0.53 0.50 2600
I(Local TV Channel) 0.17 0.38 2578 0.04 0.20 2600
# TV channels received 2.22 0.65 2578 1.78 0.68 2600
Note: The table shows summary statistics for the groups of municipalities that are above and below
the median number of ISPs in 2010. The unit of observation is a municipality-year. The variables
TV and Radio are the share of voters who reported having a TV or radio set at home in the
Census.
Table 1.9: Descriptive statistics for local support.
Top 50% # ISPs Bottom 50% # ISPs
Mean Std.Dev. Obs Mean Std.Dev. Obs
I(PT Visit) 0.04 0.65 2578 0.00 0.00 2600
I(PSDB Visit) 0.05 0.74 2578 0.00 0.02 2600
I(PV Visit) 0.04 0.78 2578 0.00 0.00 2600
∆ Partisans PT 0.21 0.09 2578 0.20 0.11 2600
∆ Partisans PSDB 0.18 0.08 2578 0.19 0.10 2600
∆ Partisans PV 0.01 0.02 2578 0.01 0.02 2600
∆ Partisans Small 0.02 0.03 2578 0.01 0.03 2600
I(Mayor PT) 0.33 0.47 2578 0.31 0.46 2600
I(Mayor PSDB) 0.23 0.42 2578 0.23 0.42 2600
I(Mayor PV) 0.02 0.12 2578 0.01 0.11 2600
Note: The table shows summary statistics for the groups of municipalities that are above and below
the median number of ISPs in 2010. The unit of observation is a municipality-year.
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Table 1.10: OLS with Controls.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ PT ∆ PSDB ∆ PV ∆ Small
∆ ISPs −0.050*** 0.009 0.058*** 0.003***
[0.012] [0.010] [0.008] [0.001]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Media Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local Support Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5445 5445 5445 5445
R2 0.568 0.407 0.695 0.552
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in brackets.
Table 1.11: Reduced Form and First-Stage.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ PT ∆ PSDB PV ∆ Small ∆ ISPs
Log Distances 0.239** 0.157* −0.397*** −0.021*** −0.508***
[0.107] [0.093] [0.054] [0.005] [0.121]
Constant −5.884 3.649 −14.141 −3.239***−232.230***
[9.888] [7.116] [10.053] [0.648] [34.640]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Media Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local Support Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5445 5445 5445 5445 5445
R2 0.567 0.407 0.694 0.552 0.604
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in brackets.
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Table 1.12: IV-2SLS using PVt−1 = 0.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ PT ∆ PSDB PV ∆ Small
∆ ISPs −0.470** −0.309 0.781*** 0.042***
[0.231] [0.197] [0.201] [0.013]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Media Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local Support Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5445 5445 5445 5445
R2 0.484 0.324 . 0.146
F − Exc.Inst. 17.620 17.620 17.620 17.620
mean 1.88 −7.25 7.70 0.54
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in brackets.
Note: In Column (3) the dependent variable is PV’s vote shares in 2010. The last line of the table
displays the sample mean of the differences in vote shares between 2010 and 2006.
Table 1.13: IV-2SLS using PVt−1 = PPSt−1.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ PT ∆ PSDB ∆ PV ∆ Small
∆ ISPs −0.470** −0.309 0.488*** 0.042***
[0.231] [0.197] [0.145] [0.013]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Media Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local Support Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5445 5445 5445 5445
R2 0.484 0.324 0.211 0.146
F − Exc.Inst. 17.620 17.620 17.620 17.620
mean 1.88 −7.25 7.70 0.54
Note: PPS was the party which came in third in the 2006 election. So I take it as a proxy for the
share of votes PV would have got if it had fielded a candidate in that election. The last line of
the table displays the sample mean of the differences in vote shares between 2010 and 2006. The
unit of observation is a municipality-year.
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Table 1.14: Period 2002-2006.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ PT ∆ PSDB PSOL-PSB Small
∆ ISPs −0.024 −0.027 0.015* 0.003
[0.018] [0.017] [0.009] [0.008]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Media Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local Support Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5445 5445 5445 5445
R2 0.794 0.632 0.656 0.672
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in brackets.
Note: In Column (3) the dependent variable is the vote shares of the third-placed candidate in
the 2006 election in levels. As in 2010, this party did not field a candidate in 2002. I do this to
guarantee that the results are not being driven by the fact that the third-placed candidate in 2002
is a bad proxy to take differences from. I do the same for small parties in Column (4). The unit
of observation is a municipality-year.
Table 1.15: Period 1998-2002.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ PSDB ∆ PT PPS Small
∆ ISPs 0.015 −0.018 0.012 0.004
[0.012] [0.016] [0.009] [0.008]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Media Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local Support Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5376 5376 5376 5376
R2 0.538 0.425 0.506 0.671
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in brackets.
Note: In Column (3) the dependent variable is the vote shares of the third-placed candidate in
the 2002 election in levels. As in 2010, this party did not field a candidate in 1998. I do this to
guarantee that the results are not being driven by the fact that the third-placed candidate in 1998
is a bad proxy to take differences from. I do the same for small parties in Column (4). The unit
of observation is a municipality-year.
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Table 1.16: Turnout and Blank Voting.
(1) (2)
∆ Blanks ∆ Turnout
∆ ISPs 0.001 0.000
[0.001] [0.005]
Controls Yes Yes
State Dummies Yes Yes
Other Media Yes Yes
Local Support Yes Yes
Observations 5445 5445
R2 0.249 0.652
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in brackets.
Note: The turnout share is measured as the number of voters who turned up to voter over the total
number of registered voters. The unit of observation is a municipality-year.
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Table 1.17: LPM for September’s Survey: Internet Use.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PT PSDB PV Small Blank
Internet −3.417*** 0.603 1.916*** −0.191 −0.608
[0.976] [0.896] [0.680] [0.243] [0.369]
Radio-tv-newspaper 2.377** −0.665 0.747 −0.032 −0.324
[1.059] [0.972] [0.739] [0.252] [0.445]
Word of mouth 3.124*** −0.509 0.866 0.103 −2.188***
[0.984] [0.906] [0.686] [0.233] [0.408]
Groups 1.211 −3.790*** −0.713 0.499* 0.430
[1.024] [0.936] [0.688] [0.258] [0.372]
Campaign tv-radio 3.863*** 1.176 −3.892*** −0.038 −1.465***
[1.027] [0.940] [0.715] [0.261] [0.388]
Part. Small −27.675*** −25.158*** 42.795*** 19.525*** −3.975*
[4.861] [3.307] [7.520] [6.211] [2.326]
Part. PV −30.540*** −19.907*** 61.431*** 0.183 −4.256***
[2.279] [2.226] [3.149] [0.930] [0.963]
Part. PSDB −29.029*** 45.438*** −5.159*** −0.484 −4.480***
[1.443] [1.787] [1.170] [0.407] [0.527]
Part. PT 32.259*** −15.997*** −5.436*** −0.571** −3.744***
[0.946] [0.793] [0.590] [0.223] [0.344]
Pub. sector job 0.251 −2.660 3.803*** 0.410 −0.343
[1.862] [1.671] [1.437] [0.508] [0.753]
Unemployed 2.794 −3.158 0.413 −0.909* 1.712
[3.188] [2.730] [2.059] [0.471] [1.572]
Age −0.082*** 0.086*** −0.060*** −0.006 −0.021**
[0.027] [0.025] [0.017] [0.007] [0.010]
Gender −6.535*** 1.996** 1.675*** −0.112 0.101
[0.867] [0.783] [0.578] [0.219] [0.369]
University degree −6.488*** −0.445 7.540*** −0.374 0.638
[1.553] [1.460] [1.389] [0.395] [0.764]
High income −9.907*** 6.666*** 4.206*** −0.213 2.361**
[1.726] [1.742] [1.510] [0.431] [0.955]
Constant 52.201*** 23.923*** 11.622*** 1.852*** 8.370***
[1.997] [1.805] [1.305] [0.516] [0.891]
Observations 11630 11630 11630 11630 11630
R2 0.148 0.104 0.091 0.012 0.017
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in brackets.
Note: These estimations use data from a nationally representative survey (DATAFOLHA, 2010a)
held in September 2010. The variable Internet is a dummy which takes value one for voters
who reported Internet as being their most important source of political information. The unit of
observation is a voter, that is, a person that is at least 16 years old.
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Table 1.18: LPM for September’s Survey: ∆ ISPs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PT PSDB PV Small Blank
∆ ISPs −0.059*** 0.029*** 0.017** 0.008*** 0.023***
[0.011] [0.010] [0.008] [0.003] [0.005]
Radio-tv-newspaper 2.048* −0.505 0.822 −0.067 −0.483
[1.045] [0.958] [0.732] [0.247] [0.440]
Word of mouth 2.495** −0.417 1.249* 0.112 −2.129***
[0.980] [0.904] [0.684] [0.231] [0.409]
Groups 0.336 −3.612*** −0.236 0.496* 0.432
[1.010] [0.922] [0.672] [0.260] [0.370]
Campaign tv-radio 2.749*** 1.384 −3.269*** −0.061 −1.523***
[1.002] [0.916] [0.688] [0.248] [0.379]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Infrastruture Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11660 11660 11660 11660 11660
R2 0.152 0.105 0.096 0.012 0.021
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in brackets.
Note: These estimations use data from a nationally representative survey (DATAFOLHA, 2010a)
held in September 2010. All the regressions include sociodemographic controls at the municipality
level. The unit of observation is a voter, that is, a person that is at least 16 years old.
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Table 1.19: LPM for September’s Survey: IV-2SLS.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PT PSDB PV Small Blank
∆ ISPs −0.142*** 0.063*** 0.028** 0.009** 0.040***
[0.019] [0.017] [0.013] [0.005] [0.008]
Radio-tv-newspaper 1.944* −0.462 0.836 −0.065 −0.462
[1.048] [0.958] [0.732] [0.247] [0.440]
Word of mouth 2.327** −0.348 1.271* 0.115 −2.095***
[0.983] [0.904] [0.683] [0.232] [0.409]
Groups 0.090 −3.511*** −0.204 0.501* 0.482
[1.013] [0.922] [0.674] [0.259] [0.371]
Campaign tv-radio 2.551** 1.466 −3.243*** −0.057 −1.482***
[1.004] [0.917] [0.688] [0.248] [0.379]
Socioeconomic Status Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Infrastructure Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11660 11660 11660 11660 11660
R2 0.148 0.104 0.096 0.012 0.019
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in brackets.
Note: These estimations use data from a nationally representative survey (DATAFOLHA, 2010a)
held in September 2010. All the regressions include sociodemographic controls at the municipality
level. The unit of observation is a voter, that is, a person that is at least 16 years old.
Table 1.20: LPM for July’s Survey: IV-2SLS.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PT PSDB PV Small Blank
∆ ISPs −0.092*** 0.108*** 0.005 0.002 0.047***
[0.021] [0.021] [0.014] [0.007] [0.010]
Radio 2.646** 2.194** −0.637 0.402 −2.441***
[1.042] [1.096] [0.705] [0.344] [0.569]
World of Mouth 1.271 4.267*** −1.980** 0.572 −3.107***
[1.329] [1.417] [0.878] [0.454] [0.710]
Newspaper 4.789*** 2.232** 0.465 0.123 −3.010***
[1.067] [1.127] [0.749] [0.352] [0.607]
TV 7.967*** 0.814 −0.976 −0.859** −3.652***
[1.141] [1.238] [0.822] [0.404] [0.717]
Socioeconomic Status Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Infrastructure Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10905 10905 10905 10905 10905
R2 0.110 0.055 0.041 0.004 0.021
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in brackets.
Note: These estimations use data from a nationally representative survey (DATAFOLHA, 2010b)
held in July 2010. All the regressions include sociodemographic controls at the municipality level.
The unit of observation is a voter, that is, a person that is at least 16 years old.
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1.7.3 Internet Technologies used in Brazil
There are many types of technologies through which households can be connected
to the Internet. These technologies offer a wide range of speeds. In Brazil at least
ten different types are currently in use. The telecommunications authority of Brazil
(Agência Nacional de Telecomunicações – Anatel) makes available termly data on the
number of Internet lines each ISP reported to have each year, by municipality. These
data are grouped into 11 categories:
(i) xDSL: The most used technology is the DSL (Digital Subscriber Line), that
stands for a group of different types of access that make use of the ready built
copper wire networking structure of landline telephones. In this group are in-
cluded the ADSL (Asymmetrical Digital Subscriber Line) technology, HDSL,
and VDSL. The Table 1.21 shows the distribution of the usage of the different
types of technologies across municipalities. The DSL is the most used one, since
the use of an existent structure lower the costs for companies providing the
service.
(ii) Satellite: This technology is used in those remote places where the other types of
technology are not available, since it does not depend on any built-in structure,
just a rooftop antenna to receive the satellite signal. The speed of the Internet
provided is on average lower than the one provided by the other types and its
quality varies with weather conditions or obstructions. High latency is an issue.
Direct-to-Home Services (DHT) satellite broadcasting is also included in this
category.
(iii) Cable: We aggregate Cable Modem and HFC (Hybrid fibre-coaxial) technologies
under this category. These are normally bundled with TV services, and make
use of the cable TV structure. The high bandwidth of the structure translates
into high speed Internet. It is the second most used type in Brazil.
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(iv) Radio waves: FWA (FixedWireless Access), spread spectrum, and MMDS (Mul-
tichannel Multipoint Distribution Service) are three different forms of wireless
broadband. They are commonly used in areas with low population density,
notably rural areas, where building the structure needed to provide the other
types of technology may not be economically viable. Some companies also offer
these services in urban areas, where cables have not been laid. TV services are
also provided using these technologies. The signals are sent via microwave fre-
quencies and received in the subscriber’s location by a rooftop antenna. These
types normally offer lower speeds and are subject to interruption by weather
conditions and physical barriers such as trees or hills.
(v) Fibre-optics: The type used in Brazil is the FTTH (Fiber to the home), where
the fiber reaches the boundary of the living space, such as a box on the outside
wall of a home. The other technologies in this group, the so called FTTx, are
classified according to the reach of the fibre-optic cabling that can vary from the
user’s house to a street cabinet, and this has quality implications. The capacity
of data transmission both of copper wires and fiber optics are both limited by
their extensions, with longer extensions meaning lower speeds, but the copper
wires are much more limited in this sense in many orders of magnitude.
(vi) PLC: Power-line communication (PLC) is the technology that uses the electric
power distribution system to carry data.
(vii) Others: The agency does not specify what are the other types of technologies
used in this category.
Table 1.21 displays quantiles of the distribution of the share of each technology
across municipalities. As it can be seen, the distributions of xDSL and Cable Modem,
those which my instruments are able to predict, dominate all the others.
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Table 1.21: Descriptive statistics of the type of access technologies used across mu-
nicipalities
Technology Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
xDSL 0.00 0.54 0.82 0.71 0.93 1
Cable Modem 0.00 0.11 0.32 0.32 0.47 0.90
Spread Spectrum 0.00 0.03 0.18 0.31 0.56 1
Others 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.16 0.19 1
SAT 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.14 0.08 1
Hybrid 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.13 1
DTH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.32
MMDS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.16
FWA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 1
FTTH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.33
PLC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: This is extracted from Anatel’s data on ISPs’ reported number of subscriptions by type of
technology. I calculate the share of subscriptions in each municipality for each type of technology
and report the quantiles of these shares.
Table 1.22 displays the average share of the number of lines available at munici-
palities by different bands of speed. The highest average shares are observed in the
speed band 2Mbps-34Mbps, which is classified as broadband. With this speed, users
are able to watch videos on YouTube, for example. For the lowest speeds in this
band, it might not be possible to stream films and TV programs though. It adds to
it the fact that actual connection speeds vary. Normally, they are below the one con-
tracted. Admittedly, the speed band 64Kbps–512Kbps gives the users limited access
to heavier content. In addition, coeteris paribus, a user with a 2Mbps speed would be
able to cover four times more content than a user with a 512Kbps speed would. That
is, patient people would be able to get the same content, but it would take longer.
On the other hand, according to data from HTTPArchive.com, the average site
is now 2.1 MB in size, two times larger than the average site in 201222, for example.
This is due to the fact that most websites are content rich, have many scripts running
22See http://money.cnn.com/2015/06/16/technology/web-slow-big/.
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in the background and make heavy use of images and interactivity plug-ins. It means
that five years ago, website content was more adapted to slower speeds than they are
today. These slower speeds would allow for normal browsing – email, blogs, Facebook,
Twitter – and websites normally have versions with compressed data that allow for
browsing in situations of lower bandwidth.
The bottom line is that the majority of people with Internet access in 2010 would
enjoy actual speeds of up to 34Mbps. A smaller number of them, especially those
served by the Cable Modem technology, would have actual speeds of up to 2Mbps.
At the least, these speeds would allow normal access to social networks in general
and news content. The limitations would be manifested only in the access to video
content23.
Table 1.22: Descriptive statistics of the speed of access technologies used across mu-
nicipalities
Technology 0Kbps–64Kbps 64Kbps–512Kbps 512Kbps–2Mbps 2Mbps–34Mbps >34Mbps
Cable Modem 0 0.39 0.28 0.47 0.01
xDSL 0 0 0 0.41 0.00
FWA 0 0 0 0.29 0.00
FTTH 0 0.01 0 0.08 0.05
Spread Spectrum 0 0 0 0.06 0.00
Hybrid 0 0 0 0.05 0.01
SAT 0 0 0 0.02 0.09
Others 0 0 0 0.01 0.07
PLC 0 0 0.00 0.00 0
DTH 0.02 0.00 0.07 0 0
MMDS 0 0.12 0.00 0 0
Note: This is extracted from Anatel’s data on ISPs’ reported number of subscriptions by type of
technology and speed. I calculate the share of subscriptions in each municipality for each type of
technology and speed, and report the average share for each speed band.
23For example, to watch a video on YouTube without pauses it is required a bandwidth of at least
2Mbps.
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Chapter 2
Do some electoral systems select
better politicians than others?
Single- vs dual-ballot elections
2.1 Introduction
Democratic institutions form a complex incentive system that determines which
types of citizens become politicians and which politicians get elected. In particular,
electoral rules determine how winners are chosen from a set of candidates (ballot)
on the basis of voters’ rankings of those candidates. Throughout the time, many
voting rules have been developed so as to meet different desired properties. Those
that allow for more than a ballot in a single election have specific features that, in
theory, may provide voters’ with more information about candidates and other voters’
preferences. This paper examines whether single- and dual-ballot rules, in practice,
affect the types of politicians who run for office and win elections.
Dual-ballot elections - those that follow the rule where a second election is held
between the two most voted candidates when none of them has obtained a majority in
the initial election - are used by many countries in Latin America (for both local and
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national elections), in French presidential elections, in the United States gubernatorial
primaries, and in Italian local elections. Single-ballot elections are, nonetheless, more
ubiquitous around the world. They are normally justified on the basis of the higher
financial costs of running two elections instead of just one. The theoretical literature,
however, points to higher levels of information disclosure in dual-ballot elections that
would benefit voters (Piketty, 2000; Martinelli, 2006), allowing elections to better
aggregate preferences. Yet the objective implications of the two systems for both
voters’ and parties’ decisions are not well understood empirically.
On the one hand, dual-ballot elections normally expose voters to a longer period of
advertisement and, through first round outcomes, provide valuable information about
other voters’ preferences and candidates’ electoral performance. Coeteris paribus, we
would think these voters are more informed than those under the single round system.
Indeed, the empirical literature has shown that both length of advertisement (Da
Silveira and De Mello, 2011) and campaign spending (Levitt, 1994) have a positive
effect on election outcomes in general. If a dual-ballot system allows voters to properly
screen candidates, parties may respond to that fielding politicians of higher quality,
reinforcing the likelihood that voters will choose better candidates.
On the other hand, a longer electoral period and the requirement to vote in two
elections may demand more attention and motivation from voters, discouraging par-
ticipation in the electoral process. It could also be meaningless, when the extra signals
produced render those previously held uninformative. Moreover, the signal-to-noise
ratio of campaigns can even be reduced in a set up with a larger number of candi-
dates1 and campaign activities. Aware of this, parties would not be as concerned with
the quality of politicians they have and this behavior would attract more and more
politicians of inferior quality.
1On average, a higher number of candidates is fielded in dual-ballot elections (Fujiwara, 2011).
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This ambiguity calls for a careful empirical analysis that, to the best of my knowl-
edge, the literature still lacks. The ethical impossibility of randomizing the assign-
ment of electoral rules to municipalities represents an obvious empirical challenge.
Differences in candidates fielded and elected across different municipalities could be
incorrectly attributed to the electoral system when, in reality, municipalities that
adopt a certain rule have unique features that are correlated with certain types of
politicians and policy outcomes. Even though observable factors can be controlled for,
there will always remain unobservables that can compromise a causal interpretation
of these effects.
By using a quasi-natural experiment that follows from the allocation threshold
of single- and dual-ballot elections to Brazilian municipalities, based on electorate
size, I can assess the causal effects of the adoption of a dual-ballot system, relative to
single-ballot, in a host of relevant outcomes.
First, I verify whether observable candidates’ characteristics differ under the two
electoral rules. Second, to evaluate unobservable characteristics that are relevant for
policy-making, I also compare politicians’ performance in office. This can be achieved
by analyzing policy outcomes for which the response time of the targeted population
is short enough to be observed between elections, such as health care. Following the
literature, I also analyze performance in terms of the potential politicians have in
attracting discretionary transfers to their constituency.
The main finding of the paper is that female candidates appear less often in the
top two and top three positions in the first round of dual-ballot elections. The data
supports the interpretation that this difference is not due to gender discrimination
but rather associated to underlying political skills, specially experience in mayoral
elections. This result is in line with Bhalotra, Clots-Figueras and Iyer (2017) who
find an increase in the participation of women candidates from major political parties
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in elections that follow a female victory. Most importantly, they also show that this
effect is primarily driven by prior candidates contesting again.
Perhaps surprisingly, other observable characteristics - namely age, schooling, and
occupational skill level - are not statistically different between the two systems for
none of the adopted definitions of effective candidates.2 In addition, differences in
campaign spending and fundraising are also not found.
In general, female candidates absence from dual-ballot elections could be explained
through three channels involved in the candidacy process: (i) the woman has to be
willing to put herself forward as a candidate; (ii) the party has to offer support by
placing her in the ballot; and (iii) voters need to be willing to vote for both men
and women. In the case analyzed here, the same parties appear in top positions
in both systems but female candidates are fielded at a higher rate in single-ballot
elections. An evidence that these parties may not discriminate female candidates per
si. The same is true for the voter perspective. Because the identification strategy
holds municipalities characteristics constant, single- and dual-ballot voters should
have similar gender preferences for candidates. Therefore, channels (ii) and (iii) do
not offer a plausible explanation for my results. Channel (i) does not seem to be the
strongest mechanism behind my findings either. I present evidence3 that dual-ballot
elections are normally more contended and, as such, could repeal the participation
of women, who normally avoid competitive environments, specially those of mixed
gender. However, female candidates appear at the same rate in lower ranked positions
in both systems, revealing that women may actually be willing to participate of dual-
ballot elections too, something that downplays this mechanism.
In terms of unobservable characteristics, mayors elected in dual-ballot municipali-
ties are more likely to attract discretionary transfers of capital to their municipalities,
but only in election years when they are eligible for re-election. Furthermore, these
2Those with a non-zero chance of winning or going to the second round.
3De Mello, Firpo and Chamon (2009) also provide evidence in this direction.
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municipalities do not present any differences in health outcomes, as measured by the
share of non-premature births and the share of mothers with at least one prenatal visit
during the mayor’s term. These politicians try re-election and are elected at the same
rate as in single-ballot, pointing to the interpretation that dual-ballot requires an ad-
ditional effort from mayors at this stage. If dual-ballot mayors actually performed
better than their single-ballot counterparts in general, performance differences should
also have been found for term-constrained mayors. Based on this idea, throughout
the paper, I provide evidence that supports the view that the political skills required
from candidates in order to enter dual-ballot elections are not necessarily associated
with higher quality and that female entry is barred because of these very same skills.
Overall, there is suggestive evidence that dual-ballot elections affect entry of ef-
fective candidates only through requiring more political experience, but that has no
implications for performance in office, except that mayors with re-election interests
tend to attract more resources to the municipality in election years – however, these
resources are not reverted into better policy outcomes. From the voters’ perspective,
there is a reduction in turnout in the second round of dual-ballot elections, relative
to its first round, followed by reductions in both blank and spoilt votes. This is not
explained by closeness in the elections and voter behavior is similar in the comparison
of the first rounds of the two types of elections. All together, these results indicate
that political experience combined with some loss of voters’ interest in the second
round tend to attenuate the potential extra demands posed by dual-ballot elections.
This paper has intersections with a number of different strands of the literature.
First, it is related to an empirical literature that has tried to assess the effects of elec-
toral rules on politicians’ performance in office. Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi (2003)
do a cross-country analysis to verify the effects of a host of electoral rules on cor-
ruption. They verify that countries that switch from strictly majoritarian to strictly
proportional elections present smaller levels of corruption, even though the effect is
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small. Gagliarducci, Nannicini and Naticchioni (2011) compare the performance of
candidates elected under majoritarian and proportional systems in Italy and show
that representatives elected under majority field more bills and are less absent from
Congress. This paper compares politicians fielded and elected through two different
majoritarian systems instead. Dual-ballot elections not only change the formal way
under which votes are translated into a winner, but also consist of an experimen-
tal setting where voters and politicians are also exposed to new sets of information.
Therefore, has different features to be explored.
Second, there is also a small literature in political science (Fulton, 2014; Roberts,
Seawright and Cyr, 2012) that has described how proportional representation elec-
toral systems are associated with greater legislative representation of women relative
to majoritarian systems. My findings detect differences in representation within ma-
joritarian systems and in executive positions.
Third, it is also related to the economic literature on gender differences in politics
(Brollo and Troiano, 2016; Anzia and Berry, 2011; Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras, 2014).
This literature uses samples of elections where women have closely won/lost against
male candidates to show that female politicians perform better in office and are less
corrupt, on average. I provide new evidence about gender differences at the stage of
candidacy for an election and how electoral rules may pose extra barriers to women’s
political advancement.
Lastly, the closest paper to mine is Nannicini, Bordignon and Tabellini (2016).
They show municipalities that choose mayors using dual-ballot systems face less
volatility in property taxes. This is due to the fact that in dual-ballot elections
centre parties make coalitions with extremist parties4 - in which case there is an
adaption of policies towards the positions of extremist parties - less often than in sin-
4This is also related to a theoretical literature on dual-ballot elections that points to gains in
efficiency given by the separation between the “communicative” and “decision-making” functions of
voting (Martinelli, 2002; Piketty, 2000; Bouton, 2013).
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gle round elections, where extremist parties can threaten the victory of centre parties
by dividing minority voters. In this case, policies are enacted as a result of strategic
considerations induced by the system at the time of the election and are indirectly
related to politicians quality. In this paper, I focus on a previous stage: the one
in which citizens choose to run for office and the party selects who to support. I
use this to infer about the effects of a dual-ballot system on the characteristics of
those fielded. I further analyze intermediary policy outcomes, that are plausibly not
affected by political ideology, only to try to assess unobserved features that parties
may take into account in this selection process.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 I describe in detail my identi-
fication strategy, the datasets used and the institutional background of the elections
considered. Section 2.3 contains the results of all estimations and discusses some
of the possible mechanisms leading to the results found. Section 2.4 concludes the
paper. All tables and figures are presented in an appendix.
2.2 Institutional Background, Data and Estima-
tion Framework
2.2.1 Data
Election outcomes and candidates’ characteristics - Data on mayoral elections, num-
ber of registered voters and candidates’ characteristics are available from the electoral
authority (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral - TSE) for the election years 2000, 2004, 2008,
2012 and 2016. These data, however, need to be matched over the years as to verify
previous positions held by the candidates. I developed an algorithm to identify the
same candidates over time: (i) for the years where identification numbers for candi-
dates were available, they were used to make these connections (ii) for the elections
73
where they were not available, I assume a candidate with the same name at the same
city at different points in time is the same person. Since this is administrative data,
there are some inconsistencies such as misspelled or incomplete names. A partial
matching algorithm was used to identify these cases and the results eyeballed so as to
verify the valid matches. Candidates’ characteristics available in this dataset include
date of birth, gender, education, occupation and reported wealth.
Discretionary transfers - Data on discretionary transfers are available from balance
sheets reported by the municipalities to the Brazilian National Treasury (Tesouro
Nacional). This information is available for all the years up to 2015. Following Brollo
and Troiano (2016), I use discretionary transfers of capital as a measure of politician
ability to attract resources to the municipality. To get a measure of non-discretionary
transfers, I subtract transfers of capital from the total of capital resources the munic-
ipality had.
Health Outcomes - Information on all births and number of mother’s prenatal visits are
provided by the Information System on Live Births (SINASC), available on DataSUS,
a system managed by the Ministry of Health. These data are available for all years
since 2000 up to 2015. I extract two variables from them: the share of non-premature
births and the share of mothers who had at least one prenatal visit during pregnancy.
Campaign spending and donations - This information is also available from TSE, the
electoral authority. Candidates are required to report in detail the amount and the
sources of donations received and how they were spent. All donations are aggregated
into the following categories: those raised in campaign events (Events), voters do-
nations (Voters), party funding (Party), public funding (Public Funding) and those
for which the source was not identified (Not Identified). It is not possible to do the
same with spending because candidates report the figures labelled by loose multiple
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categories over the years, which makes it difficult to rationalize them into meaningful
groups. I therefore explore only the overall total spent by the candidates.
Municipalities’ characteristics - The 2000 Census conducted by the national statistics
office IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística) is used to obtain detailed
characteristics of municipalities at the baseline year. These variables describe voters
education, income distribution, demographics and municipalities’ infrastructure. For
a list of the variables and their definitions see Table 2.2.
2.2.2 Estimation framework
Brazil is a federation with 26 states and a federal district politically organized in
5567 municipalities. Voting is compulsory for all citizens aged 18 years or over, but
the vote is voluntary for those aged 16-17 or above 70 years of age. Participation in
elections is normally high due to this feature.
Each municipality chooses a new mayor and local legislature every four years.
Since 1998 mayors are allowed to run for a second term. The constitution establishes
a threshold of 200,000 registered voters to determine whether a municipality holds
a dual- (with plurality rule) or a single-ballot in mayoral elections. In dual-ballot
elections municipalities above this threshold have a second election with the top two
candidates of the first round when none of them has obtained more than 50 percent
of the valid votes. This threshold generates a discontinuity that randomly assigns
single- and dual-ballot elections to municipalities sufficiently close to it. That is, those
municipalities should be similar to each other in both observables and unobservables,
with the only difference coming from the discontinuous implementation of distinct
electoral systems.5
5This feature has been used for identification before by Fujiwara (2011) for Brazil, and Nannicini,
Bordignon and Tabellini (2016) for Italy.
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More formally, let Vit be the RDD running variable for municipality i in the
election at time t. Vit is a variable centered at the threshold and, thus, denotes the
distance from the threshold and has positive values for municipalities with dual-ballot
and negative values for municipalities with single-ballot. The treatment effect in a
close neighborhood of the threshold on outcome Yit is given by:
TE = lim
vit↓0
E[yit|vit]− lim
vit↑0
E[yit|vit] (2.1)
Under the assumption that the conditional expectation of yit on vit is continu-
ous, the first term on the right-hand side converges to the expected outcome for a
dual-ballot municipality, which has as many voters as the single-ballot municipal-
ity. Similarly, the single-ballot municipality converges to the expected outcome of a
dual-ballot municipality under the same conditions.
The continuity assumption depends on two facts: the non-existence of (i) ma-
nipulation in the allocation of single- and dual-ballot rules across municipalities and
(ii) other treatments based on the same threshold. As discussed in Fujiwara (2011),
this threshold is arbitrary and is not used as a cutoff for the assignment of any other
treatment. All the municipalities comply with the rule, and therefore, the regression
discontinuity design is sharp.
Following the literature, two different methods are used to estimate average treat-
ment effects (ATE): a p-order polynomial fitted on either side of the threshold and a
local polynomial regression.
Let vit = #votersit− 200, 000 be the number of registered voters centered around
the cutoff in municipality i in time t, then a p-order polynomial can be estimated
through:
yit =
p∑
k=0
βkv
k
it + τit
p∑
k=0
γkv
k
it + µt + εit (2.2)
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where yit is the outcome of interest in municipality i in time period t, τit is a dummy
that is one when the municipality follows a dual-ballot system, µit are year fixed
effects and standard errors are clustered at the municipality level as the same city
can be observed multiple times. γ0 is the treatment effect, that is, it measures the
jump around the cutoff between the two groups of municipalities.
Following Imbens and Lemieux (2008), the local linear regression approach sets
p = 1 in equation (2.2) above and restricts the sample to municipalities in the optimal
interval vit ∈ [−b,+b] computed using Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Again, γ0
is the treatment effect at the threshold vit = 0.
2.2.3 Validity Tests
The identification strategy is based on the fact that the population threshold
used to assign the treatment is arbitrary and, as such, observable and unobservable
characteristics of municipalities close enough to this threshold should be statistically
similar.
If this assumption holds, there should not be any discontinuities around the thresh-
old for any of the municipalities’ characteristics we can observe. Therefore, using a
wide array of variables extracted from the Census 2000 and that characterize well a
municipality in terms of income, education and infrastructure I assess the validity of
this assumption.
These tests are reported in Table 2.1 and can also be confirmed by visual in-
spection of Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3. All variables, including the share of women in
the population, are balanced across the cut-off. Overall, there are no differences in
education levels, income, unemployment, as well as sanitation and electricity services.
These results are corroborated by McCrary (2008)’s continuity test. In princi-
ple, politicians could manipulate the number of registered voters in a municipality
to induce the application of their most preferred electoral rule. McCrary (2008)’s
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continuity test verifies whether there is any random sorting of municipalities at the
cutoff. The idea of the test is that with sorting the density of the running variable
would not be continuous. It tests the null hypothesis of continuity of the running
variable density by implementing kernel local linear regressions separately on both
sides of the threshold. Figure 2.7 displays the results. The estimated discontinuity
is 0.5360 with a standard error of 0.4481 (As it can be seen, there is no evidence of
discontinuities in the number of voters around the cutoff).
Taken together, these results suggest that the running variable of the RDD does
not show any evidence of manipulation and can be safely used as a local source of
exogenous variation in the neighborhood of the threshold that allocates electoral rules
to municipalities.
2.2.4 Sample selection and descriptive analysis
Pooling the data of the five electoral cycles produces a sample of over 23,297
elections conducted in a single-ballot system and 259 under dual-ballot.6 However,
because RDD assumptions hold only for those municipalities in the close neighbor-
hood of the threshold, I reduce the sample to those within 75,000 voters from the
zero cutoff 7 and calculate the optimal bandwidth using by Imbens and Kalyanara-
man (2012). The effective sample size used is composed by 308 elections, with 97 of
them following dual-ballot.
In this sample, dual-ballot elections have 0.94 more candidates on average and a
maximum number of 13 candidates. Whereas in the full sample, there are 3.54 more
candidates on average and the maximum number goes up to 14. In fact, dual-ballot
6My data differ from the one used in Fujiwara (2011) by two elections. While he includes
electoral cycles from 1996 to 2008, I include electoral cycles from 2000 to 2012. A dataset containing
all elections in 1996 is currently not available from TSE.
7This was the greatest threshold used in Fujiwara (2011).
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has been shown to have a causal effect on the number of candidates fielded in an
election (see (Fujiwara, 2011; Nannicini, Bordignon and Tabellini, 2016)).
Since the goal here is to compare candidates’ characteristics on both sides of the
discontinuity, it is important to investigate what the implications of a higher number
of candidates are for the distribution of quality and how a fair comparison between
the two systems can be performed.
Vote shares obtained by a candidate reflect many dimensions of quality, such as
party affiliation, experience, valence, campaign spending and so on. However, vote
shares in dual-ballot elections are on average lower than in single-ballot because (i)
more candidates enter the competition and (ii) some citizens vote for their preferred
candidate even when she is not likely to win (sincere voting) – as there will be a second
round where they can vote making strategic considerations. Hence, the strategic
voting component of vote shares is different in each system.
Empirical distributions of aggregate vote shares, broken down by candidates’ rank-
ing, are presented in Figure 2.4. If we take the sum of vote shares of the two first-
placed candidates in each system, as displayed in Panel (a), the average for single-
ballot is 0.76 and for dual-ballot it goes down to 0.72 and has a larger variance, making
the difference in means significant. Medians, in turn, are 0.77 and 0.71, respectively,
confirming the left skewness of the single-ballot distribution. Both distributions are
bimodal. Importantly, dual-ballot presents a longer left tail, illustrating the fact that
dual-ballot allows for the entry of candidates that receive very small vote shares and,
as we will see later, compare very poorly in terms of observables to other candidates
in the race.
Panel (c) shows that we only get an approximation between the aggregate vote
shares of the two systems when considering the aggregate of the four first-placed
candidates in dual-ballot against the two first-placed in single-ballot.
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In the smaller sample of 97 dual-ballot races, there were 43 outright victories and
first-round first-placed candidates won in 39 of those with a second round. In the
full sample, that was 111 and 108, respectively. In other words, dual-ballot races
normally go to a second round but first-round winners often win the election.
Figure 2.6 displays the distribution of the number of elections a municipality has
been running dual-ballot within our sample of five electoral races. Because the sample
has been reduced to those close to the threshold, we observe only a few cases where
the municipalities had a dual-ballot system over all five elections. The bulk of them
are newly converted municipalities or have been in the system for two or three races.
Therefore, this paper can not say much about the long term effects of the adoption
of a dual-ballot system.
We would like to infer what the average quality of groups of candidates fielded
under each system is, but there are candidates who enter the election just targeting
a non-zero probability of a positive vote share, no matter how small it is. This can
be seen in Figure 2.5 which displays the aggregate of vote shares of fourth and lower
placed candidates in the two systems. Clearly, the density of zeros or near zero vote
shares is higher in dual-ballot elections. Therefore, to make meaningful comparisons
between groups it is necessary to find some criteria that determine who the effective
candidates are in both types of elections. In the next section, I discuss the problems
arising from this sort of classifications and identify the ones to be used here.
2.2.5 Selecting comparable groups of candidates
There is a fundamental problem about comparing the quality of candidates be-
tween the two systems. Dual-ballot elections and their lower barriers to entry attract
candidates who would not have entered the election if it was not for the dual-ballot
rule. These new entrants can be either of high or low quality and make it to the top
three candidates, depending on voters’ strategies.
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If we take the full pool of candidates who enter dual-ballot elections and com-
pare their quality with those in single-ballot, it could be the case that non-effective
candidates - those with no chance of getting a positive share of votes if voters had
no incentives to vote sincerely - would weight down the average quality, producing a
result where dual-ballot candidates would be worse on average, even if some group of
top candidates are better than their single-ballot counterparts. The problem is that,
a priori, we cannot judge by the election results who the effective candidates would
be in each of the systems.
When there is a risk of upset victory in a dual-ballot election, a potentially effective
candidate could get a relatively low share of votes because voters coordinate to give
outright victory to a candidate that is more likely to win the election and avoid the
victory of a Condorcet loser in a second round. However, as Bouton and Gratton
(2015) show, this is an equilibrium only for dual-ballot elections with a threshold
below 50%. Here, all the elections have a threshold of 50% for outright victory.
Therefore, we can discard the possibility that dual-ballot elections present effective
candidates with low vote shares just due to strategic considerations.
Hence, if the case of upset victory can be ruled out, it is likely that candidates
who get very low vote shares in dual-ballot elections are those who enter the race
just because the chance of a non-zero vote share is higher. They are likely to be
candidates who would perform as badly or worse in single-ballot elections, so we get
to observe them only in dual-ballot elections.
Based on the arguments above, assume that election results are a good ex-ante
measure of how likely the candidate is to be a serious contestant in an election (ideally
we would look at polls held at the beginning of the electoral period, but that is not
available for most of the municipalities). We can then have an idea of which candidates
are more likely to be in the effective group. Note that by doing this, we do not need
the assumption to hold for each candidate’s ranking. We just need that the group of
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top ranked candidates are the same ex-ante and ex-post. The group of non-effective
candidates is then composed by those who get a very small share of votes relative to
the other candidates of the system they are competing on.
Based on this argument, we cannot reach a definitive concept of candidate effec-
tiveness for both systems, but we can compare different combinations of best ranked
candidates. Throughout the paper I compare the groups of top two placed candidates
in both systems and the top two in single-ballot and top three in dual-ballot.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Are candidates different over observable characteris-
tics?
In this section I evaluate dual-ballot treatment effects over candidates’ age, gender,
schooling, and occupational skill levels. I will refer to these variables as observable
characteristics throughout the text.
Occupational skill levels are used to differentiate those engaged in occupations
that require the execution of a more complex range of tasks. These are here classified
according to the four skill levels of the International Standard Classification of Oc-
cupations 2008 (International Labour Organization, 2012). Candidates belonging to
the fourth skill level normally have a university degree and perform complex tasks in
a specialized field that demands problem-solving and decision-making in addition to
creativity.8 Examples of professionals in this category are musicians, medical prac-
8The other three skill levels are:
1. Skill level 1: Occupations that require basic or no education and involve the performance of
simple and manual tasks. Examples: Office cleaners, kitchen assistants.
2. Skill level 2: Occupations that require basic education and involve operating machinery or
electronic equipment. Examples: Bus drivers, police officers, hairdressers.
3. Skill level 3: Normally requires a university degree and involve the execution of complex
tasks in a specialized field. Examples: Legal secretaries, shop managers, computer support
technicians.
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titioners, computer systems analysts, etc. A dummy identifying candidates in this
skill level, called High skill, is used to compare candidates who fall into this category
across the two electoral systems.
For all the outcomes and different samples of interest I run a non-parametric
model, using Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) to select the optimal bandwidth, and
a parametric RDD spline polynomial of 3rd and 4th orders – considering the sample
of municipalities that are 75,000 voters away from the zero cutoff. Standard errors
are clustered at the municipality level to account for any type of serial correlation
and year fixed effects control for year-specific characteristics of elections.
I start by showing the results for the sample that includes all candidates running in
an election. Panel A in Table 2.3 demonstrates that, overall, there are no statistically
significant effects when we go from single- to dual-ballot in any of the characteristics
or specifications considered. Similarly, when the set of top ranked candidates in each
election is excluded the same results are verified (Panel B in Table 2.3).
As previously discussed, to try to account for the fact that some of the candidates
attracted by lower barriers to entry in dual-ballot elections may pull down the over-
all average quality, I now consider different groups of candidates in each side of the
discontinuity. My assumption is that relative low shares of votes in the first round of
dual-ballot elections are not given by strategic considerations, but rather reflect vot-
ers’ preferences. Therefore, my measures of effectiveness are based on the candidates
who have a considerable relative large share of the votes in each election.
In Panel A of Table 2.4 I use the subsample of top two candidates in both systems.
Remarkably, the probability of a woman appearing in the top two of a dual-ballot
election is 10 to 30 percentage points lower, depending on the bandwidth and specifi-
cation. Out of an already low baseline mean for female candidates in single-ballot of
11 percent. Whereas no statistically significant differences are found with respect to
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age, schooling or skill, which implies that the additional women fielded under single-
ballot are at least as good as their male counterparts in dual-ballot over these three
dimensions.
Since two candidates go to the second round in dual-ballot, three candidates nor-
mally contest the elections more closely, while this is true for only two candidates
in single-ballot elections. To account for that, I amplify the sample to the top three
candidates in dual-ballot against the top two in single-ballot. As displayed in Panel B
of Table 2.4, the number of female candidates in dual-ballot races increases but is still
lower, on average, when compared to single-ballot, around 10 to 23 percentage points.
Again, no differences are verified in the other observable characteristics considered.
As the previous results have shown, there is no discontinuity in the full sample of
female candidates fielded in each electoral system, the discontinuity is verified only in
the subsamples of effective candidates. That is, women are fielded at the same rate
in both systems, but do not get into the elite group as often.
To shed some light on this outcome, I take the subsample containing only female
candidates and check for discontinuities in the same characteristics: education, ex-
perience and skill. The results are shown in Panel A of Table 2.7. Essentially, there
are no detectable discontinuities between characteristics of women fielded in the two
systems, except that they seem to be older, on average. I also do the same analysis
for the sample containing only males. Panel B in Table 2.7 display the results. Male
candidates, in turn, present the same observable characteristics in both systems, on
average. This finding aligns with the argument that dual-ballot may demand more
experience from politicians, but only for women this requirement is reflected in age.
This would be consistent with both parties disproportionally requiring more experi-
ence from women than men, or just a reflection of late entry of women in politics.
To sum up, the only significant treatment effect observed thus far is that dual-
ballot races have comparatively less female candidates competing in top positions,
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despite presenting the same observable characteristics. There seems to be a conver-
gence in all the other observable dimensions in both electoral rules, something that
indicates parties’ selection process may already be driven by these criteria in general.
The question that remains to be answered is whether this result can be attributed
to large parties’ gender preferences or to some underlying candidates’ characteristics
that are associated to gender. This question cannot obviously be answered directly,
but in the next sections additional results help excluding mechanisms that could be
at play.
2.3.2 Do dual-ballot candidates spend more in their political
campaigns?
A second round election in Brazil implies additional 28 days of rallies, debates
and production of ads for radio and tv. This longer advertisement period should also
shift the amount of resources necessary to run a political campaign, as compared to
single-ballot. Candidates should, therefore, be able to raise a large amount of funds
to make up for these extended costs; a skill that should account for another dimension
of candidates’ quality that parties may observe.
To test this proposition, I verify whether there is any dual-ballot effect on candi-
dates’ campaign funds and spending. The results are displayed in Table 2.6. First,
there are no statistically significant differences between the total spent in single-ballot
relative to that of dual-ballot elections (Total spending). The same is true for the
total spent in single-ballot compared to that of a first round in dual-ballot (Total
spending 1st round). The total spent in the second round of dual-ballot compared
with the monthly average spent in single-ballot elections is also statistically similar
(Total spending 1st/2nd round).
The aggregate of funds raised in both first and second rounds seem to be larger in
dual-ballot, although not statistically significant (Fundraising total). When broken
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down by rounds, there are small and non-significant differences between single-ballot
and dual-ballot first round (Fundraising total 1st round), but large positive differ-
ences between first (monthly average) and second rounds in each system, respectively
(Fundraising total 1st/2nd round).
In short, there are no differences in the total of resources raised and spent in the
two systems, on average. Candidates seem to keep the same pace of spending in the
second round and may transfer resources from first to second rounds.
To have a more precise idea of candidates fundraising abilities I also check for
discontinuities in the following sources of funding: events, voters, companies, public
funding9, party funding and unknown sources. The results are presented in Table
2.3. They show that either candidates do not focus differently in any donor groups
and/or none of the donors seem to take system into account when giving money to
campaigns.
All in all, candidates follow a similar path of spending and fundraising in their
campaigns despite dual-ballot elections lasting longer. This suggests that candidates
have, on average, the same fundraising abilities in the two systems but may require
additional political skills to compensate for the supposedly more demanding campaign
in dual-ballot. In the next section, I assess whether political characteristics and
redistributive politics play a role in balancing these differences.
2.3.3 Are candidates different over political characteristics?
Table 2.8 displays the analysis of discontinuity in key variables characterizing the
political process underlying each of the systems: experience as a candidate in mayoral
elections, reelection entry, reelection rates and competitiveness.
9In Brazil, parties receive public resources to fund political campaigns, proportional to the number
of representatives they have in the lower chamber.
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The variable experience in mayoral elections counts how many times the politician
has been a candidate in a mayoral race at that municipality up to the most recent
election. Remarkably, there is a large number of politicians who compete more than
twice in the sample. Around 29 percent has competed at least once, 10 percent twice
and 3 percent three or four times. 10 The results in the first line of Table 2.8 show
that candidates in dual-ballot elections have participated of 0.26 to 0.36 more elections
on average when compared to single-ballot elections, which have an average of 0.52
elections. At the same time, both systems do not present any significant differences
between a mayor running for reelection (Incumbent race) or being reelected (Reelection
win). A visual representation of these estimates is in Figure 2.8.
This speaks to the absence of women in dual-ballot elections to the extent to that
the presence of more experienced male politicians may repeal the chance of entry of
new female candidates, given that women do not have had much tradition in politics.
It remains to be seen whether this is a result that persists in the long run, in which
case part of this effect could be attributed to plain gender discrimination.
Figure 2.9 displays the average share of women fielded in each system over time in
the sample of elections used here. When considering all those fielded, independently
of ranking, this average is statistically the same in all years, except in 2000, when
it is higher. When including only candidates in the top two positions, this average
becomes significantly lower for dual-ballot from 2004 to 2012, but displaying a smooth
growth in women participation until catching up in 2016. A finding that aids the view
that the experience may be a requirement of a more demanding political process and
not related to gender per si. As the time passes, more politically experienced women
may become available to contest dual-ballot elections in top positions. It is important
to highlight, however, how low the participation of women still is in both systems,
10Candidates of elections in 2000 are not included in this sample because our data covers all races
between 2000 and 2016 and therefore is truncated on the left. however, the possibility of reelection
was approved only in 1997 and, therefore, candidates should not be repeatedly competing in the
elections not taken into account.
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not going over 15% in any period. Something that indicates a slow process of change
and that political experience may consist in a strong barrier to entry.
I also investigate whether there are signs of tougher competition in dual-ballot
elections that is reflected in vote shares. I first compare the margin of votes of all
candidates over the next-placed candidate in the first round of the two systems. As
it can be seen in line (2) of Table 2.8, there are small and no significant differences
between the two systems. However, when comparing the margin of victory of the first
ranked candidate in single-ballot and that of the second round of dual-ballot, I find
that this margin is lower for the latter. This is a somewhat surprising result since
the higher number of candidates in single-ballot, as compared to the second round
of dual-ballot elections, would tend to smooth these margins across candidates. This
provides evidence that dual-ballot elections tend to be closer than single-ballot in this
context, something that could also explain why women are not seen as often at the
top positions in dual-ballot elections.
This interpretation is aligned with experimental evidence that has identified re-
duction of women’s performance in competitive settings, that becomes more severe
in mixed gender environments (Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini, 2003). However,
female candidates appear at the same rate in lower positions being fielded by minor
parties. This demonstrates that women’s entry issue may be more related to parties’
endorsement than with their choices of whether to compete or not. The stronger
presence of men in these elections may in itself be a repulsing factor for the entry of
women, as found in Gagliarducci and Paserman (2012), where female mayors are less
likely to finish their mandate when a council is composed solely by male politicians.
In short, the interpretation that receives more support from the data is that there
are underlying unobserved political skills associated to entry in dual-ballot elections
that not only women seem to lack but also inexperienced male politicians. This
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is backed by the fact that large parties are willing to field women in single-ballot
elections, despite still not in parity with male candidates.
2.3.4 Are dual-ballot politicians different in terms of perfor-
mance?
Health outcomes - One dimension over which the performance of politicians has
been evaluated is health outcomes. As Fujiwara (2010) and Brollo and Troiano (2016)
point out, the population responses to investment in health are fast and relevant
enough so they can be evaluated in the short spam of time between different terms,
and is one of the few outcomes that are available at the municipality level. Addition-
ally, resources allocated to health in municipalities are tied to population size and
income per capita, so it should be homogenous across municipalities in this aspect,
even though the mayor has discretionary power in the allocation of these resources.
A considerable large share of the population depend on public health care in Brazil
(Sistema Unico de Saude – SUS), about 75% of the population according to the
Household Surveys 11 data. This number has also been constant over the last decade.
Panel B in Table 2.9 displays treatment effects over two baseline variables charac-
terizing health outcomes: any prenatal visits—the share of mothers who had at least
one prenatal visit during pregnancy—and non-premature births, defined as the share
of births from pregnancies of 37 weeks or above. Considering the possible existence
of political cycles in policy investment so as to improve electoral chances close to
elections, I split the four-year term into the sum of the first three years, second and
third years and election year – the fourth and last year of the term –, respectively.
The effects of dual-ballot in these variables are numerically small and statistically
insignificant. These results are, however, also compatible with both a more effective
allocation of health resources and/or a higher share of resources destined to this
11Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios – PNAD.
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end by male mayors in dual-ballot municipalities. This is true because the presence
of female mayors brings up the average health outcomes in single-ballot elections.
Therefore, this result does not refute the case for candidates of higher quality in
dual-ballot elections.
Discretionary transfers of capital - As in Brollo and Troiano (2016), I use discre-
tionary transfers of capital as a measure of politicians’ ability to attract resources
to the municipality, since they depend on agreements (convenios) made between the
municipality and federal or state governments. The same pattern of non-significance
is observed for discretionary transfers of capital in Panel A of Table 2.10. Despite
not significant, dual-ballot municipalities still display a large negative effect on the
discretionary transfers mayors are able to attract in the first three years of their man-
date. Something that is reverted in the election year, when transfers of capital are
much larger and significant relative to single-ballot. In terms of economic magnitude,
our results show that dual-ballot mayors attract 36 percent more transfers for capital
investment than their single-ballot counterparts. Overall, there seems to be a net
positive higher value of transfers to dual-ballot municipalities.
Is it that other political incentives affect candidates’ performance or candidates
elected in dual-ballot elections really have differential characteristics that make them
perform better? Term-constrained candidates that still perform better in dual-ballot
elections would speak to the hypothesis that the system selects better candidates –
namely, career concerned – or at least keeps checks and balances that hold politicians
more accountable. To investigate this channel, I exclude term constrained candidates
from the sample and run the same specifications. Now, discretionary transfers in
election years are large and significant in some of the specifications with a greater
sample size. Whereas non-discretionary transfers and overall discretionary transfers
remain the same. Since candidates are equally likely to run for reelection and win
on both sides of the discontinuity, the higher share of transfers attracted by dual-
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ballot may be an extra effort required by the system itself. This supports the idea
that dual-ballot elections may require higher political skills that are translated into
policies with electoral goals.
2.3.5 Do voters loose interest in the election over time?
The requirement of voting in two elections, rather than in just one, associated with
a longer campaign period may discourage voters from participation in the election.
To test this hypothesis, I look at whether there are any differences in voter turnout
and the share of blank and spoilt votes, which are equivalent to voting for outside
options, across the two types of elections. Not surprisingly, a dual-ballot system has
no effect on participation relative to that of single-ballot. This is explained by the fact
that the first round of the two types of elections are comparable over many campaign
dimensions, as we have previously shown.
If there is any type of discouragement it should appear in the second round of
dual-ballot elections relative to their own first round. A quick test of difference in
means reveals that turnout and the share of spoilt and blank votes are significantly
higher in the first round of the election. This result remains even when using a sample
of close elections – classified by the difference in vote shares of the top two candidates
in the first round – where supposedly voters would have a higher incentive to turnout.
This does not obviously rule out all the confounders at play. It could well be that
those who vote sincerely for trailing candidates in the first round just give up voting
in the second round because they do not have a better option. If that is the case,
this is only a different channel through which dual-ballot elections release candidates
from the extra demands of a second round, since by knowing that these voters do
not turnout, candidates can focus on a smaller set of voters in the second round. All
in all, there is suggestive evidence that a second round combines mechanisms that
tend to attenuate its own demands. This result helps in explaining why dual-ballot
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candidates need more political abilities as opposed to monetary resources or human
capital outside politics.
2.3.6 Discussion
The previous results indicate that politics in general attracts the same type of
citizens in terms of observable characteristics. That is, candidates are required to have
a college degree and/or an occupation that qualifies them to the position. Parties’
selection of candidates must therefore be made based on other grounds.
The problem with analyzing unobserved quality of politicians based on perfor-
mance is differentiating moral hazard aspects from adverse selection. It remains to
be seen whether politicians are ex-ante of higher-quality, and voters can observe that
only in dual-ballot elections, or there are embedded accountability mechanisms that
forces them to perform better. But, in either case, these are features that single-
ballot elections seem to lack. The pool of more experienced candidates in dual-ballot,
their political campaign strategy and timing of policies with clear electoral goals,
support the idea that the screening process in this system, together with the quality
of competitors, are more enhanced than in single-ballot.
The results found for women can emerge from a series of mechanisms. First, it
could be a result of party discrimination, because parties decide how to allocate can-
didates. In the sample of elections considered here, major parties are equally present
in top positions in both systems. These parties field female candidates more often
in single-ballot elections, so the reduction in the proportion of women we observe in
dual-ballot top positions does not seem to be consistent with discrimination, unless
parties hold gender bias that are specific to dual-ballot elections. The absence of
women is more consistent with parties’ beliefs that dual-ballot requires more polit-
ically experienced candidates, who are able to win a more demanding election with
limited campaign spending and strategically acquire and apply resources when in of-
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fice targeting political goals. A question that cannot be answered in our setting is
whether these requirements are disproportional towards women, because we do not
observe the pool of women candidates within each party.
Second, there could be a shorter supply of female politicians in municipalities with
dual-ballot elections, even in municipalities with the same proportion of women in the
population, on average . That is, women may perceive dual-ballot elections as being
more difficult to enter, at least competing through major parties, and may prefer
other occupations or alternative public positions Casas-Arce and Saiz (2015), such
as local legislatures. However, the similarity in the presence of female candidates
representing minor parties is an indication that this is perhaps not a major factor
contributing to the results found.
Third, it could also be a result of voters’ gender discrimination. My identification
strategy accounts for pre-existing gender preferences of the electorate in both sides of
the discontinuity. However, voters in dual-ballot elections are subject to a different
incentive system that can trigger more discrimination. It might just be more difficult
to identify a high-quality female candidate in a dual-ballot setting. This is because
people observe the average quality and number of candidates that are fielded in dual-
ballot elections over time and they know there is a recurring group of low-quality
candidates that make screening more difficult. They just associate women to this
group; a sort of pooling equilibrium for women and low-quality male candidates.
This would feed back into parties’ beliefs that voters tend to prefer male candidates
in dual-ballot elections. Nonetheless, it is hard to believe that a major party label
would not differentiate a female candidate, even in dual-ballot elections.
For minor parties, the pool of possible candidates is normally composed by un-
derrepresented groups of the population. For example, unionized parties such as
PSTU (United Socialist Workers’ Party) normally field candidates of working class
and participate more often of dual-ballot elections. Moreover, there is evidence in the
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literature that women tend to be allocated to positions already known to be difficult
to win Sanbonmatsu (2002); Murray (2008); Casas-Arce and Saiz (2015), something
that would also explain why minor parties field more women in general. After all,
they do not target a victory anyway. It is just that in dual-ballot the probability of
a party getting zero votes is lower, making it less prone to shame.
Finally, in terms of the strategic components of dual-ballot elections, threads posed
to the victory of mainstream parties by small and/or extremist parties are reduced
and, as a result, their bargaining power to influence policy positions of major parties
are also reduced (Nannicini, Bordignon and Tabellini, 2016). This factor would work
towards the creation of a more permissive and stable environment for policy positions.
It would not, however, interfere to a greater extent with the types of politicians elected
or the type of performance analyzed here, because the competition is moved towards
other grounds.
2.3.7 External validity
The RD empirical strategy is valid for municipalities with a population of around
200,000 voters. That is, municipalities that have just switched to dual-ballot or are
close to. It is possible that the results found do not generalize to the rest of Brazilian
municipalities.
The longer the time the municipality has been running elections under the dual-
ballot system, the more adapted parties can become to the rules, as well as voters,
and have a better understanding of the types of candidates each election requires. It
is hard to say whether these differences may just fade over time, as part of a natural
adaption to the new system. On the other hand, this initial condition could create
a persistent gender gap in dual-ballot elections, independently of the characteristics
that gave rise to it.
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Despite this, the results obtained here speak to the analysis of whether electoral
races under rules that supposedly allow for better screening of candidates are worth
their costs. It is true that candidates spend, on average, the same financial resources
in campaigning, but there are other non-monetary costs such as the time spent in
the process, the higher number of candidates to choose from, the enhancement of
underrepresentation of women and, more generally, the creation of barriers to entry
of newly minted candidates.
My results show that, in practice, the types of candidates elected in each of these
systems are virtually the same, with the drawback that dual-ballot mayors may need
to make more use of political strategies, such as redistributive politics, to win elec-
tions.
In fact, dual-ballot major benefits seem to be related to its strategic components
that allow voters to communicate policy preferences. Piketty (2000) defends with the-
oretical arguments the communicative function of runoff systems in that they allow
citizens to vote in extreme candidates in the first round in order to send messages to
their most preferred candidate so they can adjust their policies. In contrast, Bouton
(2013), theoretically argues that runoff systems with a threshold below 50 percent may
lead to the systematic victory of the Condorcet loser in an election with three can-
didates. Additionally, Nannicini, Bordignon and Tabellini (2016) shows empirically
that extremist voters have a lower bargaining power in dual-ballot relative to single-
ballot and, as a consequence, have less influence in policies that are implemented by
mainstream parties.
2.4 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed whether there are differences in the selection process
of candidates, both by parties and voters, when there is a change from single- to
95
dual-ballot elections under plurality rule. The identification strategy makes use of
the quasi-random assignment of these electoral rules to assume that municipalities
with population in the neighborhood of the 200,000 voters threshold of assignment
are similar in a number of characteristics. This assumption is verified by balance tests
for a host of characteristics. McCrary’s test confirms the assumption that there is no
manipulation in population counts as to induce a municipality to hold elections in a
given system.
Candidates’ observable characteristics such as occupational skill level, education
and age are statistically the same in both systems for different selections of candidates
by political strength. Surprisingly, however, there is a gender gap between the two:
dual-ballot elections are less likely to have a woman in top positions, as defined by
the share of votes obtained in the election.
To investigate whether the gender gap found is due to discrimination or there are
other underlying skills that could well be required from both men and women in dual-
ballot races, I also look at more specific political characteristics and some nuances of
the electoral process. Dual-ballot elections have candidates with a larger experience
in mayoral elections, a factor that can be an advantage when competing in parties’
primaries but can also repeal other politicians from entry. The low historical presence
of women in politics makes experience an important additional barrier to the entry
of female candidates.
There is evidence in the literature that women get lower donations in electoral
campaigns and, in general, have less resources to spend. The lack of access to financial
resources is seen as major contributing factor for not winning an election and could
therefore influence parties decisions. I test whether dual-ballot candidates actually
raise and spend more money when compared to those in single-ballot. In fact, there
are no detectable differences on what is donated and spent across the two systems,
even when considering that second round elections would demand more resources.
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This finding might impose even more strain on the participation of women, not only
through the additional difficulties in gathering donations, but also by having to win
an election that has already, on average, less resources per day of campaign.
To further understand these differences in the two systems reflected in the lack
of female candidates in dual-ballot, I also look at the performance of winner can-
didates in office. Following the previous literature Ferraz and Finan (2008); Brollo
and Troiano (2016); Gagliarducci and Paserman (2012), I consider a variable that
reflects candidates’ abilities to attract resources to the municipality - discretionary
transfers of capital - and a variable that reflects the effectiveness in the application of
non-discretionary resources – prenatal visits and non-premature births. Dual-ballot
mayors attract more discretionary transfers of capital only in election years when they
can run for reelection. It appears to be a compensatory policy for the comparatively
low resources to spend in the campaign. In terms of health outcomes, there are no
detectable differences.
All in all, these results are consistent with differentiation of candidates induced
by the electoral system over directly unobservable characteristics that are reflected in
the lower participation of women in dual-ballot elections.
This paper exploited the mechanisms behind the supply side of politicians in dual-
ballot elections but has not said anything about how voters respond to the lengthier
electoral process and how this feeds back into politicians and party’s strategies. Do
they tend to participate more or less of the electoral process in the dual-ballot system?
Because dual-ballot favors experienced politicians and require more strategic moves -
such as attracting more discretionary transfers – it is also important to verify whether
these characteristics are also associated with more cases of corruption or are beneficial
to the municipalities following the rule.
In terms of public policy, improvements over candidates’ characteristics and/or
performance induced by simply changing electoral systems might be desirable in any
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circumstances where welfare gains would be superior to the costs of setting up the
new electoral process. Understanding all these interactions between electoral systems
and mechanisms that induce politicians to perform better is an exciting avenue for
future research.
2.5 Appendix
2.5.1 Figures
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Figure 2.1: Balance tests for municipality characteristics: schooling.
Note: Variables extracted from the 2000 Census. This sample considers all municipalities within
a 75,000 distance from the threshold for visualization purposes. Scatter points are averaged over
327 voters, as determined by Imbens and Lemieux (2008).
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Figure 2.2: Balance tests for municipality characteristics: income and demographics.
Note: Variables extracted from the 2000 Census. See 2.2 for definitions. This sample considers
all municipalities within a 75,000 distance from the threshold for visualization purposes. Scatter
points are averaged over 327 voters, as determined by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
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Figure 2.3: Balance tests for municipality characteristics: infrastructure.
Note: Variables extracted from the 2000 Census. See 2.2 for definitions. This sample considers
all municipalities within a 75,000 distance from the threshold for visualization purposes. Scatter
points are averaged over 327 voters, as defined by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of vote shares in single- and dual-ballot elections
Note: This sample considers all municipalities within a 75,000 distance from the threshold and all
mayoral election held from 2000 to 2016.
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Figure 2.5: Density of aggregate vote shares of fourth or lower placed candidates
Note: The x-axis considers the sum of vote shares of fourth and lower placed candidates. This
sample considers all mayoral races between 2000 and 2016 and municipalities within a 75,000
voters distance from the threshold.
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Figure 2.6: Distribution of the number of elections since conversion to dual-ballot.
Note: This sample considers all mayoral races between 2000 and 2016 and municipalities within a
75,000 voters distance from the threshold. Therefore, five means the municipality has run elections
under dual-ballot in all races in the sample. Conversely, zero means the municipality has run all
elections under single-ballot.
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Figure 2.7: McCrary’s continuity test for the number of voters in a municipality
Note: Kernel estimation of the density of the number of voters centered around the 200,000 threshold
of dual-ballot allocation. Point estimate of discontinuity: .5360 with standard error .4481. Optimal
bin-width and bin-size follows McCrary (2008). This sample considers all mayoral races between
2000 and 2016 and municipalities within a 75,000 distance from the threshold for visualization
purposes. Test results do not vary with the sample considered.
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Figure 2.8: Discontinuity in the outcomes of the elections.
Note: This sample considers all mayoral races between 2000 and 2016 and municipalities within a
75,000 voters distance from the threshold.
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Figure 2.9: Share of female candidates in dual-ballot vs Single-ballot.
Note: This sample considers all mayoral races between 2000 and 2016 and municipalities within a
75,000 voters distance from the threshold.
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2.5.2 Tables
Table 2.1: Balance tests on municipalities’ baseline characteristics.
Panel A: Schooling.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mean BW OLS Spline 3rd Spline 4th Optimal BW Half Optimal BW
Illiterates 0.0910 15820.94 −0.0034 0.0028 0.0011 0.0089 −0.0028
[0.0539] (308) [0.0081] [0.0105] [0.0159] [0.0178] [0.0151]
Primary school 0.4401 21925.30 −0.0034 −0.0070 −0.0037 −0.0192 0.0049
[0.0748] (308) [0.0081] [0.0272] [0.0333] [0.0292] [0.0169]
Secondary School 0.2594 24621.21 −0.0034 0.0057 0.0046 −0.0047 0.0105
[0.0657] (308) [0.0081] [0.0253] [0.0305] [0.0232] [0.0155]
Tertiary School 0.0614 23889.06 0.0129 0.0131 0.0140 0.0075 0.0184
[0.0341] (308) [0.0086] [0.0128] [0.0149] [0.0125] [0.0164]
Observations 211 308 308 308 82 40
Panel B: Income and demographics.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mean BW OLS Spline 3rd Spline 4th Optimal BW Half Optimal BW
Unemployed 0.5421 19184.65 −0.0174** 0.0307 0.0279 0.0327 0.0102
[0.0548] (308) [0.0085] [0.0196] [0.0248] [0.0236] [0.0121]
Per capita income 611.2953 16780.72 −0.0174** 100.6014 128.3677 67.4590 94.2142**
[210.4976] (308) [0.0085] [75.3298] [86.9779] [85.5042] [44.7340]
Women 0.5101 34859.90 −0.0174** −0.0016 −0.0010 −0.0010 0.0018
[0.0076] (308) [0.0085] [0.0030] [0.0037] [0.0025] [0.0018]
Urban 0.9451 17450.52 −0.0007 −0.0077 −0.0067 −0.0075 −0.0313
[0.0630] (308) [0.0132] [0.0162] [0.0226] [0.0218] [0.0271]
Observations 211 308 308 308 58 34
Panel C: Sanitation.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mean BW OLS Spline 3rd Spline 4th Optimal BW Half Optimal BW
Running water 0.9002 25260.67 0.0219 0.0375 0.0254 0.0030 0.0183
[0.1210] (308) [0.0221] [0.0486] [0.0739] [0.0463] [0.0615]
Bathroom and running water 0.8805 24844.01 0.0219 0.0371 0.0286 0.0062 0.0198
[0.1377] (308) [0.0221] [0.0541] [0.0824] [0.0527] [0.0243]
Eletricity 0.9868 20292.11 0.0219 0.0021 0.0056 0.0011 0.0006
[0.0304] (308) [0.0221] [0.0062] [0.0115] [0.0098] [0.0052]
Sewerage supply 0.0467 24352.83 −0.0128 −0.0114 −0.0109 0.0032 −0.0043
[0.0802] (308) [0.0142] [0.0273] [0.0478] [0.0300] [0.0479]
Observations 211 308 308 308 86 40
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in brackets. Sample size in parenthesis.
Note: Column (1) displays the corresponding variable mean and standard deviation (in square
brackets) in single-ballot elections. Column (2) displays the optimal bandwidth value obtained
through Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and the sample size used in the calculation is displayed
below in parenthesis. Columns (4) and (5) display parametric estimates considering polynomial
splines of 3rd and 4th order, respectively, using a sample of municipalities within a 75,000 voters
distance from the zero cutoff. Column (3) displays baseline OLS results using the same sample.
Columns (6) and (7) display non-parametric estimates with samples restricted to the optimal
bandwidth in (2) and half of it, respectively. See Table 2.2 for definitions.
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Table 2.2: Definition of municipalities’ baseline characteristics.
Variable Description
Illiterate Share of the population aged 18 or above that cannot read or write.
Primary School Share of the population aged 18 or above with at least primary education.
Secondary School Share of the population aged 18 or above with at least secondary education.
Tertiary School Share of the population aged 25 or above with at least a university degree.
Unemployed Share of the population aged 18 or above who were unemployed.
Per Capita Income Average per capita for income.
Women Share of women in the population.
Urban Share of the population living in urban areas.
Running water Share of households with water supply.
Bathroom and running water Share of households with water supply and a bathroom.
Eletricity Share of households with eletricity.
Sewerage supply Share of households with sewerage supply.
Note: This table shows the definition of the variables used to measure schooling, income and
sanitation at the municipality level. Variables are defined as in the 2000 Census.
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Table 2.3: Dual-ballot treatment effects on candidates’ observable characteristics.
Panel A: Sample includes all candidates in both single- and dual-ballot races.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mean BW OLS Spline 3rd Spline 4th Optimal BW Half Optimal BW
Female 0.1079 26822.65 −0.0505 −0.0983 −0.0979 −0.0766 −0.0539
[0.3104] (1461) [0.0354] [0.0631] [0.0813] [0.0506] [0.0709]
Age 49.8504 24122.24 −0.0505 1.5877 0.4159 1.0060 −0.6161
[10.6737] (1461) [0.0354] [2.6489] [3.1055] [2.3052] [1.2402]
University Degree 0.7019 31496.82 −0.0505 −0.0822 −0.1389 −0.1436 −0.0146
[0.4577] (1461) [0.0354] [0.1274] [0.1456] [0.0997] [0.0620]
High Skill 0.6218 19791.07 0.0481 0.0548 −0.0144 0.0414 0.0066
[0.4852] (1461) [0.0426] [0.1049] [0.1335] [0.0997] [0.1531]
Observations 936 1461 1461 1461 339 181
Panel B: Sample excludes top two and three candidates in single- and dual-ballot races,
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mean BW OLS Spline 3rd Spline 4th Optimal BW Half Optimal BW
Female 0.1029 33361.95 0.0045 0.0029 0.0545 −0.0020 0.0906
[0.3041] (752) [0.0532] [0.0893] [0.1089] [0.0706] [0.0885]
Age 48.8971 22200.00 0.0045 2.9944 0.3439 3.0693 0.8956
[10.7334] (752) [0.0532] [3.8555] [4.6021] [3.7320] [1.8572]
University Degree 0.6388 24132.24 0.0045 −0.1826 −0.1736 −0.1338 −0.0325
[0.4808] (752) [0.0532] [0.1464] [0.1812] [0.1375] [0.0775]
High Skill 0.5456 20789.34 0.0046 0.0113 −0.0952 −0.0065 −0.2042
[0.4984] (752) [0.0680] [0.1445] [0.1990] [0.1373] [0.2088]
Observations 515 752 752 752 178 93
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in brackets. Sample size in parenthesis.
Note: Column (1) displays the corresponding variable mean and standard deviation (in square
brackets) in single-ballot elections. Column (2) displays the optimal bandwidth value obtained
through Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and the sample size used in the calculation is displayed
below in parenthesis. Columns (4) and (5) display parametric estimates considering polynomial
splines of 3rd and 4th order, respectively, using a sample of municipalities within a 75,000 voters
distance from the zero cutoff. Column (3) displays baseline OLS results using the same sample.
Columns (6) and (7) display non-parametric estimates with samples restricted to the optimal
bandwidth in (2) and half of it, respectively. See Section 2.3.1 for a definition of high skill.
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Table 2.4: Dual-ballot treatment effects on candidates’ observable characteristics.
Panel A: Subsample of top two ranked candidates in both single- and dual-ballot races.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mean BW OLS Spline 3rd Spline 4th Optimal BW Half Optimal BW
Female 0.1140 26380.17 −0.1078* −0.2199** −0.3074*** −0.1952** −0.2577**
[0.3182] (615) [0.0590] [0.0896] [0.1093] [0.0812] [0.1006]
Age 51.0166 21059.50 −0.1078* 1.3246 0.8900 1.1463 −2.0160
[10.4957] (615) [0.0590] [2.8500] [3.3837] [2.6262] [1.7522]
University Degree 0.7791 26827.01 −0.1078* 0.0367 −0.1243 −0.0643 0.0350
[0.4153] (615) [0.0590] [0.1644] [0.1738] [0.1501] [0.0752]
High Skill 0.7150 34166.69 0.0657 0.1306 0.0423 0.0633 0.0800
[0.4520] (615) [0.0794] [0.1515] [0.1916] [0.1098] [0.1534]
Observations 421 615 615 615 242 114
Panel B: Subsample of top two and top three ranked candidates in single- and dual-ballot
races, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mean BW OLS Spline 3rd Spline 4th Optimal BW Half Optimal BW
Female 0.1140 27292.10 −0.1055** −0.1967** −0.2340** −0.1638** −0.1959*
[0.3182] (709) [0.0530] [0.0935] [0.1144] [0.0697] [0.0987]
Age 51.0166 35036.14 −0.1055** 0.1460 0.2439 −1.0555 −2.3156
[10.4957] (709) [0.0530] [2.7042] [3.2674] [1.9185] [1.5255]
University Degree 0.7791 26577.84 −0.1055** 0.0188 −0.1601 −0.1022 −0.0161
[0.4153] (709) [0.0530] [0.1522] [0.1687] [0.1265] [0.0725]
High Skill 0.7150 33480.04 0.0666 0.0707 −0.0080 0.0242 0.0419
[0.4520] (709) [0.0677] [0.1397] [0.1686] [0.0966] [0.1345]
Observations 421 709 709 709 296 135
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in brackets. Sample size in parenthesis.
Note: Column (1) displays the corresponding variable mean and standard deviation (in square
brackets) in single-ballot elections. Column (2) displays the optimal bandwidth value obtained
through Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and the sample size used in the calculation is displayed
below in parenthesis. Columns (4) and (5) display parametric estimates considering polynomial
splines of 3rd and 4th order, respectively, using a sample of municipalities within a 75,000 voters
distance from the zero cutoff. Column (3) displays baseline OLS results using the same sample.
Columns (6) and (7) display non-parametric estimates with samples restricted to the optimal
bandwidth in (2) and half of it, respectively. See Section 2.3.1 for a definition of high skill.
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Table 2.5: Dual-ballot treatment effects on observable candidates’ characteristics by
gender.
Panel A: All female candidates in both single- and dual-ballot races.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mean BW OLS Spline 3rd Spline 4th Optimal BW Half Optimal BW
Age 47.8119 30201.10 1.3894 12.6594** 5.7498 8.9580* 1.3894
[8.7060] (162) [2.9905] [5.8162] [5.4215] [4.6990] [2.9905]
University Degree 0.7822 22937.81 1.3894 0.2446 −0.0815 0.2335 0.2509*
[0.4148] (162) [2.9905] [0.2141] [0.2725] [0.1859] [0.1420]
High Skill 0.5644 33472.27 0.1179 −0.1956 −0.3894 −0.2429 −0.1409
[0.4983] (162) [0.1387] [0.2557] [0.3200] [0.2013] [0.3174]
Observations 101 162 162 162 76 30
Panel B: All male candidates in both single- and dual-ballot races.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mean BW OLS Spline 3rd Spline 4th Optimal BW Half Optimal BW
Age 50.0970 22712.83 −0.7783 0.0091 0.0558 0.6205 −0.7783
[10.8662] (1299) [1.2710] [2.6314] [3.0899] [2.1613] [1.2710]
University Degree 0.6922 26540.53 −0.7783 −0.1276 −0.1274 −0.1584 −0.0431
[0.4619] (1299) [1.2710] [0.1366] [0.1547] [0.1106] [0.0630]
High Skill 0.6287 19565.27 0.0439 0.0869 0.0405 0.0670 0.0460
[0.4834] (1299) [0.0467] [0.0968] [0.1121] [0.0892] [0.1368]
Observations 835 1299 1299 1299 291 159
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in brackets. Sample size in parenthesis.
Note: Column (1) displays the corresponding variable mean and standard deviation (in square
brackets) in single-ballot elections. Column (2) displays the optimal bandwidth value obtained
through Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and the sample size used in the calculation is displayed
below in parenthesis. Columns (4) and (5) display parametric estimates considering polynomial
splines of 3rd and 4th order, respectively, using a sample of municipalities within a 75,000 voters
distance from the zero cutoff. Column (3) displays baseline OLS results using the same sample.
Columns (6) and (7) display non-parametric estimates with samples restricted to the optimal
bandwidth in (2) and half of it, respectively. See Section 2.3.1 for a definition of high skill.
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Table 2.6: Dual-ballot treatment effects on campaign donations and spending.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mean BW OLS Spline 3rd Spline 4th Optimal BW Half Optimal BW
Total spending 1st round 1.5936 24606.31 −0.8073*** −0.0930 −0.1557 −0.1555 −0.4627
[1.7184] (499) [0.2923] [0.5174] [0.6049] [0.4864] [0.5577]
Total spending 1st/2nd round 0.5312 25575.12 −0.8073*** −0.0006 −0.1466 −0.0073 −0.1727
[0.5728] (487) [0.2923] [0.2300] [0.2616] [0.2094] [0.1174]
Total spending 1.8251 26482.71 −0.8073*** 0.1606 −0.0944 0.1357 −0.6747**
[1.8846] (417) [0.2923] [0.6049] [0.7093] [0.5935] [0.3042]
Fundraising total 1st round 1.4019 22399.17 −0.8073*** 0.0232 0.1211 0.0542 −0.5448**
[1.6042] (518) [0.2923] [0.4879] [0.6139] [0.4765] [0.2597]
Fundraising total 1st/2nd round 0.4673 27873.58 −0.8073*** 0.2707 0.1928 0.2607 −0.0548
[0.5347] (518) [0.2923] [0.2243] [0.2817] [0.1862] [0.1051]
Fundraising total 1.6721 24737.74 −0.4497 0.3049 0.4446 0.3633 0.1192
[1.9320] (518) [0.3289] [0.6184] [0.7567] [0.5746] [0.7599]
Observations 358 518 518 518 146 70
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in brackets. Sample size in parenthesis.
Note: Column (1) displays the corresponding variable mean and standard deviation (in square
brackets) in single-ballot elections. Column (2) displays the optimal bandwidth value obtained
through Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and the sample size used in the calculation is displayed
below in parenthesis. Columns (4) and (5) display parametric estimates considering polynomial
splines of 3rd and 4th order, respectively, using a sample of municipalities within a 75,000 voters
distance from the zero cutoff. Column (3) displays baseline OLS results using the same sample.
Columns (6) and (7) display non-parametric estimates with samples restricted to the optimal
bandwidth in (2) and half of it, respectively.
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Table 2.7: Dual-ballot treatment effects on sources of campaign funding for top two
candidates.
Panel A: Campaign funding (per capita) raised in the first round.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mean BW OLS Spline 3rd Spline 4th Optimal BW Half Optimal BW
Events 0.0196 22740.40 −0.0179 −0.0111 −0.0460 −0.0245 −0.0085
[0.1173] (467) [0.0172] [0.0304] [0.0339] [0.0228] [0.0204]
Voters 0.2891 26616.29 −0.0179 −0.0801 −0.0018 −0.0562 −0.0476
[0.3622] (467) [0.0172] [0.1208] [0.1804] [0.1089] [0.0794]
Companies 0.4894 20056.32 −0.0179 0.0789 0.0971 0.0833 −0.2719**
[0.8542] (467) [0.0172] [0.2671] [0.3493] [0.2732] [0.1350]
Public funding 0.0076 20816.63 −0.0179 −0.0054 −0.0069 −0.0063 0.0076
[0.0986] (467) [0.0172] [0.0150] [0.0170] [0.0067] [0.0080]
Party funding 0.2816 19036.88 −0.0179 0.1652 0.2484 0.2651* −0.1252
[0.6116] (467) [0.0172] [0.1278] [0.1775] [0.1508] [0.0900]
Unknown 0.0063 7086.51 0.0068 −0.0072 0.0121 0.0002 0.0001
[0.0989] (467) [0.0064] [0.0099] [0.0131] [0.0002] [0.0003]
Observations 327 467 467 467 41 19
Panel B: Campaign funding (per capita) raised in the election.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mean BW OLS Spline 3rd Spline 4th Optimal BW Half Optimal BW
Events 0.0215 32912.35 −0.0287 −0.0245 −0.0688 −0.0427 −0.0435
[0.1231] (467) [0.0204] [0.0399] [0.0435] [0.0255] [0.0355]
Voters 0.3619 32879.41 −0.0287 −0.1231 −0.0441 −0.0430 0.0078
[0.4526] (467) [0.0204] [0.1346] [0.1943] [0.1148] [0.0901]
Companies 0.5620 21228.35 −0.0287 0.3074 0.5451 0.4938 −0.1573
[0.9738] (467) [0.0204] [0.3488] [0.4770] [0.4054] [0.1533]
Public funding 0.0078 22013.48 −0.0287 −0.0045 −0.0064 −0.0065 0.0069
[0.0987] (467) [0.0204] [0.0151] [0.0171] [0.0067] [0.0081]
Party funding 0.3188 23050.91 −0.0287 0.3034* 0.2995 0.1863 −0.1014
[0.7171] (467) [0.0204] [0.1567] [0.2203] [0.1283] [0.1054]
Unknown 0.0063 7594.75 0.0069 −0.0072 0.0120 0.0002 0.0001
[0.0989] (467) [0.0064] [0.0099] [0.0131] [0.0002] [0.0003]
Observations 327 467 467 467 43 21
Panel B: Campaign funding (per capita) raised in the first round of single-ballot (monthly
average) against the second round of dual-ballot.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mean BW OLS Spline 3rd Spline 4th Optimal BW Half Optimal BW
Events 0.0065 19681.78 −0.0073 0.0069 −0.0161 −0.0066 0.0010
[0.0391] (467) [0.0059] [0.0144] [0.0117] [0.0067] [0.0070]
Voters 0.0964 16246.58 −0.0073 −0.0738 −0.0640 −0.0521 −0.0114
[0.1207] (467) [0.0059] [0.0507] [0.0666] [0.0622] [0.0303]
Companies 0.1631 19823.29 −0.0073 0.2332 0.3336 0.3026 −0.0152
[0.2847] (467) [0.0059] [0.1807] [0.2438] [0.2164] [0.0652]
Public funding 0.0025 20993.23 −0.0073 −0.0018 −0.0029 −0.0021 0.0024
[0.0329] (467) [0.0059] [0.0050] [0.0056] [0.0022] [0.0027]
Party funding 0.0939 21581.31 −0.0073 0.1316** 0.0843 0.1159 −0.0094
[0.2039] (467) [0.0059] [0.0644] [0.0868] [0.0689] [0.0383]
Unknown 0.0021 8251.18 0.0023 −0.0024 0.0039 0.0000 −0.0000
[0.0330] (467) [0.0021] [0.0033] [0.0044] [0.0000] [0.0001]
Observations 327 467 467 467 45 25
R2 0.016 0.018 0.022 0.072 0.126
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in brackets. Sample size in parenthesis.
Note: Column (1) displays the corresponding variable mean and standard deviation (in square
brackets) in single-ballot elections. Column (2) displays the optimal bandwidth value obtained
through Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and the sample size used in the calculation is displayed
below in parenthesis. Columns (4) and (5) display parametric estimates considering polynomial
splines of 3rd and 4th order, respectively, using a sample of municipalities within a 75,000 voters
distance from the zero cutoff. Column (3) displays baseline OLS results using the same sample.
Columns (6) and (7) display non-parametric estimates with samples restricted to the optimal
bandwidth in (2) and half of it, respectively. 112
Table 2.8: Dual-ballot treatment effects on political characteristics.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mean BW OLS Spline 3rd Spline 4th Optimal BW Half Optimal BW
Experience in Mayoral elections 0.5173 18665.06 −0.1248 0.2458** 0.2632** 0.1927 0.3679**
[0.8239] (1251) [0.0865] [0.1193] [0.1205] [0.1204] [0.1573]
Margin of votes (1st round) 0.1195 27371.89 −0.0389*** −0.0528* −0.0001 −0.0232 −0.0242
[0.1248] (1163) [0.0129] [0.0314] [0.0345] [0.0251] [0.0306]
Margin of votes (1st SB vs 2nd DB) 0.1750 23046.05 −0.1145** −0.1991*** −0.1210 −0.1145** −0.1145**
[0.1534] (264) [0.0439] [0.0744] [0.0903] [0.0439] [0.0439]
Incumbent race 0.3388 31660.89 −0.1145** 0.2007 0.1568 −0.0198 0.0144
[0.4746] (267) [0.0439] [0.1934] [0.2151] [0.1524] [0.1113]
Reelection Win 0.2240 35966.01 −0.1145** −0.0424 −0.1744 −0.0583 0.0490
[0.4181] (267) [0.0439] [0.1875] [0.2154] [0.1479] [0.1100]
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in brackets. Sample size in parenthesis.
Note: Column (1) displays the corresponding variable mean and standard deviation (in square
brackets) in single-ballot elections. Column (2) displays the optimal bandwidth value obtained
through Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and the sample size used in the calculation is displayed
below in parenthesis. Columns (4) and (5) display parametric estimates considering polynomial
splines of 3rd and 4th order, respectively, using a sample of municipalities within a 75,000 voters
distance from the zero cutoff. Column (3) displays baseline OLS results using the same sample.
Columns (6) and (7) display non-parametric estimates with samples restricted to the optimal
bandwidth in (2) and half of it, respectively.
Table 2.9: Dual-ballot treatment effects on health outcomes.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mean BW OLS Spline 3rd Spline 4th Optimal BW Half Optimal BW
Non-premature births 0.3991 20556.50 −0.0035 0.0051 0.0083 0.0045 −0.0014
[0.2605] (259) [0.0039] [0.0058] [0.0066] [0.0054] [0.0055]
Any prenatal visits 0.6294 20238.87 −0.0035 0.0053 0.0056 0.0071 −0.0013
[0.4109] (259) [0.0039] [0.0081] [0.0088] [0.0088] [0.0040]
Non-premature births (3 years) 0.4586 21293.10 −0.0035 0.0069 0.0104 0.0054 −0.0045
[0.3281] (259) [0.0039] [0.0077] [0.0088] [0.0072] [0.0052]
Any prenatal visits (3 years) 0.6963 20278.54 −0.0035 0.0070 0.0085 0.0090 −0.0022
[0.4410] (259) [0.0039] [0.0092] [0.0096] [0.0094] [0.0043]
Non-premature births (2nd and 3rd years) 0.4598 21402.52 −0.0035 0.0072 0.0095 0.0061 −0.0039
[0.3296] (259) [0.0039] [0.0072] [0.0079] [0.0065] [0.0047]
Any prenatal visits (2nd and 3rd years) 0.6969 20262.91 −0.0035 0.0058 0.0066 0.0070 −0.0033
[0.4414] (259) [0.0039] [0.0087] [0.0093] [0.0092] [0.0042]
Non-premature births (election year) 0.4998 23324.97 −0.0035 0.0001 0.0034 0.0013 −0.0010
[0.0051] (117) [0.0039] [0.0025] [0.0028] [0.0020] [0.0015]
Any prenatal visits (election year) 0.9718 25087.39 0.0024 −0.0017 −0.0076 0.0069 −0.0082
[0.0246] (117) [0.0083] [0.0145] [0.0163] [0.0139] [0.0103]
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in brackets. Sample size in parenthesis.
Note: Column (1) displays the corresponding variable mean and standard deviation (in square
brackets) in single-ballot elections. Column (2) displays the optimal bandwidth value obtained
through Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and the sample size used in the calculation is displayed
below in parenthesis. Columns (4) and (5) display parametric estimates considering polynomial
splines of 3rd and 4th order, respectively, using a sample of municipalities within a 75,000 voters
distance from the zero cutoff. Column (3) displays baseline OLS results using the same sample.
Columns (6) and (7) display non-parametric estimates with samples restricted to the optimal
bandwidth in (2) and half of it, respectively.
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Table 2.10: Dual-ballot treatment effects on transfers for capital investment.
Panel A: Transfers for capital investment for the full sample of municipalities.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mean BW OLS Spline 3rd Spline 4th Optimal BW Half Optimal BW
Discretionary transfers 11.2495 20198.71 0.7054 0.7177 0.4819 1.0945 −0.6584
[7.4749] (259) [0.5963] [1.2574] [1.1731] [1.0130] [1.1002]
Non-discretionary transfers 9.7850 26258.37 0.7054 1.2183 1.4717 1.3093 −0.2304
[7.0049] (259) [0.5963] [2.4039] [2.8766] [1.9703] [1.0876]
Discretionary transfers (3 years) 10.9158 24598.71 0.7054 −1.5162 −2.5059 −0.5637 0.2314
[7.3710] (259) [0.5963] [2.1963] [2.7931] [2.1687] [0.7887]
Non-discretionary transfers (3 years) 9.3919 25862.92 0.7054 1.0124 1.7797 1.1275 −0.2315
[6.9197] (259) [0.5963] [2.4183] [2.9401] [1.9959] [1.0914]
Discretionary transfers (election year) 14.4140 21211.90 0.7054 0.4458 −0.7116 0.8725 0.9104
[3.5504] (117) [0.5963] [1.1797] [1.0613] [0.8948] [0.8030]
Non-discretionary transfers (election year) 11.6159 22662.32 −1.0449 −0.5182 0.0560 −0.3493 −2.1525
[5.0868] (117) [1.7881] [2.7917] [3.1884] [2.3069] [3.1675]
Panel B: Transfers for capital investment in municipalities with first-term mayors.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mean BW OLS Spline 3rd Spline 4th Optimal BW Half Optimal BW
Discretionary transfers 8.8783 32234.27 0.1901 0.3141 1.1695 0.8175 1.1701
[8.1251] (91) [0.3343] [0.7328] [0.7406] [0.5667] [1.0578]
Non-discretionary transfers 7.7169 27391.21 0.1901 2.2137 0.4023 0.3054 −0.7342
[7.2791] (91) [0.3343] [1.7903] [1.2885] [1.4465] [0.8364]
Discretionary transfers (3 years) 8.7493 32678.30 0.1901 0.1336 1.0432 0.5741 0.1660
[8.0104] (91) [0.3343] [0.7317] [0.6916] [0.5475] [0.3578]
Non-discretionary transfers (3 years) 7.5571 27786.77 0.1901 2.3314 0.9430 0.2077 −1.0827
[7.1491] (91) [0.3343] [1.7491] [1.5187] [1.3130] [0.8544]
Discretionary transfers (election year) 15.3340 18576.04 0.1901 5.6883*** 7.6140*** 2.9985 0.6255
[1.0154] (28) [0.3343] [0.7192] [1.6457] [1.6196] [0.7999]
Non-discretionary transfers (election year) 12.0976 10839.17 2.1985 5.6553 3.1832 6.2464 −
[3.9729] (28) [2.8372] [5.9781] [8.8505] [3.6229] [.]
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in brackets. Sample size in parenthesis.
Note: Column (1) displays the corresponding variable mean and standard deviation (in square
brackets) in single-ballot elections. Column (2) displays the optimal bandwidth value obtained
through Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and the sample size used in the calculation is displayed
below in parenthesis. Columns (4) and (5) display parametric estimates considering polynomial
splines of 3rd and 4th order, respectively, using a sample of municipalities within a 75,000 voters
distance from the zero cutoff. Column (3) displays baseline OLS results using the same sample.
Columns (6) and (7) display non-parametric estimates with samples restricted to the optimal
bandwidth in (2) and half of it, respectively. Cells with dash indicate there were not enough
observations to run a model in that bandwidth.
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Table 2.11: Dual-ballot treatment effects on turnout, spoilt and blank votes.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mean BW OLS Spline 3rd Spline 4th Optimal BW Half Optimal BW
Blank 0.0294 20742.22 −0.0898 0.0014 −0.0003 −0.0021 −0.0012
[0.0168] (233) [0.0840] [0.0065] [0.0085] [0.0065] [0.0044]
Spoilt 0.0454 22518.92 −0.0898 0.0034 0.0052 0.0054 −0.0006
[0.0127] (233) [0.0840] [0.0066] [0.0079] [0.0061] [0.0042]
Turnout 0.8453 33546.13 0.0033 −0.0186 −0.0156 −0.0149 −0.0093
[0.0371] (307) [0.0092] [0.0128] [0.0159] [0.0109] [0.0171]
Observations 211 307 307 307 119 53
R2 0.117 0.126 0.135 0.158 0.149
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in brackets. Sample size in parenthesis.
Note: Column (1) displays the corresponding variable mean and standard deviation (in square
brackets) in single-ballot elections. Column (2) displays the optimal bandwidth value obtained
through Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and the sample size used in the calculation is displayed
below in parenthesis. Columns (4) and (5) display parametric estimates considering polynomial
splines of 3rd and 4th order, respectively, using a sample of municipalities within a 75,000 voters
distance from the zero cutoff. Column (3) displays baseline OLS results using the same sample.
Columns (6) and (7) display non-parametric estimates with samples restricted to the optimal
bandwidth in (2) and half of it, respectively.
Table 2.12: Differences in turnout, spoilt and blank votes across rounds of dual-ballot
elections.
Panel A: Sample of all elections within 75000 voters from the cuttoff.
Difference Std. Error Obs.
Blank 0.0125*** 0.0026 273
Spoilt 0.0185*** 0.0021 273
Turnout 0.0174*** 0.0055 273
Panel B: Sample of close elections within 75000 voters from the cuttoff.
Difference Std. Error Obs.
Blank 0.0109*** 0.0027 134
Spoilt 0.0176*** 0.0021 134
Turnout 0.0145** 0.0066 134
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Mean test of the differences in the share of votes of the correspondent variable between first
and second rounds of dual-ballot elections. Close elections in Panel B are defined as elections
where the top candidate received no more than ten percentage points more votes with respect to
the second placed candidate in the first round.
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Chapter 3
Voting motivations and political
corruption
3.1 Introduction
The literature has identified many reasons why citizens turnout to vote. They
range from strictly rational, such as the probability of altering election outcomes or
the expected returns in social welfare, to strictly behavioral, such as voting to impress
others or fulfill a sense of civic duty. It is natural to think that these considerations
not only determine voters’ turnout but also interact with the choice of candidates.
Whether politicians take into account the composition of voter types in the electorate
when deciding about rents extraction is still an open question.
According to political agency models, candidates are inherently corrupt and decide
about the extraction of rents based on voters’ capacity to hold them accountable.
Elections are the primary instrument for political accountability. Ousting corrupt
politicians from office, nevertheless, will depend on voters knowledge of corruption
events as well as how they update their beliefs about the corruption levels. Voters
who care less about public policies or who pay extra costs in acquiring information
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may have a diminished capacity for accountability. Candidates’ knowledge about the
size of this group and how it votes may enhance their opportunities for rent extraction
without major electoral drawbacks.
In this paper, I use a quasi-naturally generated group of voters with differential
political information and motivations for voting to investigate whether this has any
consequences to the way they vote and how politicians respond to it. The electoral
legislation in Brazil allows internal migrants to remain voting in their municipality of
origin if they so wish. Indeed, a large number of them return to vote, as the average
gap between the number of resident voters and the number of registered voters in net
sender municipalities reveals.
I exploit the variation in registration rates across Brazilian municipalities to ana-
lyze whether the size of this group of migrant voters has any implications to politicians
accountability. Mayoral corruption is measured using the well known Brazilian ran-
dom audits program considering three electoral cycles: 2004, 2008 and 2012.
Many identification issues emerge from this setting of double selection: citizens
choose to migrate and then where to vote. More than that, there can be a simulta-
neous causation between corruption, migration and registration rates. For example,
local government corruption levels may negatively affect the economy and become a
push factor for out-migration. This can either be positively or negatively related to
registration rates. On the one hand, voters could choose to remain voting in their mu-
nicipality of origin to try and improve the quality of politicians elected. On the other
hand, these voters could instead get discouraged with politics and request a transfer
to vote in their destination. In addition, municipalities with high migration levels
have non-observable socioeconomic and political characteristics that are correlated
with both the quality of local governments and migration.
The identification of the causal effects of changes in registration rates on cor-
ruption is possible by using the total variation of registration rates in destination
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municipalities, net of the change in registration rates in the municipality of origin
itself, as instruments for changes in registration rates in source municipalities. Be-
cause registration rates and migration are intrinsically related, migration by itself
could have an effect on corruption; changes in registration rates could also be captur-
ing that. I can separate these effects by adding arguably exogenous measures of in-
and out-migration as controls in the equation that estimates the effects of registra-
tion rates. For this, I follow the standard approach of the labor/migration literature
that uses the proportion of past immigrants of the same origin in a given destina-
tion for apportioning contemporaneous migration to the source location, net of its
contemporaneous migration itself.
I find that positive changes in registration rates generate a sizable causal increase
in the number of corruption events found in a municipality; politicians in these munic-
ipalities also perform worse in terms of the attraction of discretionary governmental
transfers. Because the bulk of the budget of a municipality is composed by earmarked
resources, extracting rents from discretionary transfers would not be a close substi-
tute. At the least, these results imply that politicians in less corrupt municipalities
are more concerned with their reputation and try to extract rents from non-monitored
resources, which would imply both less cases of corruption found and less cases of
non-detectable corruption. The impact of changes in registration rates on corruption
is not entirely explained by neither fraud in registration rates nor immigration or
return migration.
To try and shed some light on the mechanisms behind these effects, I first identify
voters’ motivations for keeping their registration in the source municipality. The idea
is that when migrant voters decide where to vote they are actually choosing between
elections. To evaluate whether the size of an election, and therefore pivotality, plays
a role in this decision I exploit the discontinuities in the allocation of the maximum
number of councillor seats across municipalities. These thresholds increase the re-
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quirement in the number of votes a party needs to elect a councillor and, therefore,
the size of an election. Using a fuzzy regression discontinuity design based on these
population thresholds, I argue that one strong motivation to remain voting in their
city of origin is the size of the election: the likelihood of being pivotal in smaller
elections is greater.
Candidates in turn can observe registration rates. There is probably some uncer-
tainty about turnout rates, but historical rates should be a good predictor and voting
in Brazil is compulsory. If candidates think that voting motivations for migrant voters
have a minor component that corresponds to benefits from public goods and know
that they have limited information about their performance in office, conditional on
the size of this group of voters, inconsequential extraction of rents can become easier.
Because there is positive selection in out-migration, imitating the behavior of resident
voters should on average reproduce choices of lower quality, on the assumption that
less educated voters are also less sophisticated. Note that this explanation does not
require that migrant voters actually return to vote systematically, only that party
elites believe that they can return. The total out-migration effects on corruption
stemming from the loss of more sophisticated voters (these include both those who
return and those who do not) and restricting the pool of citizens that could possibly
become better candidates do not seem to be as strong as the one of registration rates.
Perhaps because those who return to vote can be persuaded into offsetting the power
of remaining voters who care about performance and public goods.
This paper resides in three branches of literature: voting behavior, political cor-
ruption and turnout. It relates most closely to the literature on political corruption
and electoral accountability. These studies have focused on two mechanisms: electoral
institutions that incentivize good performance and press coverage that informs voters
about politicians behavior (see e.g. Ferraz and Finan (2011); Snyder and Strömberg
(2010). This paper focuses on voting motivation and its consequences for political
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corruption. Turnout of migrant voters seems to be consistent with instrumental the-
ories of voting, by which voters condition their decisions on the event of being pivotal
(Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1995). The empirical literature on this is still scarce,
with the more relevant studies being the laboratory experiments of Battaglini, Mor-
ton and Palfrey (2009) and the structural results of (Kawai and Watanabe, 2013). To
a lesser extent, my results are also related to the expressive theories of voting whereby
citizens vote because of social pressures (Dellavigna, List and Malmendier, 2015) or
because it is a civic duty to do so (Degan and Merlo, 2011).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 describes the institutional back-
ground in Brazilian elections and datasets used. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 focus on im-
plementation issues and empirical strategy. In Section 3.5 I present my first set of
results, the effects of registration rates on corruption and performance, along with
a discussion of the relationship between migration, registration rates and these out-
comes. Section 3.6 tries to understand the mechanisms through which registration
rates may affect corruption. Section 3.7 presents some robustness checks and Section
3.8 concludes the paper.
3.2 Institutional Background and Data
This section describes the institutional framework and the data used in the em-
pirical analysis.
3.2.1 Electoral Institutions
Brazil is a federation with 26 states and one federal district divided into 5567
municipalities. Each municipality chooses a new mayor and local legislature every
four years. All of them enjoy the same legal status. The Constitution establishes a
threshold of 200,000 registered voters to determine whether a municipality holds two-
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or one-round mayoral election. Municipalities above the threshold have a second
round election with the top two candidates of the first round when none of them
has obtained more than 50% of the valid votes. The election for councillors is held
simultaneously to that of males and follows the proportional rule to allocate seats.
The maximum number of seats available in a municipality is exogenously determined
by population thresholds.
All citizens above 18 and below 71 years of age are required to vote and face
penalties if they do not and fail to justify their absence. Having a clean electoral
record is necessary in order to obtain and regularize key documents, take office as
a civil servant and enrol on higher education institutions. To register for voting in
a municipality, a voter is requested to present a proof of address and has to have
been living there for at least three months. Once the voter is registered, in the case
she moves out to another municipality, she has the option to request a registration
transfer or remain voting in her municipality of origin. The longer an individual has
lived outside her voting municipality the more likely it is that the electoral authority
has held a voters’ re-registration program; in the case of re-registration, the voter
must travel back to the city, attend the local electoral court and present an address
proof to be able to keep their electoral register up to date at that municipality.
There have been two such programs at the national level: one in 1986, so as to
build an electronic database containing all the electorate information; and one that
has gradually been rolled-out since 2008, so as to collect biometric data of all the
electorate.
A local electoral authority can, however, run an electorate revision at its own
discretion when there is clear evidence of fraud or all of the issues below are detected:
1. the number of voters who request a transfer to a given municipality in a year is
10% higher than in the previous year;
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2. the number of registered voters is higher than the number of residents with age
70 or over plus two times the number of residents with ages between 10 and 15.
3. the number of voters in the municipality is higher than 65% of the population
estimated by the Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics (IBGE) for
that year.
These electorate revisions when approved by a judge are not normally run in
election years, only in exceptional circumstances. Many legal revision requests have
been submitted to electoral authorities over time, specially by opposition parties. All
under the allegation of fraud: the existence of “ghost voters”. They are basically dead
people that still manage to turn up and vote. However, very few of these requests
have been approved because not all the conditions above were met, as the thresholds
stablished by the law are very high.1 While it might be true that part of the high
registration rates is due to fraud, as we will see, they are also highly correlated with
out-migration rates. This indicates that at least part of the voters exceeding the
resident population in voting age is composed by those who choose to remain voting
in their home municipality.
Another aspect that also facilitates their return is that elections are always held
on the first Sunday of October, from 8am to 5pm. For municipalities with second
rounds, they are held on the last Sunday of October. The election day is considered a
national holiday. This is to guarantee that the majority of voters will not be working
on election day. If they do, employers are legally required to allow them time to go
and vote. Since voting is mandatory, voters do not necessarily have to cast a vote for
a candidate, the options for voting blank or spoiling the vote are also available. For
all these reasons, turnout for all elections in Brazil is very high.
1Apparently, the criterion used to get to these thresholds was that the number of irregularly
registered voters should be high enough to affect the outcome of an election.
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3.2.2 Data sources and implementation
Voters Data
The data on the number of registered voters in each municipality is provided by
the national electoral authority, Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE). It releases detailed
data on the number of voters by age groups in election years. Therefore, the available
data is biennial and stretches from 1996 to 2014.
I use IBGE Censuses and Population Counts2 to construct a database of resident
voters by age groups in each municipality. I rely on the annual population estimates
provided by DataSus (Departamento de Informática do Sistema Único de Saúde),
the statistical division of the Ministry of Health, to calculate the number of resident
voters for the remaining years. DataSus takes the population estimates provided by
IBGE3, used to allocate intergovernmental transfers, that are based on population
size, across municipalities (see Brollo et al. (2013)), and stratifies them by age. These
are the only available estimates of the Brazilian population by municipality and age.
I discuss the precision of these estimates in Subsection 3.3.2.
By matching the datasets from the two sources, I can calculate the ratio between
the number of registered voters and the number of voting age people who actually
live in the municipality. A ratio greater than one indicates that the municipality has
more voters than resident voters.
Elections and Candidates Data
Data on mayoral elections outcomes and candidates’ characteristics are also avail-
able from the electoral authority (TSE) for the election years 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008
2IBGE counts the population of all municipalities with up to 150,000 residents 5 years past the
Census. I use years 1996 and 2007.
3The data and estimates methodology are available at http://tabnet.datasus.gov.br/cgi/
ibge/popdescr.htm.
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and 2012. Here I use the same dataset on candidates characteristics described in
Chapter 2.
These characteristics include age, gender, education and occupation.4 Based on
occupational skill levels, I create a dummy variable called High-Medium Skill, that is
one for groups of occupations that require the execution of more complex tasks and
zero otherwise. I use this variable as a proxy for politicians’ quality.
Measuring Mayors’ Performance
To measure mayors performance I follow Fujiwara (2010) and Brollo and Troiano
(2016) and consider the attraction of discretionary transfers of capital.
Data on discretionary transfers are available from Brazilian National Treasury
(Tesouro Nacional) for most of the municipalities5 and years. As in Brollo and Troiano
(2016), I consider discretionary transfers of capital as a measure of politicians’ ability
to attract resources to the municipality, since they depend on agreements (convênios)
made between the municipality and the federal or state governments. I consider the
average transfers received during the first three years of the four-year mayoral term
as my variable of interest. This is to net out effects of political cycles in transfers.6
Corruption Data
The data on corruption comes from an audit program initiated in 2003 by Con-
troladoria Geral da União (CGU), that randomly selects municipalities for the appli-
cation of rigorous audits. This data has also been used by Ferraz and Finan (2011)
and Brollo et al. (2013). The institution gathers information about irregularities in
4As defined by the International Standard Classification of Occupations 2008 (ISCO08) - ILO.
5The data is self-reported by the municipalities and is available for 95% of them. I keep in the
sample those municipalities that reported transfers for all the years.
6All the values are in R$ 2000 prices.
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the use of federal transfers and classify them in a scale of corruption according to how
serious they are:
(i) Mild Corruption These are irregularities more related to the lack of technical
knowledge in the management of the resources than with corruption itself. They
are mistakes that do not affect the application of the resources in question.
(ii) Moderate Corruption These irregularities will affect the execution of the pro-
grams funded by the resources involved, but according to the judgement of
CGU’s auditors do not significantly compromise their outcomes. This category
can include the same bad practices of those classified as severe corruption but
differ in their intensity.
(iii) Severe Corruption According to CGU these are the irregularities that will really
compromise the execution of programs funded by the resources involved. Ex-
amples of these are favoritism in procurement, purchase of overpriced products,
lack of purchase receipts and delay in the execution of infrastructure projects.
The data contain the number of irregularities in each category for the municipal-
ities audited. To relieve concerns about the subjectivity in the classification between
moderate and severe corruption, I put together these two types of corruption and
call it corruption. All municipalities present many cases of mild corruption and this
category has a low variability.
I obtained the amount of resources audited in each municipality by scraping the
audit reports available at CGU’s website7 and linking them to the database above.
All values are in Brazilian Reais considering prices of the baseline year (2000).
7http://www.cgu.gov.br/assuntos/auditoria-e-fiscalizacao/pesquisa-de-relatorios
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Migration Data
Using 1990, 2000 and 2010 censuses, provided by the Brazilian Institute of Geog-
raphy and Statistics (IBGE), I build a database of all the bilateral flows of migrants
across Brazilian municipalities. The Census normally applies a specific questionary
about migration to a large sample of the population, so it is representative at the
municipality level. The 2010 Census asked how long the individual had lived in their
current location, and if the answer was less or equal to 10 years, they further asked the
municipality they had lived in before moving. Using the two questions I can approx-
imate the bilateral flows of migrants across municipalities for each year since 2000.
The other two censuses only asked individuals for their previous place of residence up
to 5 years before the interview.
Defining Local Economies
In the construction of the instruments, to be described in detail later, I have to
account for the fact that shocks in a municipality may be diffused among all the
components of a local economy. Following the definition of local labor markets used
in a recent literature in labor economics (see e.g Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2015),
Costa, Garred and Pessoa (2016) and Dix-Carneiro, Soares and Ulyssea (2016)), I
use the geographic units “microregions” constructed by IBGE. These are contiguous
municipalities integrated in local economies. Brazil comprehends 558 such units, with
an average of 13 municipalities per unit. Economic shocks outside a municipality’s
“microregion” may be considered plausibly exogenous for that municipality.
Apart from this, I am also interested in excluding from the analysis destination
municipalities that are too close to sending municipalities. Because this would imply
voters have easy access to their municipality of origin and, thus, to information.
In addition, these municipalities may be similar in many respects and, therefore,
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destination municipalities characteristics would not be exogenous. Excluding bilateral
flows of voters within a local economy will also serve this purpose.
Other Data
From the 2000 Census, I also extract a set of demographic and socioeconomic
controls at the municipality level. These variables are the baseline characteristics
used in all regressions. They include a measure of income inequality (Gini Index),
the log of average income (Log Income), the rate of unemployment (Unemployed),
the percentage of public sector workers (Public Sector Workers), the share of the
population living in a rural area (Rural), the percentage of the population with a
given education level (University-Degree, High-School, Illiterates), and the log of total
population (Log Population).
3.3 Baseline model, sample selection and measure-
ment error in registration rates
3.3.1 Baseline Model
In this paper, I am primarily interested in estimating the effects of registration
rates on the behavior of politicians. Let Yit be the outcome of interest, number of
corruption events, for municipality i in time t. I use data on mayoral elections from
three electoral cycles, 2004, 2008 and 2012, to estimate the following baseline model:
Yit = α + βRit +X ′i,t=2000γ + It + Πs + it, i = 1, . . . , n. (3.1)
where Rit represents registration rates in municipality i in time t and X includes mu-
nicipalities characteristics extracted from the 2000 Census (a measure of inequality
(Gini Index), the log of average household income, percentage of rural population,
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percentage of illiterates, percentage of adults with secondary education, the percent-
age of civil servants and population size in log units). Because of the variation in
state governments and its influence on local politics I include a set of state intercepts
(Πs). To capture elections differences, I also include election-year fixed effects (It).
Errors are clustered at the municipality level.
The next two subsections discuss how accurate registration rates (Rit) are in ac-
counting for migrant voters who remain voting in their municipality of origin and how
treated municipalities are selected within those for which corruption data is available.
3.3.2 Registration Rates: Registered Voters vs Resident Vot-
ers
I define registration rates as the ratio between the number of registered voters in
a municipality and its number of resident voters. In this subsection, I discuss how
these two variables have evolved over time and how far they are from each other by
different age groups of voters. I also discuss possible sources of measurement error in
the number of resident voters.
Figures 3.1 and 3.3 display the average gap between the number of voters regis-
tered in a municipality and its number of residents in voting age over a period of nine
years, from 1996 to 2012.8 Out of census years, I use population estimates provided
by the Brazilian Ministry of Health (Datasus). I split the sample of municipalities at
the 200,000 voters threshold used to allocate single and dual-ballot elections across
municipalities, as this will also reflect large cities that receive a high number of mi-
grants.
In Figure 3.1 I include voters with age 16 or above. In census years, the most
precise estimates of resident voters, small municipalities (below 200k voters, Figure
3.1(a)) have slightly more resident voters than registered voters. For large municipal-
8The electoral authority has biannual releases of voters’ data.
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ities (above 200k voters, Figure 3.1(b)), this gap is even larger and this is true for all
years in the sample.
Figure 3.2 reveals where the noise for small municipalities come from. It includes
in the sample only 16-17 year olds. As previously discussed, voting is compulsory in
Brazil for citizens between 18 and 70 years of age. But for 16 and 17 year olds voting
or registering for voting is voluntary. Therefore, young voters not registering with
the electoral authority might account for part of the gap displayed in Figure 3.1.
In Figure 3.3 I exclude these young voters for which voting is voluntary. Note
that now the gap between the two measures is inverted for small municipalities only,
whereas for large municipalities it has been narrowed. Since 16-17 is an entry thresh-
old, there is also some noise stemming from the disconnect between the date of the
Census interviews and birth dates. For example, at the time of the interview a voter
may not yet be 16 years old, but by the time of the election she will be and, thus,
will have registered with the electoral authority.
There is also some measurement error coming from the fact that voters above 70
years of age are not required to vote as well. It adds to that the fact that this group
of people are more sensitive to mobility problems and less likely to vote. Therefore,
adding this group to the computation of registration rates would over estimate the
number of actual voters in a municipality. Consequently, to increase precision, I
include only voters between the ages of 18 and 70 (inclusive) in the registration rates
used in all the specifications.
As for the measurement error related to the estimates of the number of residents,
its size varies to the extent to which migration and deaths are relatively stable over
a 9 years period of time. Since these are population estimates of the Ministry of
Health, and it has a centralized system that monitors the number of deaths in a
municipality, it is expected that their estimates can account well for this source of
variability. In both 1996 and 2007, municipalities with population below 150,000 had
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their residents counted. So the data for these years are as precise as in Census years
for smaller municipalities.
The level of registration rates is determined in part by the stock of migrants in a
municipality which was greatly determined by migratory waves of previous decades.
However, the longer an individual has lived outside her voting municipality the more
likely it is that she will have asked for a transference and/or a re-registration program
has taken place. Therefore, the sample of municipalities with high registration rates
should capture recent migration only.
3.3.3 Sample Selection
The sample of municipalities audited by the anti-corruption program, even though
obtained through randomization, does not ensure a balance in sample size both across
groups and over time. The randomization is based on a single sequence of random
assignments through the national lottery and samples (with replacement across years)
from the set of all Brazilian municipalities with less than 450,000 inhabitants.9 There-
fore, we have to find some criterion to resample these municipalities appropriately in
terms of registration rates.
The sample of audited municipalities made available by CGU comprises 1,158 mu-
nicipalities. Corruption events are classified as mild, moderate or severe. It includes
data from draws realized from 2006 to 2014. An average of 128 municipalities were
drawn by year, with a minimum of 24 in 2012 and a maximum of 180 in 2007. Ta-
bles 3.1 and 3.2 compare the means of characteristics of municipalities – such as per
capita income, education and urbanization – at the top and bottom percentiles of the
distribution of registration rates. Except for the Gini coefficient of income, different
percentiles are significantly different in means across all dimensions considered.
9This includes approximately 92% of all Brazilian municipalities.
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Figure 3.4 displays the quantile distribution of registration rates. About 20%
of the municipalities are on or above one, that is, have more registered voters than
resident voters. However, the closest we get to one the more likely it is that the
difference from one is just due to noise. Because the threshold for identifying munic-
ipalities with high registration rates is not well defined, we need to analyse in more
detail how migration may determine registration rates.
Consider that in time t = 0, when there is no movement of voters, voters regis-
tration (R0) is exactly equal to the number of resident voters (N0), and therefore,
R0/N0 = 1. In time t = 1, we allow for both in- and out-migration. The registration
rate in time t = 1, will now be given by
R1
N1
= R0 + InMig1 −OutMig1
N0 + InMig1 −OutMig1 (3.2)
However, not everyone who migrates requests a transfer of registration, therefore we
have
R1
N1
= R0 + (InMig1 −OutMig1)
N0 + (InMig1 −OutMig1) +
(ROut1 −NRIn1)
N0 + (InMig1 −OutMig1) (3.3)
ROut1 stands for the voters who out-migrate but remain registered in their municipal-
ity of origin and RIn1 stands for the in-migrants that do not request a transfer to the
host municipality. Note that if there are deaths and new citizens entering compulsory
voting age, registration rates should still remain equal to one.
The registration rate in t = 1 given by equation 3.3 is zero whenever (ROut1 =
NRIn1) ≥ 0. However, this condition is very unlikely. Abstracting from any dis-
turbances stemming from measurement error, whenever (ROut1 − NRIn1) > 0, reg-
istration rates will be above one in t = 1, and below one, otherwise. As the time
passes, and migratory flows evolve, registration rates could go either above or below
one. In fact, if we start with R0/N0 < 1 and allow for migratory movements with
imperfect registration, there could still be a positive variation in (ROut1−NRIn1) and
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we would not observe it by just looking at above one registration rates. The same
argument is true when we start with R0/N0 > 1, and there is a negative variation in
(ROut1 − NRIn1), such that R1/N1 < 1. Consequently, a priori, we cannot classify
municipalities by just observing registration rates in levels.
However, we can observe the variation in registration rates between elections. And
since the imperfect registration rates we are interested in are entirely related to migra-
tion10, we can combine variation in registration rates with variation in migration to
elicit municipalities that should be in our sample. If R1/N1−R0/N0 = ∆RegRate1 >
0, even in the case where R0/N0 6= 1, registration rates are rising faster than the
number of resident voters. If politicians observe this, they can react to it both in
terms of policy and campaign efforts.
Based on this argument, the inclusion of a municipality in the sample used here
is decided according to the following algorithm:
(i) Take municipalities’ full history of registration rates from 1996 to 2012 and
calculate differences with respect to the previous election. Keep those munici-
palities who had at least one positive variation in registration rates.
(ii) Calculate the net out-migration for all these municipalities and retain from
the previous sample only those who are above the 25th percentile of net out-
migration.
Criterion (i) accounts for the fact that every time there is a positive variation in
registration rates, under the assumption of small measurement error, the number of
registered voters is growing faster than the number of resident voters. Note that this
is independent of the level of registration rates of the municipality. To avoid cases
where (ROut1 −NRIn1) is negative, which is the case where in-migration would cause
the municipality to have more residents than voters, and this would affect politicians
10Those related to fraud or measurement error would accumulate confounding factors.
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differently, in criterion (ii) I keep only those municipalities that have a reasonably
high net out-migration (above the 25th percentile), since out-migration is the only
mechanism that would produce the variation in registration rates we are interested in
– that is, only sufficiently high out-migration will produce registered voters that are
non-residents. Because this excludes municipalities that have variation in registration
rates not due to out-migration, it is also useful to reduce measurement error and the
possibility that these registration rates are capturing fraudulent registration of voters.
Table 3.3 compares characteristics of this sample of municipalities, referred to
as “out-migration sample” throughout the text, against the characteristics of the re-
maining municipalities in the corruption sample, referred to as “general sample”. Mu-
nicipalities in the out-migration sample present, on average, higher income inequality,
lower education levels and income per capita, are more rural and less populated. In
addition, a higher percentage of voters in these municipalities work as civil servants.
By using this sample, I exploit the variation in intensity of treatment, that is, the
variation in registration rates only across municipalities for which net out-migration
is above the 25th percentile.
3.4 Identification Strategy
This section formalizes the empirical strategy that allows for the identification
of causal effects of changes in registration rates, therefore voting motivations, on
corruption and performance.
There are obvious endogeneity problems in registration rates, but the most chal-
lenging issue to be taken into consideration is that registration rates are correlated
with migration. This correlation induces a simultaneous determination of both reg-
istration rates and corruption, because migration can directly affect corruption. I
am interested in the effects of out-migration on corruption only through its impact
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in the variation of registration rates. Therefore, not only an exogenous variation in
registration rates is necessary, but also in migration.
A good IV candidate has to be correlated with registration rates but not directly
correlated with migration in addition to the usual exclusion restriction that would
solve the problems of simultaneity, measurement error and omitted variables. Because
changes in registration rates are a direct consequence of migration, it is not possible
to find orthogonal exogenous variation in both of them. The approach adopted here
will be to find an IV for registration rates and construct measures of migration flows
that can be included as controls in our specification.
The simultaneous determination of registration rates and corruption works
through many channels. For example, municipalities with more corrupt politicians
would have a higher out-migration rate and these voters displaced by bad gov-
ernments would hardly be willing to keep their voting duties there. In this case,
out-migration and variation in registration rates would be negatively correlated, gen-
erating a downward bias in the registration rates coefficient. Conversely, these voters
could instead be more interested in politics after having verified the consequences of
voting in certain types of politicians and are keen to improve their place of origin. In
this case, the coefficient on registration rates would be upward biased.
As previously explained in Section 3.2.2, because Census questions can recover
only the movement of people who remain in a destination until the date of the in-
terview, those with short migration spells, length of less than 5 years before the
interview, are not captured. This could lead to attenuation bias in the inference of
migration effects.
As mentioned earlier, there is also some measurement error in the population
estimates used to calculate registration rates, but it is a lesser concern because regis-
tration rates will only have an effect on corruption to the extent to which politicians
know about it. Politicians know precisely how many voters are there in a munici-
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pality, as TSE data is publicly available, and may base their decisions on population
estimates as well.
As for the omitted variable bias, one possibility is that corrupt municipalities have
an electorate that is more ideological and thus have a higher tolerance to corruption
(Boukouras and Koufopoulos, 2008). Politicians respond to that extracting more
rents. Ideological out-migrants could probably get a higher value from voting in
their home municipalities generating a spurious correlation between registration rates
and corruption through ideology. Politicians would extract more rents both with or
without higher registration rates.
With these considerations in mind, in the following subsections I develop an in-
strument for registration rates and plausibly exogenous measures of both in- and
out-migration.
3.4.1 Developing an instrument for registration rates
When an internal migrant decides where to vote, she might factor in elections’
characteristics, traveling and transference costs. To request a registration transfer,
the citizen has to wait three months time after moving and pay a visit to the electoral
authority with, among other documents, a proof of address in that municipality.
Otherwise, the voter can choose to leave her registration as it is and, in the case she
cannot travel to her electoral domicile and vote in election day, she can go to the
closest polling place and justify her abstention without any incurring penalties. In
this sense, it is probably more costly to request a transfer.
Voters’ types may also play a role in this decision. An instrumental voter may
be more likely to vote in the host municipality, considering that she will not benefit
from any policies implemented in her home municipality, at least directly or contem-
poraneously. If she does derive benefits from it, differences in the size of the elections,
and therefore pivotality, may influence this decision instead. It is important to high-
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light that local elections are less ideological than national elections. At the local level
voters are more concerned about public goods, property values, taxes, etc.
To try and get rid of this selection process, I focus on exogenous conditions in
destination municipalities that might influence voters’ decision to request a transfer.
Since it is not clear what these conditions could be – for example, peer effects from
previous migrants or distance to the local electoral court or distance to the source
municipality, etc – I use the decision made by internal migrants who arrive in all the
destinations of out-migrants of a given source municipality net of its own possible
contribution to it. In other words, I extract the variation in registration rates of
municipalities that are destinations of out-migrants of the municipality of interest, but
discounting the variation in registration rates stemming from the source municipality
itself. To make sure destination municipalities are sufficiently different from source
municipalities, I consider only destinations that are outside the source municipalities’
microregion (as defined in Section 3.2.2). The idea is that the variation in registration
rates of destination municipalities that are independent of the variation in registration
rates of a given source municipality will aggregate reasons for not requesting a transfer
that are peculiar to those destinations and exogenous to the variation in registration
rates of any given source municipality.
More formally, let ∆Rd be the variation in registration rates in destination d with
respect to the previous election. Consider the set of all destinations d where the
source municipality o has sent voters to, Do = {1, . . . , Nod}, with Nod > 3, and define
γd as being the proportion of the variation in registration rates in municipality d
relative to the total variation in registration rates of all municipalities in Do.
γd = ∆Rd/
∑
Do
∆Rd
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γd is then the factor used to remove the variation in registration rates of the munici-
pality of origin o from each destination d, as in the equation below:
∆̂Rd = ∆Rd − γd∆Ro, d ∈ Do (3.4)
where ∆̂Rd is, therefore, the variation in registration rates of destination d net of
the variation in registration rates of the source municipality o. Because the set Do
for each source municipality o is large, a sufficient statistic is needed to summarize
these data and be used as an IV. The median seems to be a natural candidate, as it
is relatively less skewed towards extremely large or small values and, therefore, may
give a better idea of a typical destination municipality for each source.
The median value Mo of all the values ∆̂Rd, with d ∈ Do, is the IV for ∆Ro.
That is, Mo = ∆̂Rd(Nod+1
2
) for an odd number of destinations (Nod) and Mo =∆̂Rd(Nod
2
) + ∆̂Rd(Nod
2 +1
) 0.5, otherwise.
The median destination, in terms of variation in registration rates, net of the
variation in registration rates in the origin, should be correlated with variation in
registration rates of the origin municipality to the extent to which it proxies for
factors in the destination that influence internal migrants in general to request a
transfer or not. The necessary exclusion restriction is that variation in registration
rates in the median destination municipality, net of the variation stemming from the
origin municipality itself, affects corruption in the origin municipality only through
its influence on migrants’ decision of requesting a transfer.
3.4.2 Developing an exogenous measure of in- and out-
migration flows
The thought experiment used for creating an instrument for migration resembles
the one in the previous section. We need a variable that captures factors that influence
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migration decisions but that is not correlated with contemporaneous economic or
political shocks in the source/destination municipality.
A number of empirical studies in the immigration literature uses historical settle-
ment of immigrants as an instrument to estimate the effects of migration on economic
outcomes (See e.g. Card, 2001; Dustmann, Hatton and Preston, 2005; Altonji and
Card, 2007). The idea is that prospective immigrants choose locations on the basis
of the strength of immigrant networks, something that is not correlated with contem-
poraneous economic shocks, as long as historical migration is sufficiently lagged and
cross-sectional permanent differences have been differenced out.
Following the same argument, the instrument developed here uses the 1990s dis-
tribution of the stock of internal migrants across municipalities to allocate the new
waves of in- and out-migrants to a given municipality. For example, if one-third of
the total number of internal migrants in 2000 were living in Sao Paulo and two-thirds
in Rio de Janeiro, the instrument allocates one-third of the new migrants of a given
year to Sao Paulo and two-thirds to Rio de Janeiro.
Formally, consider the set of all municipalities in the country I = 1, . . . , 5565. In-
or out-migration in municipality i will be given by:
Xit =
Xi,2000∑
I
Xi,2000
∗∑
I
X−i,t, t = 2004, 2008, 2012. (3.5)
where Xi,2000 is the stock of in- or out- migrants in municipality i in 2000, Xit is the
flow of in- or out- migrants in municipality i in year t considering the date of migration
reported by the voter in the census of 2010, and ∑
I
X−i,t is the aggregate of the flows
of in- or out-migrants of all Brazilian municipalities but i. The migration flow in
year t considers the aggregate of flows of the previous three years. Migration flows
in the election year is excluded to avoid including migrant voters that still have fresh
information about the municipality as well as politically motivated migration. The
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national flow of internal migration is likely to be exogenous within a single state or
municipality. But for large municipalities this assumption may not hold. To deal with
this concern, municipality i’s contemporaneous flow of migrants is netted out from
the total contemporaneous flow in the second term of the equation. The necessary
assumption for an exclusion restriction to hold here is that unobserved factors that
determine the decision of migrants to leave city i in the 1990s are uncorrelated with
contemporaneous political and economic shocks in i.
3.5 Results
This section investigates the effects of registration rates on corruption and imple-
ments the IV estimations discussed in Section 3.4.
3.5.1 Effects of registration rates on corruption
This section presents estimates of the effects of registration rates on the number of
corruption events. Table 3.1 contains OLS regression results from estimating variants
to equation 3.1. The specification in the first column estimates the effects of reg-
istration rates on corruption, controlling only for elections intercepts. Columns (2)
and (3) extend this specification to include intercepts for the years the municipalities
were drawn in the audit program and state intercepts,11 respectively. Column (4)
adds municipal characteristics.
The results suggest that registration rates and their associated effect on politicians
choice of rents, on average, had a significant positive effect on the number of corrup-
tion events found in a municipality. One percentage point increase in registration
rates would imply that 40 more cases of corruption would be found, on average. Au-
dit years and state intercepts reduce this effect by about 12% with a loss in precision.
11This sample spams 23 out of 26 states in Brazil.
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State intercepts added in Column (3), to account for state-level changes potentially
driven by state-specific politics, further reduce this effect to 23.6 corruption cases.
This indicates that some of the states that faced the highest variations in registration
rates also displayed other characteristics that contributed to the growth of corruption,
initially biasing the coefficient.
The inclusion of municipal characteristics in Column (4), however, just absorbs
some of the variation in the error term, and does not alter significantly the estimated
effect or the estimated precision. In Column (5) the same specification is estimated,
but the total value of transfers audited in each municipality is added as a control.
This specification addresses concerns about the definition of transfers used here and
the so called “political resource course”. That is, more transfers leave scope for more
corruption. The transfers audited in each municipality are ear marked resources and
allocated through exogenous population thresholds. However, as Brollo et al. (2013)
shows, some municipalities receive more resources then those compatible with their
population size. Therefore, the value of resources audited is potentially endogenous.
Adding the value of the resources audited as a control only increases the parameter
estimate by 2.4% and slightly improves precision. The number of cases of corruption is
really increasing on the amount of resources audited, but it does not affect significantly
the coefficient of registration rates on corruption. This indicates that the variation in
the amount of resources a municipality receives and that is audited does not follow
that of registration rates in our sample, at least not to a great extent. Because of
these endogeneity concerns the specification used henceforth is that of Column (4).
3.5.2 The causal effect of registration rates on corruption
Column (1) in Table 3.5 presents the results from the reduced-form specification
analyzing the effect of changes in registration rates at destination municipalities on the
number of corruption cases found in the source municipality. As we would expect,
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the larger the variation in destinations’ registration rates the lower the variation
in registration rates in the source municipality. Similarly, though more precisely
estimated, the first-stage in column (2) displays a direct negative correlation between
registration rates in destination and source municipalities.
The first-stage is sufficiently strong, with an F-statistic of around 15. The second
stage result shows that an increase in registration rates also lead to an increase in
the verified number of corruption cases. On average, 42 extra cases of corruption
would be verified for each percentage point increase in registration rates. Moving
a municipality from the 90th percentile to the 10th percentile of the distribution of
registration rates, leads to a variation of 0.39 percentage point. According to the first-
stage results, this would lead to a reduction of 0.34 in median destination registration
rates. One percentage point increase in source registration rates means that one
percent of voters leave the municipality and none of them request a vote transfer in
the destination. To put this number into context, in the sample used to estimate
this model, a municipality in the 90th percentile of corruption, had 83 more cases of
corruption detected.
3.5.3 Placebo Exercise
To address concerns about the exclusion restriction assumption that the instru-
ment affects corruption only through conditions in destination municipalities that
prevent voters from requesting a vote transfer, I run the following placebo exercise.
In Section 3.4, a sample containing only municipalities with out-migration rates
above the 25th percentile was chosen to guarantee that changes in registration rates
were more likely to stem from migrant voters keeping their home electoral domicile
after moving, rather than fraud or measurement error. The remaining sample contains
municipalities for which changes in registration rates are supposedly unrelated to
migratory movements.
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If the change in registration rates for the median destination municipalities proxies
for any factor other than those that affect registration rates in the source municipality,
when we use this sample to regress registration rates, for the median destination mu-
nicipalities, on the number of corruption cases, employing the same specification used
in the previous section, the coefficient should come out statistically significant. Table
3.6 depicts the results of this exercise. The relationship between these two variables
is small, positive and with large standard errors. An indication that registration rates
for the median destination municipalities do not capture any other aspect related to
the incidence of corruption in an audited municipality. Therefore, omitted variables
do not seem to challenge the credibility of the identification strategy used here.
3.5.4 Internal out-migration and corruption
While sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 established a connection between positive changes
in registration rates and corruption, this section investigates the mechanisms through
which this could happen.
As discussed earlier, changes in registration rates could just be capturing the
effects of in- and out-migration. Internal migration affects sending and receiving
locations through differing mechanisms: by altering the distribution of characteristics
of the population such as age, schooling and marital status, the so called compositional
effects, and by affecting the capital to labor ratio in the economy, yielding further
implications to wages, employment and investment.
The magnitude of the compositional effects depend on the size of the internal mi-
grant population and the degree of substitution and complementarity between movers
and residents. If there is positive self-selection in migration and it is sufficiently high,
on the assumption of low substitutability, the source area may suffer with a shortage
of qualified labor force, for example. Internal migration is therefore a potential source
of demographic change and economic growth.
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Empirical evidence regards characteristics such as average income (Hicks, 1963;
Sjaastad, 1962) and/or regional differences in the return to skills in destination areas
(Borjas, Freeman and Katz, 1997; Roy, 1951) as the main attractors for migrants.
Therefore, working age people with relatively high levels of schooling and income
are normally more likely to migrate to larger metropolitan centres. These variables
in turn have been shown to be correlated with voters’ participation, abstention and
ideological positions.
There is also a literature that demonstrates the population composition by itself
actually affects the provision of public goods. The so called intergenerational compe-
tition in the allocation of public sector resources. For example, Poterba (1996) shows
American states that experience an increase in the elderly population have a corre-
spondent reduction in education spending per child. In Alesina, Baqir and Easterly
(1999), the provision of productive public goods by white majorities respond to the
variation in the size of minority groups.
To assess the extent to which the effects found through high registration rates are
due to labor market changes or population recomposition, I use the flow of in- and
out-migrants in the previous three years leading up to an election, as described in
Section 3.2.
For a double IV strategy to work here we would need at least one instrumental
variable for either registration rates or migration that we could plausibly claim is or-
thogonal to the other. Otherwise, adding the two IV’s would just build up the bias. If
we are interested in the effects of registration rates alone, net of the migration effects,
the concern about adding migration in the right hand side of the equation is twofold:
(i) contemporaneous migration can potentially be related to ex-ante corruption and
(ii) it is also indirectly related to corruption via negative economic shocks that are
turned into push factors and, perhaps, facilitate corruption. To address this issue
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and be able to add migration as a control in the previous specification I construct
plausibly exogenous measures of migration as described in Section 3.2.
Table 3.7 displays the estimates of our preferred specification from the previous
section including endogenous and plausibly exogenous measures of migration flows.
The first four columns present coefficients from an OLS specification, while the last
two columns contain the corresponding IV results. In Column (1) endogenous mea-
sures of in- and out-migration are added as controls. For parsimony, in Column (2),
I include only net-migration, which restricts arrivals and departures to exert equal
and opposite effects on corruption. The estimated coefficients for registration rates
remain unchanged in both cases. However, the coefficients for in- and out-migration
are very close to zero with large standard errors, indicating that attenuation bias may
be a concern. The same is true when net out-migration is added. To account for this,
in Columns (3) and (4) I add plausibly exogenous migration measures. Besides being
more exogenous, they are also more precise to the extent to which a municipality’s
stock of migrants over a decade is closer to actual migration than yearly flows. In-
deed, coefficients on in-, out- and net out-migration become larger (in absolute value)
but still with wide confidence intervals that contain zero.
The coefficient in registration rates, however, does not change significantly. While
the relationship between in-migration and corruption is positive and large, the co-
efficient does not meet the conventional standards for statistical significance. Con-
versely, out-migration has instead a negative and small relationship with corruption,
with wide confidence intervals as well. In the last two columns, the two-stages least
squares coefficient for registration rates declines by less than 2% both in the more
flexible specification with in- and out-migration and the more restrictive with net
out-migration.
Considering the results in Column (5), a variation of one percentage point in reg-
istration rates, following one percentage point increase in both in- and out-migration
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would amount to 57 more cases of corruption found, on average. This would be a styl-
ized case where half of those who out-migrate remain registered in the municipality of
origin and half of those who arrive register for voting in the destination municipality.
Taken together these results indicate that changes in registration rates have a sig-
nificantly large and autonomous effect on corruption when compared with migration.
The next section tries to understand why voters would choose to remain voting in
their municipality of origin.
3.6 Mechanisms
3.6.1 Why out-migrants would remain voting in their place
of origin? A Downsian framework
Consider the traditional Downsian framework where citizens enjoy both instru-
mental and expressive benefits from voting. The instrumental utility consists of the
extra benefit Bi citizen i obtains if her preferred candidate wins. It can be seen as
the additional level of public goods the preferred candidate would provide because
she is more competent, for example. In contrast, the expressive utility of voting, Di,
is derived from the simple act of voting and is independent of the election outcome.
It is the satisfaction of voting itself; some authors have justified it in terms of civic
duty.
If citizen i has a perceived likelihood Pi of being pivotal, PiBi is the expected
level of extra public goods the preferred candidate would be able to provide. But
voting is costly. The citizen incurs a cost Ci when she votes regardless of who wins
the election. The citizen’s rational decision is then voting when:
PiBi +Di ≥ Ci (3.6)
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and abstaining otherwise. Therefore, depending on the levels of Bi and Di voters
may turn up to vote or not. Here, I use this framework to help understand migrants’
decision of which election to vote. The goal is to identify how the choice of elections
may be related to the voters’ types.
Assume Bi, Di and Ci are normally distributed, and Ci has mean zero and variance
one.12 With probability λ a voter believes she will be pivotal. Therefore, PiBi+Di =
Vi is also normally distributed with mean µ = E(Vi) = λE(Bi) + E(Di).
The framework I use henceforth is similar to the standard Borjas/Roy model of
selection in migration. Consider a voter who has moved from source municipality 0
to host municipality 1. The utility of voting in the source municipality is given by
v0 = µ0 + ε0 − c (3.7)
where ε0 ∼ N(0, σ20) and c is an extra cost that can be understood as costs of travel
and/or acquiring information about politics in the source municipality.
And in the host municipality,
v1 = µ1 + ε1 (3.8)
where ε1 ∼ N(0, σ21).
A citizen will choose to vote in the host municipality whenever
[µ1 − (µ0 − c)] + (ε1 − ε0) > 0 (3.9)
12If we define Bi = Bai −Bbi , where a and b are candidates, the voter switches to candidate b every
time Bi ≤ 0. To focus on voters’ types and their relationship with the choice of election, I assume
E(Ci) = 0. That is, citizens will always vote.
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Define ε = ε1 − ε0. The probability that a randomly chosen voter who migrate
choose to vote in the host municipality is equal to
p = Pr[ε > (µ0 − µ1 − c)] (3.10)
= Pr[ ε
σε
>
(µ0 − µ1 − c)
σε
] (3.11)
= 1− Φ(z) (3.12)
where z = (µ0−µ1−c)
σε
and Φ(.) the CDF of a standard normal. Note that z is increasing
on the mean benefits obtained in the source municipality and decreasing in the cost of
voting in the source municipality and mean benefits of voting in the host municipality;
the higher the z the lower the probability of voting in the host municipality. Because
we want to focus on selection, we assume average benefits from voting are the same
in both locations, that is, µ1 ≈ µ0.
The expected utility of voting in the source municipality of a voter who chooses
to vote in the host municipality is given by:
E(v0|v1 > v0) = µ0 + E(ε0| ε
σε
> z) (3.13)
Similarly, the expected utility of voting in the destination municipality of a voter
who chooses to vote in the host municipality is given by:
E(v1|v1 > v0) = µ0 + E(ε1| ε
σε
> z) (3.14)
Given the normality of the error term, it can be shown that:
E(v0|v1 > v0) = µ0 + σ0σ1
σε
(
ρ− σ0
σ1
)(
φ(z)
1− Φ(z)
)
(3.15)
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E(v1|v1 > v0) = µ1 + σ0σ1
σε
(
σ1
σ0
− ρ
)(
φ(z)
1− Φ(z)
)
(3.16)
where ρ = σ01/σ0σ1.
Expressive voting, if perceived as an act of civic duty, may well be very similar
across source and destination municipalities. While migrant voters do not benefit
directly from policies implemented in the source municipality, they may face a very
different perceived probability of being pivotal, depending on the relative number of
voters between the two municipalities. If the benefits a voter get from policies imple-
mented in the source municipality are non-zero, pivotality considerations could be a
factor weighting up the decision of where to vote. If we assume the average expressive
motivation for voting is the same across municipalities, the error terms in the utility
equations would be entirely driven by the interaction of pivotality considerations and
benefits from public policies.
Having said that, we can derive two relevant different types of voter selection from
equations 3.15 and 3.16.
(i) Positive sorting: σ1/σ0 > 1 and ρ > σ0/σ1.
The dispersion of benefits (σ1/σ0 > 1) is higher in the host municipality, which
means that those who choose to vote there are likely to have a high instrumental
motive to vote that is driven by the benefit derived from public policies. As-
suming λ1 < λ0, this is a case where the benefits from policy compensate the
loss in perceived pivotality. The second condition (ρ > σ0/σ1) means that the
correlation between motivations to vote between source and host municipality
are sufficiently high such that voters do not change their types across cities.
Voters who get higher instrumental benefits choose to vote in the host munici-
pality. This is the case where there is positive selection of voters into the host
municipality.
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(ii) Negative sorting: σ0/σ1 > 1 and ρ > σ1/σ0.
The dispersion of benefits (σ0/σ1 > 1) is higher in the source municipality, which
means that those who choose to vote there are likely to have a high instrumental
motive to vote. Assuming λ1 < λ0, this is a case where the benefits from
perceived pivotality more than compensate the loss in benefits from public goods
and the extra costs of voting. The second condition (ρ > σ0/σ1) means that the
correlation between voting motivations between source and host municipality are
sufficiently high such that voters do not change their types across cities. Voters
who get higher instrumental benefits choose to vote in the source municipality.
In this case, there is a negative selection of voters into the source municipality.
The assumption λ1 < λ0 comes from the fact that voters out-migrate more often
from small cities to large metropolitan areas. Therefore, the size of mayoral elections
between source and destination municipalities may change considerably. The benefit
of being more likely to be decisive in an election is only accounted for when there
exists at least a small positive benefit stemming from policies. Non-zero benefits from
policy in source municipalities could be generated by a natural attachment to home
places and/or by relatives that remain there. I test these propositions in the next
section.
The effect of election size on migrant voters’ choices
In this section, I test the prediction that migrant voters should choose to remain
voting in their municipality of origin more often when its election is relatively smaller
when compared to that of the host municipality.
To do this, I exploit the discontinuities in the definition of the maximum number of
council seats municipalities in Brazil are allowed to have. The Brazilian Constitution
uses 24 population brackets to determine the number of seats in each municipality.
They start at nine and discontinuously increase by two seats in each subsequent
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bracket. These thresholds are displayed in Table 3.8. For example, municipalities
with a population below 15,000 are allowed to have a maximum of nine councillors.
The largest municipalities, those with population above 8 million, are allowed to have
55 councillors.
The councils themselves decide the number of seats, in theory, based on the budget
available to cover wages. Obviously, ruling parties may have different incentives to
articulate in favor of more seats or not. It could be either easier or more difficult
to get support for their projects. Therefore, these discontinuities allow for a fuzzy
design.
The allocation of seats across parties follow the proportional rule: the total number
of valid votes in the previous election is divided by the number of seats available to get
the number of votes a party need to have gathered to fill a seat. This is the so called
electoral quotient. For example, in a municipality that had 6,000 valid votes in the
previous election and 9 seats available, the electoral quotient would be approximately
667 votes. If the total number of votes a party receives is equal to 1,334 it gets two
seats. The allocation of seats within the party goes to the candidates who obtained
most of the votes.
If the width of the thresholds grows faster than the additional number of seats,
assuming that the number of voters is proportional to the population, the number
of votes a party needs in order to get a seat actually increases in each threshold.
This is what happens with the constitutional thresholds, because the number of seats
increase in steps of two, but the widths increase following different rules. Therefore,
on average, a candidate will need more votes to be elected in a larger municipality.
The idea is that the more votes a candidate needs to be elected, the less likely
it is that a voter is decisive (pivotal) in electing that candidate. If a voter moves
from a small to a large municipality, which is normally the case, chances are that her
actual (and perceived) likelihood of being pivotal in the host municipality is smaller
150
(Hoffman, Morgan and Raymond, 2013). Moreover, smaller elections may provide a
better sense of community, where the social enforcement for voting is greater (Funk,
2010), even from a distance.
I use these discontinuities in the number of seats to compare registration rates
of municipalities that are close enough to the thresholds. The constitutional max-
imum number of seats is used as an instrument for the actual number of seats in
a municipality. If out-migrants systematically choose to vote in municipalities with
smaller elections, we should observe that municipalities with a higher number of seats
experience less variation in registration rates.
Formally, I estimate the following specification:
Ri = f(populationi) + βCi + It + Πs + it, i = 1, . . . , n. (3.17)
where the maximum number of councillors is used as an instrument for the actual
number of councillors, f(.) is a high-order polynomial of the municipality population,
It time fixed effects, and Πs state fixed effects. Error terms it are clustered at the
municipality level.
To implement the model, the 24 thresholds are pooled by merging the thresholds
together and normalizing population size as the distance from the closest threshold.
To keep a municipality in a unique threshold, each interval starts and ends at the
midpoints below and above each threshold.
In this framework, for the regression discontinuity design to be valid, we need to
assume that conditional regression functions of potential outcomes at the thresholds
are continuous, that is, there is no manipulative sorting at the thresholds and there
are no other policies implemented over those cutoffs. To my knowledge, there are
no other policies that use the same cutoffs. And since the thresholds are determined
by the constitution, the only way municipalities could have a higher number of seats
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would be by manipulating population estimates. These estimates are provided to the
electoral authority by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (Instituto
Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica, IBGE) and the thresholds were established in the
constitution of 1989. Unless local politicians were able to bribe IBGE to manipulate
population estimates, manipulation would be possible only in Census years by, for
example, bringing people in to inflate population counts. This would be, however,
very impractical, since IBGE’s interviewers visit households.
The continuity assumption also guarantees that the maximum number of seats
affects registration rates only through the number of seats the municipality actually
has. This is the exclusion restriction of the IV set up. Additionally to this assumption,
we also need that the number of seats in a municipality below a threshold is not
larger than it would have been had the municipality been allocated to above the
threshold. This is the monotonicity assumption. Figure 3.5 displays the jumps in the
observed number of seats compared to the constitutional maximum number of seats
in that population threshold (indicated by vertical red lines), which suggests that the
monotonicity condition is valid.
Table 3.17 estimates the first-stage and the reduced-form regressions. The table
reports the estimated coefficients of maximum number of councillors, in a regression
where the dependent variable corresponds to each column heading. The column
“Full-Sample” is obtained by estimating a single regression on the entire sample. The
column “Thresholds = 1000” does the same but considers only municipalities within
1000 inhabitants from a threshold in the first three thresholds. The functional form,
f(populationi), is defined either as a forth- (columns (3), (4), (7) and (8)), third-
(columns (2) and (6)) or second-order (columns (1) and (5)) polynomial. Columns
(4) and (8) also add municipalities characteristics. In all of these cases, the results
are very similar. I interpret the results of the most conservative specification.
152
Columns (1) and (3) report the estimated reduced-form coefficient for the full-
sample and the sample within 1000 inhabitants from the threshold, respectively. This
coefficient represents the effect of the maximum number of seats on registration rates.
Both of them are negative and significant. Columns (2) and (4) report the first-stage
estimates for the same two samples, namely the effect of the constitutional maximum
number of seats and the actual number of seats in a municipality. The coefficient is
positive and highly significant, that is, the higher the threshold of seats the higher
the actual number of seats. But the coefficient is smaller than one. This is probably
a reflection of the councils’ choice of number of seats in accordance with specific
interests. Measurement error originating in the population that we use to classify
municipalities could also lead to a downward bias. By the estimated coefficients in
column (3), when the constitutional maximum number of seats in a municipality
increases by two, there is a 0.028 percentage point reduction in registration rates.
Table 3.10 estimates the baseline IV regressions where the maximum allowed num-
ber of seats are used as instruments for the actual number of seats observed in a
municipality, considering many specifications and the two samples. In the most con-
servative specification, column (8), an increase of two units in the actual number of
seats translates into a 0.12 percentage point reduction in registration rates. In other
words, among municipalities where the number of registered voters is greater than
the number of resident voters, this ratio is lower for those that face larger elections.
This indicates that voters may indeed take into account the size of the election when
making a decision of whether to vote in their home municipality.
It is easy to imagine how the number of councillors would affect corruption itself
but not registration rates. For example, a larger number of councillors would im-
ply that a mayor would have to negotiate more votes to get her projects approved,
depending on the distribution of seats across parties. However, it is not clear how
number of seats would directly affect registration rates. One could think that the
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higher the number of seats, the more votes a council candidate would need to get
elected and municipalities of this type would be more prone to fraud in registration
rates. However, if that was the case, we would observe instead a positive effect of the
number of councillors on registration rates. Even if there is such effect, our results
show that the dominant effect is that at least some voters decide to remain voting in
their city of origin based on the size of the election.
3.6.2 Who migrates?
This section investigates the link between the type of selection in migration and
its implications to the characteristics of those voters who keep their electoral domicile
at their place of origin.
Table 3.11 compares the composition of groups of migrants and non-migrants
in terms of education levels, gender, age, the time spent in the host municipality
and wages. Column (1) displays the averages for migrants, Column (2) for non-
migrants and Column (3) tests the significance of the difference in means between
the two groups. The group of non-migrants presents systematically higher means in
all education levels except the group of those without formal education. Migrants
are younger, include more females and have higher wages. The average time they
declared to have lived in the host municipality was 3.7 years.
These statistics could be misleading if those who migrate do so seeking higher
levels of education. To address this issue, Table 3.12 considers the same groups and
characteristics, but the group of migrants include only those with migration spells of
less than three years. The idea is that a degree could not have been completed over
this time. For this group, the average spell of migration is 1.4 years. And the same
patterns in education levels, age, gender and wages are observed.
In terms of voter behavior, positive selection in migration means that less educated
voters remain in the city. If the migrant voters, those who keep their registration in
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the origin, are also positively selected, in any case, they would be less informed than
before and probably not interested in public goods. Therefore, the municipality looses
voters of higher quality both in the out-migration and vote transfer steps.
Even in the case where returning voters can imitate the behavior of relatives or
friends living in the source municipality, if we consider that the remaining voters are
on average less educated than migrant voters, an imitating behavior would gravitate
towards the average behavior of native voters, who are, in theory, worse voters. In
addition, even without an imitating behavior, lack of information would imply that
it is easier for locals to persuade returning voters in terms of a bad candidate.
To summarise, there is positive selection in those who migrate and, through many
mechanisms, the vote of a migrant voter is either not informed or close to that of
residents who have lower levels of education and lower wages. And this seems to
have implications to the quality of politicians elected and, therefore, the incidence of
corruption.
3.6.3 Why do politicians react to it by extracting more rents?
Candidates’ quality
This section analyses whether the increase in corruption caused by positive
changes in registration rates is due to the entry of candidates of lower quality. I first
measure quality in terms of education and occupational skills and then in terms of
the performance in attracting discretionary transfers. Table 3.13 depicts the results
of linear probability models where highly educated candidates are defined as those
with at least secondary education and as high-skilled those with an occupation in
a category classified by the International Labour Organization (ILO) as requiring
higher skills to be executed.
155
Column (5) shows that the higher the change in registration rates the lower the
probability that the municipality will have candidates ranked in the top three that
belong to the group of high-skilled occupations. When education is considered, the
2SLS results are not statistically significant but also display a negative coefficient.
The link between skill and corruption may be related to the influence registration
rates exert in the entry of candidates.
Columns (3) and (6) investigate whether a municipality is more likely to have
an incumbent candidate, given that the candidate is not term constrained, when
it displays higher variations in registration rates. Only 279 municipalities in our
sample meet this condition; therefore, we may not have enough power to identify an
incumbency effect when it is sufficiently small. The coefficient obtained is positive
and sizeable, though not statistically significant, indicating that mayors in a first
term are more likely to run for reelection in municipalities with higher changes in
registration rates. If anything, it is possible that the positive effects of positive changes
in registration rates on corruption are driven by migrant voters allowing corrupt
mayors to remain competitive when running for reelection.
While the audits investigate the application of earmarked resources, discretionary
transfers – transfers from federal and state governments that originate from spe-
cific agreements with the local government – are not investigated and their attrac-
tion depend entirely on the mayors capacity of setting up these agreements. Ta-
ble 3.14 contrasts the effects of variation in registration rates on discretionary and
non-discretionary transfers (earmarked resources allocated according to population
thresholds). Columns (1) and (2) results indicate that variations in registration rates
are associated with a reduction in resources but it is only statistically significant for
discretionary transfers. The instrumented versions of these models in Columns (3)
and (4), respectively, confirm the direction of these effects. A change of one per-
centage point in registration rates is associated with a reduction of approximately
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R$2,823 in discretionary resources, whereas for non-discretionary transfers the coef-
ficient remains negative but still not statistically significant.
Combined with the result that candidates running for election are more likely
to be of high skill in municipalities with lower changes in registration rates, this
result about performance might indicate that these municipalities have a better pool
of candidates and those elected perform better simply because they are of higher
quality. Or else voters’ motivations could foster accountability both when parties field
candidates and politicians manage public resources. Another possible interpretation
is that career concerned mayors could try to attract non-auditable resources in order
to safely extract rents from them instead. But this channel is less plausible when
we compare the total value of resources of the two types. Discretionary transfers are
normally of much lower magnitude and would not substitute for rents that can be
extracted from non-discretionary transfers; they could be used only as complements
when the politician is seeking to extract large rents.
All in all, independently of the specific mechanisms at work, these results show
that voter motivation do affect the types of politicians fielded and elected.
3.7 Robustness Checks
3.7.1 Fraud in the registration of voters
While there is evidence that some migrant voters prefer voting in their municipal-
ity of origin, the fraudulent registration of voters could also be a source of anomalous
variation in the voters to residents ratio. To investigate this possibility, I use data
of the recent re-registration program run by the electoral authority undertaken to
collect biometric data from the electorate.
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Because of its large cost, the program has slowly been rolled out initially to mu-
nicipalities that have been reported as having some type of irregularity. It started in
2008 with a pilot applied in three municipalities, and expanded in 2010 to include 60
more municipalities. In 2011-2012, 299 more municipalities were added. All together,
these municipalities span 24 out of the 26 Brazilian states.
When a re-registration is held in a municipality, both irregular voters and migrant
voters may be excluded from the electorate register if they fail to travel back to the
municipality and provide the documents needed for it. Therefore, such program
will reduce the number of registered voters both by detecting irregularities and by
excluding some of the non-resident voters.
First, I look at the list of municipalities where voters have been re-registered and
check whether any of them is also in the sample used here. If they are, we require that
the new number of registered voters still be superior to the number of residents for
all the municipalities that had registration rates above one before the re-registration
program. However, only one municipality is common to both samples. When this
municipality is excluded from the sample, the results found in previous sections do
not change. It is therefore reassuring that the majority of municipalities in the sample
were not at the top of the list of those suspected to have fraud in registration rates.
It is, however, informative to analyze how registration rates behaved before and
after the program was held. Transition data for municipalities that re-registered their
voters during the period considered here are displayed in Tables 3.15 and 3.16. We are
interested in evaluating what happened to municipalities who had a registration rate
above one before the re-registration. I analyse 2012 and 2010 data separately and use
2008 as the baseline year. In 2012, about 60 percent of the municipalities who were
above one in 2008 remained above one after re-registration despite some reduction
in registration rates. 88 percent that were below one remained unchanged and 12
percent made the transition to registration rates above one. For those municipalities
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who had a positive variation in registration rates in 2012, 32 percent of those below
one in 2008 transitioned to above one and 80 percent of those who were above one
continued in the same group. These data provide suggestive evidence that even
though there might exist some irregularities in the registration of voters, it is not
the only determinant of registration rates above one. It is worth mentioning that
with biometric data it becomes harder to register ghost voters, for example. So there
is no evidence that fraudulent registration has gone up in the year that follows the
re-registration program. Additionally, it is hard to believe that the most fraudulent
municipalities would have any bargaining power with the federal electoral authority
in delaying the program, specially because ‘disadvantaged’ parties competing in those
municipalities would be interested in the re-registration itself.
3.7.2 International migration
A recent literature in economics has linked return migration to transfer of political
norms (Batista and Vicente, 2011; Chauvet and Mercier, 2014) and openness to em-
igration to institutional development(Docquier et al., 2015). If emigration or return
migration are large enough to affect registration rates, it could also affect corruption
in indirect ways. To address this concern, I look at return migration rates expressed
in the Census 2010. This Census asked people whether they were living in another
country on July 2005; I use this question to quantify return migration.
Table 3.17 displays descriptive statistics of return migration rates reported in
the 2010 Census across municipalities. It also displays a list of municipalities with
the highest rates. A total of 0.1 percent of the population in the country and 0.2
percent, on average, across municipalities reported having lived in another country.
The highest return rates can be found in southern municipalities that had European
colonisation and/or are located in border areas. None of these municipalities are in
the sample used here because of the selection criterion of positive net out-migration.
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Brazil has historically been an immigration country, with large groups of Italians,
Germans and Portugueses being attracted to its southern region to work in the cul-
tivation of coffee during the nineteenth century. Migration from Brazil is a relatively
recent phenomenon and basically constituted by first or second generation of Euro-
pean descendants who manage to get an European citizenship based on genealogy.
Most of the remaining population faces visa constraints in both Europe and United
States. Therefore, return migration levels have been very low throughout the years.
Table 3.18 displays descriptive statistics of immigration rates for the ten years
period covered by the 2010 Census across municipalities. It also displays a list of
municipalities who had a rate of at least two percent over the period. Panel A displays
the data for the period 2001-2005. The average municipality has an emigration rate
of 0.01 percent, with a minimum of zero and a maximum of 6.3 percent. The list
of municipalities with the highest rates include predominantly border areas. For
example, Chui, the municipality with the highest rate, is located in the South of
the country and share border with Uruguay. The second municipality in the list,
Itaipulandia, also in the South, shares border with Paraguay and had European
colonization. In the period of 2006-2010, the average emigration rate goes up to 0.02
percent, again driven by Chui. The second placed municipality, Missal, is also in
the South, close to the border with Uruguay and colonized by the Germans. None
of these municipalities are included in the sample used in our main results. Thus,
neither migration nor return migration seem to be large enough in this period to
affect the results obtained here.
3.8 Conclusion
Voters weight differently the various benefits they get from voting. If politi-
cians/parties can identify voters’ motivations that are not attached to their perfor-
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mance in office they can take advantage of it in order to extract more rents without
being punished.
In this paper, I have taken advantage of a quasi-naturally generated group of
voters in Brazil that has the option of choosing in which election they would like to
vote. The Brazilian electoral legislation allows internal out-migrants to remain voting
in their municipality of origin at least until the municipality runs a re-registration
program of the electorate. I consider the ratio between the number of registered
voters in a municipality and its number of residents as an indicator of how many
out-migrants have kept their registration unchanged and are expected to vote in the
following election. This allows me to infer about considerations voters make in their
choice of election and, more importantly, how politicians after learning about voters’
types respond in terms of performance.
I find that voters make considerations about the size of the election, that is, the
probability of their vote being decisive in the election. As in Coate, Conlin and Moro
(2008), with a relative small number of eligible voters, the equilibrium probability of
being pivotal is large enough to motivate individuals with positive costs of voting and
offset possible reductions in benefits derived from public goods. When out-migrants
choose to vote in the source municipality, they reveal their types to politicians, via
registration rates. Candidates’ use of this information has then negative externalities
to the resident population. The main result of the paper is that there is a link between
corruption and voter motivation. On average, for each percentage point increase in
registration rates, 42 extra cases of corruption are verified.
I cannot rule out the fact that expressive voting – the consumption value of voting,
stemming from civic duty, ethics, or social pressure – also influence corruption in the
same context. The concepts embedded in these mechanisms are difficult to measure.
What this paper highlights is that candidates’ knowledge of voters’ types may have
negative externalities and that election size itself plays a large role in voters’ decisions.
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I use this institutional set-up just as a revelation mechanism of voters’ types to
politicians.
Small elections may have negative externalities for welfare when there is a group of
voters whose motivations detached from public goods are known to politicians. The
political economy literature has also found that when choosing a candidate voters
condition their decisions on the event of being pivotal, and because of it may even
vote for less preferred candidates in some cases. These are probably the same voters
who make strategic considerations when deciding across elections.
Even though we are in an era where social networks are used to identify voters’
types and target advertisement, as mentioned earlier, voters’ motivations are difficult
to measure and disentangle even at this level of disaggregation. For example, voters
may reveal on social networks their policy preferences, but not how they weight these
policies in the final vote decision. If they are strategic, knowing about their policy
positions is actually uninformative about whom they are voting for. The experiment
exploited here provides a quasi-separating mechanism to identify voters’ types.
Voters’ do not normally choose across elections, but this setting is representative
of an experiment where voters would only turnout to vote in an specific election if
they believed their vote could make a difference in the election outcome.
In addition to speaking to theories of political behavior, these results may also
have important policy implications. Programs that incentivize turnout, depending
on the heterogeneity of their effects across voters of different types, as long as they
are known to politicians, may either fortify or abate gains in the local provision of
public goods.
162
3.9 Appendix
3.9.1 Figures
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Figure 3.1: Average number of resident and registered voters over 16 years of age
across municipalities.
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Figure 3.2: Average number of resident and registered voters with 16-17 years of age
across municipalities.
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Figure 3.3: Average number of resident and registered voters over 18 years of age
across municipalities.
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Figure 3.4: Quantile distribution of registration rates in audited municipalities.
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3.9.2 Tables
Table 3.1: Characteristics of municipalities in the 10th and 90th percentiles of regis-
tration rates.
10th Perc. 90th Perc. Diff.
Value transfers audited (log) 14.61 15.72 −1.109***
(0.883) (1.177) (0.141)
Gini coefficient 0.557 0.567 −0.00989
(0.0827) (0.0721) (0.0105)
% adults with secondary school 8.794 14.68 −5.890***
(4.588) (8.460) (0.923)
% illiterates 32.17 21.75 10.41***
(12.44) (13.01) (1.721)
% civil servants 8.527 5.684 2.844***
(5.910) (3.372) (0.648)
Per capita income (log) 5.189 5.748 −0.559***
(0.470) (0.595) (0.0725)
% Rural 0.536 0.334 0.202***
(0.212) (0.260) (0.0321)
Population (log) 8.536 10.30 −1.766***
(0.708) (1.113) (0.126)
Observations 108 111 219
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Note: This table compares means of the characteristics of municipalities that have been audited
between 2006 and 2014. Columns 1 and 2 display means for municipalities in the 10th and 90th
percentiles of registration rates, respectively. Column 3 tests for differences in means between
the two groups. The unit of observation is a municipality-year. Municipalities characteristics are
extracted from the 2000 Census.
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Table 3.2: Characteristics of municipalities below and above median registration rates,
without bottom and top 10th percentiles.
Below Median Above Median Diff.
Value transfers audited (log) 14.85 15.01 −0.158
(1.422) (1.141) (0.0877)
Gini coefficient 0.552 0.547 0.00456
(0.0733) (0.0620) (0.00462)
% adults with secondary school 10.60 13.87 −3.265***
(5.380) (7.246) (0.435)
% illiterates 28.15 21.63 6.519***
(13.11) (13.25) (0.898)
% civil servants 7.220 6.173 1.047***
(4.567) (3.602) (0.280)
Per capita income (log) 5.405 5.721 −0.316***
(0.606) (0.569) (0.0400)
% Rural 0.461 0.391 0.0700***
(0.206) (0.243) (0.0153)
Population (log) 9.091 9.611 −0.520***
(0.953) (1.060) (0.0687)
Observations 428 434 862
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Note: This table compares means of the characteristics of municipalities that have been audited
between 2006 and 2014. Columns 1 and 2 display means for municipalities below and above the
median registration rates, respectively. Column 3 tests for differences in means between the two
groups. The unit of observation is a municipality-year. Municipalities characteristics are extracted
from the 2000 Census.
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Table 3.3: Characteristics of municipalities in the samples selected based on net out-
migration.
Out-Migration Sample General Sample Diff.
Value transfers audited (log) 14.98 14.97 −0.0102
(1.229) (1.172) (0.0727)
Gini coefficient 0.560 0.547 −0.0125**
(0.0618) (0.0699) (0.00408)
% adults with secondary school 10.77 13.16 2.385***
(5.265) (7.509) (0.410)
% illiterates 28.91 22.91 −6.000***
(12.73) (13.56) (0.807)
% civil servants 7.562 6.267 −1.295***
(4.393) (4.133) (0.258)
Per capita income (log) 5.369 5.669 0.300***
(0.520) (0.591) (0.0344)
% Rural 0.466 0.400 −0.0658***
(0.192) (0.251) (0.0140)
Population (log) 9.249 9.466 0.217***
(0.903) (1.148) (0.0646)
Observations 437 704 1141
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Note: This table compares means of the characteristics of municipalities that have been selected on
the basis of net out-migration and positive variation in registration rates (out-migration sample),
and the other remaining municipalities in the corruption sample, as described in Section 3.3.3.
Column 3 tests for differences in means between the two groups. The unit of observation is a
municipality-year. Municipalities characteristics are extracted from the 2000 Census.
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Table 3.4: Average effects of registration rates on corruption.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep.Var.: #CorruptionCases OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
∆Reg.Rates 40.820*** 35.750** 23.651** 23.726** 24.308**
[14.998] [14.381] [10.582] [10.481] [10.212]
Value transfers audited (log) – – – – 3.934*
[2.289]
Elections intercepts X X X X X
Draws intercepts X X X X
State intercepts X X X
Municipal characteristics X X
Observations 328 328 328 328 328
R2 0.049 0.131 0.579 0.597 0.604
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in brackets.
Note: This table reports the effects of registration rates on the number of corruption events. Mu-
nicipal characteristics include population (log), percentage of the population that is literate, per-
centage of the population with secondary education, percentage of the population that lives in the
rural sector, per capita income (log), Gini coefficient for income. The sample includes municipal-
ities with at least one positive variation in registration rate, with respect to a previous election,
and that was above the 25th percentile in net out-migration. State intercepts spam 23 states
and the sample includes 19 audit draws of municipalities between 2006-2014. Standard errors are
clustered at the municipality level. The unit of analysis is an election-year.
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Table 3.5: Registration rates changes and corruption cases.
Reduced Form First-Stage OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Vars. #CorruptionCases ∆Reg.Rates #CorruptionCases #CorruptionCases
Median ∆dReg.Rates −37.699* −0.887*** – –
[22.317] [0.228]
∆Reg.Rates – – 23.726** 42.489*
[10.481] [24.603]
Elections intercepts X X X X
Draws intercepts X X X X
State intercepts X X X X
Municipal characteristics X X X X
Observations 328 328 328 328
R2 0.591 0.460 0.597 0.592
F − Exc.Inst. 15.159
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in brackets.
Note: Columns: (1) Reduced form estimation where the dependent variable is the number of
corruption cases found in an audit. The independent variable of interest is the median value of
registration rates in all destinations of the municipality’s out-migrants; (2) First-stage estimation
where the dependent variable is the change in registration rates in a municipality. The independent
variable of interest is the median value of registration rates in all destinations of the municipality’s
out-migrants; (3) These are the same OLS estimates presented in Column (4) of Table 3.4; (4)
Two-Stage Least Squares, with Median ∆dReg.Rates used as an instrument for ∆Reg.Rates.
Municipal characteristics include population (log), percentage of the population that is literate,
percentage of the population with secondary education, percentage of the population that lives
in the rural sector, per capita income (log), Gini coefficient for income. The sample includes
municipalities with at least one positive variation in registration rate, with respect to a previous
election, and that was above the 25th percentile in net out-migration. State intercepts spam 23
states and the sample includes 19 audit draws of municipalities between 2006-2014. Standard
errors are clustered at the municipality level. The unit of analysis is an election-year.
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Table 3.6: Median destination registration rates and the number of corruption cases
- Placebo test.
Reduced Form
(1)
Dep. Vars. #CorruptionCases
Median ∆dReg.Rates 2.297
[32.140]
Elections intercepts X
Draws intercepts X
State intercepts X
Municipal characteristics X
Observations 521
R2 0.514
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in brackets.
Note: The table depicts a reduced form estimation where the dependent variable is the number of
corruption cases found in an audit. The independent variable of interest is the median value of
registration rates in all destinations of the municipality’s out-migrants. Municipal characteristics
include population (log), percentage of the population that is literate, percentage of the population
with secondary education, percentage of the population that lives in the rural sector, per capita
income (log), Gini coefficient for income. The sample includes municipalities with at least one
positive variation in registration rate, with respect to a previous election, and that was above the
25th percentile in net out-migration. State intercepts spam 23 states and the sample includes 19
audit draws of municipalities between 2006-2014. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality
level. The unit of analysis is an election-year.
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Table 3.7: The effects of migration on the number of corruption cases.
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Vars.: #CorruptionCases #CorruptionCases #CorruptionCases #CorruptionCases #CorruptionCases #CorruptionCases
∆Reg.Rates 23.135** 23.217** 23.025** 23.647** 41.798* 41.486*
[10.375] [10.374] [10.553] [10.484] [24.553] [24.544]
Out-Migration −0.005 – – – – –
[0.003]
In-Migration 0.008 – – – – –
[0.006]
Net Out-Migration – −0.005 – – – –
[0.003]
Past Out-Migration – – −5.081 – −4.737 –
[4.297] [4.002]
Past In-Migration – – 21.988 – 19.940 –
[18.137] [17.590]
Past Net Out-Migration – – – −2.183 – −2.134
[3.250] [2.996]
Elections intercepts X X X X X X
Draws intercepts X X X X X X
State intercepts X X X X X X
Municipal characteristics X X X X X X
Observations 328 328 328 328 328 328
R2 0.601 0.600 0.599 0.598 0.594 0.593
F − Exc.Inst. 15.031 15.166
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in brackets.
Note: Columns: (1) Estimates equation 3.1 specification by OLS adding in- and out-migration flows as controls; (2) Estimates equation 3.1 specification
by OLS adding net out-migration flows as controls; (3) Estimates equation 3.1 specification by OLS adding past in- and out-migration as controls
(see details on these measures in Section 3.2); (4) Estimates equation 3.1 specification by OLS adding past net out-migration as controls (see details
on these measures in Section 3.2); (5) 2SLS, with Median ∆dReg.Rates used as an instrument for ∆Reg.Rates, and past in- and out- migration
added as controls. (6) 2SLS, with Median ∆dReg.Rates used as an instrument for ∆Reg.Rates, and past out migration added as controls.
Municipal characteristics include population (log), percentage of the population that is literate, percentage of the population with secondary
education, percentage of the population that lives in the rural sector, per capita income (log), Gini coefficient for income. The sample includes
municipalities with at least one positive variation in registration rate, with respect to a previous election, and that was above the 25th percentile
in net out-migration. State intercepts spam 23 states and the sample includes 19 audit draws of municipalities between 2006-2014. Standard errors
are clustered at the municipality level. The unit of analysis is an election-year.
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Table 3.8: Council seats thresholds.
Threshold # of seats Population Interval
1 9 (0, 15]
2 11 (15, 30]
3 13 (30, 50]
4 15 (50, 80]
5 17 (80, 120]
6 19 (120, 160]
7 21 (160, 300]
8 23 (300, 450]
9 25 (450, 600]
10 27 (600, 750]
11 29 (750, 900]
12 31 (900, 1050]
13 33 (1050, 1200]
14 35 (1200, 1350]
15 37 (1350, 1500]
16 39 (1500, 1800]
17 41 (1800, 2400]
18 43 (2400, 3000]
19 45 (3000, 4000]
20 47 (4000, 5000]
21 49 (5000, 6000]
22 51 (6000, 7000]
23 53 (7000, 8000]
24 55 (8000, ∞)
Note: These are the thresholds that determine the maximum number of councillor seats a munici-
pality can have. They are defined by Article 29 of the Federal Constitution of Brazil. Population
is in thousands.
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Table 3.9: Registration rates and the number of council candidates.
Full-Sample Threshold =1000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Vars.: Registration Rates # Councillors Registration Rates # Councillors
Max. # Councillors −0.041*** 0.266*** −0.014** 0.220***
[0.002] [0.005] [0.006] [0.039]
2nd-order polynomial X X X X
3rd-order polynomial X X X X
4th-order polynomial X X X X
Municipal characteristics X X X X
Elections intercepts X X X X
Observations 13378 13632 532 540
R2 0.258 0.337 0.121 0.234
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in brackets.
Note: The dependent variable is registration rates. Columns (1)-(4) use the full sample of mu-
nicipalities from 2004 to 2012 to estimate different polynomial specifications; Columns (5)-(8)
use the sample of municipalities that are within a 1000 inhabitants from the threshold that the
determines the maximum number of councillors. Municipal characteristics include population
(log), percentage of the population that is literate, percentage of the population with secondary
education, percentage of the population that lives in the rural sector, per capita income (log),
Gini coefficient for income. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The unit of
analysis is an election-year.
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Table 3.10: Registration rates and the number of council candidates.
Full-Sample Threshold =1000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
# Councillors −0.159*** −0.153*** −0.147*** −0.153*** −0.075** −0.075** −0.075** −0.062**
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [0.029]
2nd-order polynomial X X X X X X X X
3rd-order polynomial X X X X X X
4th-order polynomial X X X X
Municipal characteristics X X
Elections intercepts X X X X X X X X
Observations 13378 13378 13378 13378 532 532 532 532
R2 . 0.015 0.029 0.132 0.021 0.023 0.023 0.089
F − Exc.Inst. 3010.666 2864.696 2800.565 2839.534 30.078 29.894 29.718 31.215
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in brackets.
Note: The dependent variable is registration rates. Columns (1)-(4) use the full sample of municipalities from 2004 to 2012 to estimate different
polynomial specifications; Columns (5)-(8) use the sample of municipalities that are within a 1000 inhabitants from the threshold that the determines
the maximum number of councillors. Municipal characteristics include population (log), percentage of the population that is literate, percentage
of the population with secondary education, percentage of the population that lives in the rural sector, per capita income (log), Gini coefficient for
income. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The unit of analysis is an election-year.
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Table 3.11: Migrants and non-migrants characteristics.
Movers NonMovers Diff. Means
(1) (2) (3)
Education Levels
None 0.469 0.546 0.0774***
(0.115) (0.139) (0.00241)
Primary 0.195 0.177 −0.0176***
(0.0502) (0.0441) (0.000894)
Secondary 0.265 0.204 −0.0608***
(0.0799) (0.0784) (0.00150)
Tertiary 0.0709 0.0441 −0.0268***
(0.0546) (0.0306) (0.000846)
Not known 0.00895 0.0286 0.0197***
(0.0108) (0.0295) (0.000595)
Female 0.512 0.474 −0.0384***
(0.0536) (0.0285) (0.000814)
Age 34.60 37.41 2.816***
(2.823) (4.423) (0.0702)
Time Municipality (yrs) 3.691 0 −3.691***
(0.572) (0) (0.00767)
Wage 1002.4 694.2 −308.2***
(469.6) (322.0) (7.626)
Wage (MW) 1.966 1.361 −0.604***
(0.921) (0.631) (0.0150)
Note: The table compares characteristics of migrants and non-migrants using data of the census
2010. The third column display the test for the difference in means between non-movers and
movers.
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Table 3.12: Migrants and non-migrants characteristics within three years of moving.
Movers NonMovers Diff. Means
(1) (2) (3)
Education Levels
None 0.467 0.546 0.0793***
(0.127) (0.139) (0.00252)
Primary 0.200 0.177 −0.0229***
(0.0676) (0.0441) (0.00108)
Secondary 0.266 0.204 −0.0618***
(0.0950) (0.0784) (0.00165)
Tertiary 0.0739 0.0441 −0.0298***
(0.0589) (0.0306) (0.000907)
Not known 0.0136 0.0286 0.0150***
(0.0191) (0.0295) (0.000734)
Female 0.503 0.474 −0.0286***
(0.0713) (0.0285) (0.00103)
Age 33.53 37.41 3.884***
(3.331) (4.423) (0.0741)
Time Municipality (yrs) 1.399 0 −1.399***
(0.235) (0) (0.00315)
Wage 974.4 694.2 −280.2***
(475.6) (322.0) (7.692)
Wage (MW) 1.911 1.361 −0.549***
(0.932) (0.631) (0.0151)
Note: The table compares characteristics of migrants and non-migrants using data of the census
2010. The sample considered here includes only migrants who had been living in the host city
for less than 3 years. The third column display the test for the difference in means between
non-movers and movers.
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Table 3.13: Registration rates and candidates’ quality.
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Vars.: Highly educated Highly skilled Incumbent Highly educated Highly skilled Incumbent
∆ Registration Rate −0.251** −0.250** 0.215 −0.244 −0.837** 0.199
[0.111] [0.116] [0.225] [0.335] [0.384] [0.643]
Elections intercepts X X X X X X
State intercepts X X X X X X
Municipal characteristics X X X X X X
Observations 648 648 279 648 648 279
R2 0.103 0.079 0.122 0.103 0.047 0.122
F − Exc.Inst. 13.337 13.337 15.813
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in brackets.
Note: Columns: (1) and (4) display OLS and 2SLS models, respectively, that estimate the probability of a municipality having a candidate that has at
least secondary education; (2) and (5) display OLS and 2SLS models, respectively, that estimate the probability of a municipality having a candidate
who occupation is in a category classified as a high skilled occupation as defined in 3.2; (3) and (6) display OLS and 2SLS models, respectively, that
estimate the probability of a municipality having an incumbent candidate, given that the candidate is not term constrained; (4) Estimates equation
3.1 specification by OLS adding past net out-migration as controls (see details on these measures in Section 3.2). Municipal characteristics include
population (log), percentage of the population that is literate, percentage of the population with secondary education, percentage of the population
that lives in the rural sector, per capita income (log), Gini coefficient for income. The sample includes municipalities with at least one positive
variation in registration rate, with respect to a previous election, and that was above the 25th percentile in net out-migration. State intercepts
spam 23 states. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The unit of analysis is an election-year.
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Table 3.14: Registration rates and the attraction of resources.
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Vars.: Transfers Discretionary Non-Discretionary Discretionary Non-Discretionary
∆ Registration Rate −742.309** −503.564 −2823.717*** −843.468
[363.892] [312.754] [1023.282] [620.640]
Elections intercepts X X X X
Draws intercepts X X X X
State intercepts X X X X
Municipal characteristics X X X X
Observations 317 317 316 316
R2 0.204 0.181 0.127 0.177
F − Exc.Inst. 15.371 15.371
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in brackets.
Note: Columns: (1) and (3) OLS and 2SLS models, respectively, of the changes in registration
rates on discretionary transfers using the high registration rates sample (see text for the definition
of discretionary transfers); (1) and (3) OLS and 2SLS models, respectively, of the changes in
registration rates on non-discretionary transfers using the high registration rates sample (see text
for the definition of non-discretionary transfers). Municipal characteristics include population
(log), percentage of the population that is literate, percentage of the population with secondary
education, percentage of the population that lives in the rural sector, per capita income (log),
Gini coefficient for income. The sample includes municipalities with at least one positive variation
in registration rate, with respect to a previous election, and that was above the 25th percentile
in net out-migration. State intercepts spam 23 states and the sample includes 19 audit draws of
municipalities between 2006-2014. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The
unit of analysis is an election-year.
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Table 3.15: Transitions to registration rates above and below one after re-registration
in 2012.
∆ Reg.Rate(2012)< 0 ∆ Reg.Rate(2012)>= 0
Reg.Rate(2012)<1 Reg.Rate(2012)>=1 Total Reg.Rate(2012)<1 Reg.Rate(2012)>=1 Total
Reg.Rate(2008)<1 87.88 12.12 100.00 68.75 31.25 100.00
Reg.Rate(2008)>=1 39.88 60.12 100.00 20.78 79.22 100.00
Total 47.57 52.43 100.00 29.03 70.97 100.00
Note: The table shows transitions to registration rates above and below one, between 2008 and
2012, for municipalities that re-registered their voters in 2012. The first (second) column shows
those who had a negative (non-negative) variation in registration rates after the re-registration
program.
Table 3.16: Transitions to registration rates above and below one after re-registration
in 2010.
∆ Reg.Rate(2010)< 0 ∆ Reg.Rate(2010)>= 0
Reg.Rate(2010)<1 Reg.Rate(2010)>=1 Total Reg.Rate(2010)<1 Reg.Rate(2010)>=1 Total
Reg.Rate(2008)<1 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Reg.Rate(2008)>=1 77.27 22.73 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00
Total 80.77 19.23 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00
Note: The table shows transitions to registration rates above and below one, between 2008 and
2010, for municipalities that re-registered their voters in 2010. The first (second) column shows
those who had a negative (non-negative) variation in registration rates after the re-registration
program.
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Table 3.17: Return migration rates.
Years 2006-2010
Rate
Brazil (Total) .0014
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Average Municipality .0024 .0043 .0001 .0943
Municipalities with the highest rates
Municipality Rate
Chui 0.0943
Itai 0.0590
Sete Quedas 0.0518
Pato Bragado 0.0384
Santa Helena 0.0375
Missal 0.0362
Diamante D’Oeste 0.0356
Fernandes Tourinho 0.0350
Guaira 0.0312
Mercedes 0.0311
Santa Terezinha de Itaipu 0.0310
Itaipulandia 0.0306
Mundo Novo 0.0301
Note: The table displays descriptive statistics of return migration rates reported in the 2010 Census
across municipalities and a list of municipalities with the highest rates.
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Table 3.18: Immigration Rates (2001-2010).
Panel A - Years 2001-2005
Rate
Brazil (Total) 0.0003
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Average Municipality 0.0001 0.0011 0 0.0626
Municipalities with the highest rates
Municipality Rate
Chui 0.0626
Itaipulandia 0.0180
Entre Rios do Oeste 0.0148
Tabatinga 0.0118
Santa Helena 0.0109
Mercedes 0.0101
Panel B - Years 2006-2010
Rate
Brazil (Total) 0.0005
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Average Municipality 0.0002 0.0018 0 0.1154
Municipalities with the highest rates
Municipality Rate
Chui 0.1154
Missal 0.0184
Tabatinga 0.0167
Santana do Livramento 0.0152
Pato Bragado 0.0135
Santa Helena 0.0130
Sao Miguel do Iguaçu 0.0120
Guaira 0.0118
Campo Alegre 0.0114
Mercedes 0.0113
Bonfim 0.0111
Ponta Pora 0.0104
Pauini 0.0102
Note: The table displays descriptive statistics of immigration rates reported in the 2010 Census
across municipalities and a list of municipalities with the highest rates.
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